2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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import 'dart:convert';
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import 'dart:typed_data';
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fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
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import 'package:clock/clock.dart';
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/base.dart';
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/deletion_notices.dart';
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/instance_api.dart';
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fix(auth): a capped wait, a long instance secret, writes of their own columns
Three of the second reading's lows:
- A member waits at most 5 seconds (maxClockSkew) for the register's
moment before making a session after a reset; a clock further behind
is refused at once (unavailable, logged), rather than holding the
request for as long as the clocks differ.
- instanceSecret, which lets a service set passwords and delete accounts
for anyone, stops the server when set shorter than 32 characters, as
the password keys do.
- A change of password, a reset keeping the keys and a new phrase each
write their own columns alone (writeNewPassword, columns: in
setRecoveryKeys), so one made from the row as it was before another
never undoes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:30:19 +02:00
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/people.dart' show maxClockSkew;
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/register_protocol.dart';
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import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/remote_register.dart';
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import 'package:serverpod/serverpod.dart';
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import 'package:serverpod_auth_idp_server/core.dart';
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import 'package:test/test.dart';
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import '../support/fixtures.dart';
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feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
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import '../support/password_device.dart';
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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import '../test_tools/serverpod_test_tools.dart';
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const _secret = 'a shared secret only the instance knows';
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final _learn = Uri.parse('http://learn.test:8082');
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/// The instance's register, in memory: what a member asks it, and what it
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/// answers.
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final class _Register implements AccountRegister {
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final accounts = <UuidValue>{};
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final addresses = <String, UuidValue>{};
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final gitHub = <String, UuidValue>{};
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final profiles = <UuidValue, Profile>{};
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final codes = <UuidValue, ({String address, String code})>{};
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/// The calls asked, by name, in their order.
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final asked = <String>[];
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final networks = <String>[];
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final deleted = <UuidValue>[];
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/// What [knownAccounts] was asked about, call by call.
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final askedAbout = <Set<UuidValue>>[];
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bool offered = true;
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feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
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/// Whether it offers password sign-in.
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bool passwordOffered = true;
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/// The accounts with a password, and those with an authenticator too.
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final passwords = <UuidValue>{};
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final authenticated = <UuidValue>{};
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fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
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/// The people a password was set for with a GitHub sign-in of the
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/// member's made just now.
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final freshGitHubSignIns = <UuidValue>{};
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feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
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/// What a password sign-in proves; null refuses it.
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PasswordProof? proof;
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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/// Thrown by every call while set: the register refusing, or down.
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Exception? failing;
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fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
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/// The hosts sign-ins were bound to, as members named them.
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final hosts = <String>[];
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2026-10-21 12:05:18 +02:00
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/// The accounts warned that a session was ended for its wrong proofs, and
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/// those whose warning was dismissed.
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final warned = <UuidValue>{};
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final dismissed = <UuidValue>{};
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/// Thrown by [noteSessionEndedForProofs] alone while set (as [failing]
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/// throws from everything): the register down as a member tells it.
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Exception? notingFails;
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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Future<T> _answer<T>(String call, T Function() answer) async {
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asked.add(call);
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if (failing case final error?) {
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throw error;
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}
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return answer();
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}
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/// [person] as an account with the address [address].
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void add(UuidValue person, {String? address}) {
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accounts.add(person);
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if (address != null) {
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addresses[address] = person;
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}
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}
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@override
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Future<Profile?> profileOf(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
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_answer('profileOf', () => profiles[person]);
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@override
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Future<Map<UuidValue, Profile>> profilesOf(
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Session session,
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Set<UuidValue> people,
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) => _answer(
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'profilesOf',
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() => {
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for (final person in people) person: ?profiles[person],
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},
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);
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@override
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Future<Profile?> profileByHandle(Session session, String handle) => _answer(
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'profileByHandle',
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() => profiles.values
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.where((profile) => profile.handle.toLowerCase() == handle)
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.firstOrNull,
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);
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@override
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Future<UuidValue?> personWithHandle(Session session, String handle) =>
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_answer(
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'personWithHandle',
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() => profiles.entries
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.where((entry) => entry.value.handle.toLowerCase() == handle)
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.firstOrNull
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?.key,
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);
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@override
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Future<Profile> saveProfile(
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Session session,
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UuidValue person, {
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required String handle,
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required String displayName,
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required String bio,
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required List<String> links,
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}) => _answer(
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'saveProfile',
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() => profiles[person] = Profile(
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handle: handle,
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address: '$handle@learn.test',
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displayName: displayName,
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bio: bio,
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links: links,
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pageUrl: 'https://learn.test/@$handle',
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handleFixed: false,
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),
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);
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@override
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Future<ProfileRefusal?> checkHandle(
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Session session,
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UuidValue person,
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String handle,
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) => _answer('checkHandle', () => null);
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@override
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Future<Profile> checkLinks(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
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_answer('checkLinks', () => profiles[person]!);
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@override
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Future<Profile> setAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person, ByteData png) =>
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_answer('setAvatar', () => profiles[person]!);
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@override
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Future<Profile> removeAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
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_answer('removeAvatar', () => profiles[person]!);
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@override
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Future<void> removeProfile(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
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_answer('removeProfile', () => profiles.remove(person));
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@override
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Future<void> fixHandle(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
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_answer('fixHandle', () {});
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@override
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Future<bool> emailSignInOffered(Session session) =>
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_answer('emailSignInOffered', () => offered);
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@override
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Future<UuidValue> sendSignInCode(
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Session session, {
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required String address,
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required String language,
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fix(auth): a code by mail serves only what it was asked for
Codes by mail were tied to nothing but their address (the re-review's
seventh finding): a hostile instance could answer that a setup never
finished, have the person type a code into it, relay it to start the real
instance's account reset, and 72 hours later relay a second to finish it
with its own password and keys; the mail said "to sign in" whatever the
code was for. A code is now asked for a purpose (signUp, finishSetup,
authenticatorReset, accountReset, deletion), only that purpose takes it (any
other is refused as no longer valid, leaving the code as it was), and its
mail says what it would do ("to reset your account on learn.halkyon.eu: a
new password and new keys, and what was encrypted with the old ones is
lost") and to type it only in the app on that instance, nowhere else. The
app asks for each code with the purpose of its step.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "email_code_request" ADD COLUMN "purpose" text; nullable,
so the requests of the last 15 minutes before it stay, taken by nothing
and forgotten within the hour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:21:37 +02:00
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required EmailCodePurpose purpose,
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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required String network,
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}) => _answer('sendSignInCode', () {
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networks.add(network);
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final request = const Uuid().v7obj();
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codes[request] = (address: address, code: 'K7QX-M2PD');
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return request;
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});
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@override
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Future<void> linkGitHub(
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Session session, {
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required UuidValue person,
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required String gitHubUserId,
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}) => _answer('linkGitHub', () {
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accounts.add(person);
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gitHub[gitHubUserId] = person;
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});
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@override
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Future<UuidValue?> accountWithGitHub(Session session, String gitHubUserId) =>
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_answer('accountWithGitHub', () => gitHub[gitHubUserId]);
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@override
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Future<SignInWays> signInWaysOf(Session session, UuidValue person) => _answer(
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'signInWaysOf',
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() => SignInWays(
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gitHub: gitHub.containsValue(person),
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email: addresses.containsValue(person),
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
password: passwords.contains(person),
|
|
|
|
|
authenticator: authenticated.contains(person),
|
2026-10-20 14:16:23 +02:00
|
|
|
passwordOnly:
|
|
|
|
|
passwords.contains(person) && authenticated.contains(person),
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-21 12:05:18 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> noteSessionEndedForProofs(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
) async {
|
|
|
|
|
// Not through [_answer]: a session's tenth wrong proof comes from the
|
|
|
|
|
// register refusing it, while [failing] refuses everything.
|
|
|
|
|
asked.add('noteSessionEndedForProofs');
|
|
|
|
|
if (notingFails case final error?) {
|
|
|
|
|
throw error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
warned.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> dismissSessionEndedWarning(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
|
|
|
|
|
_answer('dismissSessionEndedWarning', () {
|
|
|
|
|
dismissed.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<bool> passwordSignInOffered(Session session) =>
|
|
|
|
|
_answer('passwordSignInOffered', () => passwordOffered);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> setPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
required PasswordSetup setup,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue? request,
|
|
|
|
|
String? code,
|
fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
|
|
|
bool freshGitHubSignIn = false,
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer('setPassword', () {
|
|
|
|
|
add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
passwords.add(person);
|
fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
|
|
|
if (freshGitHubSignIn) {
|
|
|
|
|
freshGitHubSignIns.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordSignIn(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required String address,
|
|
|
|
|
required String network,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer('beginPasswordSignIn', () {
|
|
|
|
|
networks.add(network);
|
|
|
|
|
return PasswordChallenge(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
salt: ByteData(16),
|
|
|
|
|
costs: newPasswordCosts,
|
|
|
|
|
serverValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PasswordProof _proven() =>
|
|
|
|
|
proof ??
|
|
|
|
|
(throw PasswordRefusedException(
|
|
|
|
|
reason: PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
|
|
|
|
|
));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<PasswordProof> completePasswordSignIn(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
required ByteData clientValue,
|
|
|
|
|
required ByteData clientProof,
|
|
|
|
|
String? totpCode,
|
|
|
|
|
String? recoveryCode,
|
2026-10-20 14:41:16 +02:00
|
|
|
UuidValue? request,
|
|
|
|
|
String? code,
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
required String host,
|
fix(auth): codes wait after ten wrong in a row, and the owner is told
Whoever knew the password could guess codes at 10 an hour forever,
unnoticed, each guess checked against every authenticator (the second
reading's M4). Every code an account's second factor refuses after a
right password (sign-in, a phrase's reset, a change) or from a signed-in
device (removing an authenticator, new recovery codes, the code from one
confirmed before) now counts, per account, from every network; after
every tenth in a row no code is taken (codesWait, saying until when), an
hour, then twice as long each time, a day at the most (longestCodeWait,
second_factor_waits.dart): at a day, ten guesses a day still have about a
1 % chance a year against one authenticator, so the first wait mails the
owner that someone knows their password. The instance keeps no address,
so sign-in and the phrase's reset now send the address the device typed
(and its language), used only for that mail after its hash is checked
against the account's. A code accepted clears it all.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "second_factor_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures" bigint NOT NULL, "waits"
bigint NOT NULL, "waitUntil" timestamp, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT
NULL) with a unique index on "authUserId": a new table, nothing
touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:47:38 +02:00
|
|
|
String? address,
|
|
|
|
|
String? language,
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) {
|
|
|
|
|
hosts.add(host);
|
|
|
|
|
return _answer('completePasswordSignIn', _proven);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2026-10-20 14:41:16 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<UuidValue> signUpWithCode(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue request,
|
|
|
|
|
required String code,
|
|
|
|
|
required PasswordSetup setup,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer('signUpWithCode', () {
|
|
|
|
|
final account = const Uuid().v7obj();
|
|
|
|
|
add(account);
|
|
|
|
|
passwords.add(account);
|
|
|
|
|
return account;
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<AuthenticatorEnrolment> enrolAuthenticator(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
required String name,
|
|
|
|
|
required String label,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'enrolAuthenticator',
|
|
|
|
|
() => AuthenticatorEnrolment(
|
|
|
|
|
authenticator: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
uri: 'otpauth://totp/learn.test:$label',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<List<String>> confirmAuthenticator(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue authenticator,
|
|
|
|
|
required String code,
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
OwnerProof? proof,
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer('confirmAuthenticator', () {
|
|
|
|
|
authenticated.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
return const ['K7QX-M2PD'];
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<List<Authenticator>> authenticatorsOf(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
) => _answer('authenticatorsOf', () => const <Authenticator>[]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> removeAuthenticator(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue authenticator,
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
OwnerProof? proof,
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer('removeAuthenticator', () {});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<List<String>> newRecoveryCodes(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
required OwnerProof proof,
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer('newRecoveryCodes', () => const ['K7QX-M2PD']);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
required ByteData clientValue,
|
|
|
|
|
required ByteData clientProof,
|
|
|
|
|
required String address,
|
|
|
|
|
required String language,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue? request,
|
|
|
|
|
String? code,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue? keyChallenge,
|
|
|
|
|
ByteData? signature,
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
required String host,
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'resetAuthenticator',
|
|
|
|
|
() => ResetPending(takesEffectAt: DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 23)),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<KeyProofChallenge> beginKeyProof(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required String address,
|
|
|
|
|
required String network,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer('beginKeyProof', () {
|
|
|
|
|
networks.add(network);
|
|
|
|
|
return KeyProofChallenge(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
recoveryKeys: WrappedKeys(nonce: ByteData(24), cipherText: ByteData(112)),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
/// The moment a reset ended the account's sessions at the register.
|
|
|
|
|
DateTime endedBefore = DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 20, 12);
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> resetPasswordWithPhrase(
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
required ByteData signature,
|
|
|
|
|
required NewPassword password,
|
|
|
|
|
String? totpCode,
|
|
|
|
|
String? recoveryCode,
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
required String host,
|
fix(auth): codes wait after ten wrong in a row, and the owner is told
Whoever knew the password could guess codes at 10 an hour forever,
unnoticed, each guess checked against every authenticator (the second
reading's M4). Every code an account's second factor refuses after a
right password (sign-in, a phrase's reset, a change) or from a signed-in
device (removing an authenticator, new recovery codes, the code from one
confirmed before) now counts, per account, from every network; after
every tenth in a row no code is taken (codesWait, saying until when), an
hour, then twice as long each time, a day at the most (longestCodeWait,
second_factor_waits.dart): at a day, ten guesses a day still have about a
1 % chance a year against one authenticator, so the first wait mails the
owner that someone knows their password. The instance keeps no address,
so sign-in and the phrase's reset now send the address the device typed
(and its language), used only for that mail after its hash is checked
against the account's. A code accepted clears it all.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "second_factor_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures" bigint NOT NULL, "waits"
bigint NOT NULL, "waitUntil" timestamp, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT
NULL) with a unique index on "authUserId": a new table, nothing
touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:47:38 +02:00
|
|
|
String? address,
|
|
|
|
|
String? language,
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'resetPasswordWithPhrase',
|
|
|
|
|
() => (account: _proven().account, endedBefore: endedBefore),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<ResetPending> startAccountReset(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required String address,
|
|
|
|
|
required String language,
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue request,
|
|
|
|
|
required String code,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'startAccountReset',
|
|
|
|
|
() => ResetPending(takesEffectAt: DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 23)),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> completeAccountReset(
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required String address,
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue request,
|
|
|
|
|
required String code,
|
|
|
|
|
required PasswordSetup setup,
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'completeAccountReset',
|
|
|
|
|
() => (account: _proven().account, endedBefore: endedBefore),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// The sessions kept by the password changes asked, by person.
|
|
|
|
|
final changed = <UuidValue, UuidValue?>{};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordChange(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer(
|
|
|
|
|
'beginPasswordChange',
|
|
|
|
|
() => PasswordChallenge(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
salt: ByteData(16),
|
|
|
|
|
costs: newPasswordCosts,
|
|
|
|
|
serverValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> changePassword(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
required OwnerProof proof,
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
required NewPassword password,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue? keepSession,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer('changePassword', () {
|
|
|
|
|
changed[person] = keepSession;
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
changedWith.add(proof);
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> setRecoveryKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session, {
|
|
|
|
|
required UuidValue person,
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
required OwnerProof proof,
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
required WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
|
fix(auth)!: the recovery phrase is proved by a key of its own
A key proof was a signature by the account's signing key, which every
signed-in device keeps in its keyring: whoever could read one, with a
code from its authenticator, set a new password without the password or
the phrase (the second reading's H1). The phrase now proves itself with
an Ed25519 key derived from its bits alone (halkyon_keys'
recoveryProofKeysOf, KDF context hlkrprf1, a sibling of the recovery
key), whose public half every setup, new phrase and account reset sends
and the register keeps (account_password.recoveryProofKey); the device
derives the secret half only while the phrase is typed. An account
without one (none exist outside development) proves no phrase until it
sets a new one; decoys check against a decoy proof key alike.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "account_password" ADD COLUMN "recoveryProofKey" bytea;
nullable, so rows made before keep working and no data is touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:03:15 +02:00
|
|
|
required ByteData recoveryProofKey,
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
}) => _answer('setRecoveryKeys', () {});
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
@override
|
2026-10-20 21:59:42 +02:00
|
|
|
Future<void> deleteAccount(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session,
|
|
|
|
|
UuidValue person, {
|
|
|
|
|
DeletionProof? proof,
|
|
|
|
|
}) => _answer('deleteAccount', () {
|
|
|
|
|
deleted.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
deletedWith.add(proof);
|
|
|
|
|
accounts.remove(person);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// The proofs deletions came with, as the member bound them.
|
|
|
|
|
final deletedWith = <DeletionProof?>[];
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
final changedWith = <OwnerProof>[];
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@override
|
|
|
|
|
Future<Set<UuidValue>> knownAccounts(
|
|
|
|
|
Session session,
|
|
|
|
|
Set<UuidValue> people,
|
|
|
|
|
) => _answer('knownAccounts', () {
|
|
|
|
|
askedAbout.add(people);
|
|
|
|
|
return people.intersection(accounts);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void main() {
|
|
|
|
|
withServerpod(
|
|
|
|
|
'A member of an instance',
|
|
|
|
|
// Sessions issued and revoked, and deletions in transactions of their
|
|
|
|
|
// own: these tests delete what they make instead.
|
|
|
|
|
rollbackDatabase: RollbackDatabase.disabled,
|
|
|
|
|
(sessionBuilder, endpoints) {
|
|
|
|
|
late Session session;
|
|
|
|
|
late Serverpod pod;
|
|
|
|
|
late _Register register;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// Anonymous here, signed in on her phone.
|
|
|
|
|
late UuidValue anna;
|
|
|
|
|
late UuidValue annasPhone;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// An account of the register, identified here, signed in on his
|
|
|
|
|
/// laptop.
|
|
|
|
|
late UuidValue ben;
|
|
|
|
|
late UuidValue bensLaptop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/// Whose data the host deleted.
|
|
|
|
|
late List<UuidValue> hostDeleted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
setUp(() async {
|
|
|
|
|
hostDeleted = [];
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(
|
|
|
|
|
sessionBuilder,
|
|
|
|
|
accounts: MemberOfRegister(_learn),
|
|
|
|
|
deletePersonData: [
|
|
|
|
|
(session, person, transaction) async {
|
|
|
|
|
hostDeleted.add(person);
|
|
|
|
|
return null;
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
session = sessionBuilder.build();
|
|
|
|
|
pod = session.serverpod;
|
|
|
|
|
await _deleteAll(session);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, _secret);
|
|
|
|
|
register = _Register();
|
|
|
|
|
AccountRegister.use(pod, register);
|
|
|
|
|
anna = await newAnonymousPerson(session);
|
|
|
|
|
annasPhone = await signInNewDevice(session, anna);
|
|
|
|
|
ben = (await AuthServices.instance.authUsers.create(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
scopes: {identified},
|
|
|
|
|
)).id;
|
|
|
|
|
register.add(ben, address: 'ben@example.org');
|
|
|
|
|
bensLaptop = await signInNewDevice(session, ben, scopes: {identified});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
tearDown(() async {
|
|
|
|
|
AccountRegister.use(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
await _deleteAll(sessionBuilder.build());
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TestSessionBuilder asAnna() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
|
|
|
|
|
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
|
|
|
|
|
anna.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
|
authId: annasPhone.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
TestSessionBuilder asBen() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
|
|
|
|
|
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
|
|
|
|
|
ben.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
{identified},
|
|
|
|
|
authId: bensLaptop.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
TestSessionBuilder notSignedIn() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
|
|
|
|
|
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.unauthenticated(),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Future<Set<String>> scopesOf(UuidValue person) async =>
|
|
|
|
|
(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, person))!.scopeNames;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
group('signs in by asking the register', () {
|
|
|
|
|
test('which mails the code, its device network passed on', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.emailCode.sendCode(
|
|
|
|
|
asAnna(),
|
|
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'de',
|
fix(auth): a code by mail serves only what it was asked for
Codes by mail were tied to nothing but their address (the re-review's
seventh finding): a hostile instance could answer that a setup never
finished, have the person type a code into it, relay it to start the real
instance's account reset, and 72 hours later relay a second to finish it
with its own password and keys; the mail said "to sign in" whatever the
code was for. A code is now asked for a purpose (signUp, finishSetup,
authenticatorReset, accountReset, deletion), only that purpose takes it (any
other is refused as no longer valid, leaving the code as it was), and its
mail says what it would do ("to reset your account on learn.halkyon.eu: a
new password and new keys, and what was encrypted with the old ones is
lost") and to type it only in the app on that instance, nowhere else. The
app asks for each code with the purpose of its step.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "email_code_request" ADD COLUMN "purpose" text; nullable,
so the requests of the last 15 minutes before it stay, taken by nothing
and forgotten within the hour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:21:37 +02:00
|
|
|
purpose: EmailCodePurpose.signUp,
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, ['sendSignInCode']);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.codes.values.single.address, 'anna@example.org');
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.networks, hasLength(1));
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('and refuses as the register refuses', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = EmailSignInRefusedException(
|
|
|
|
|
reason: EmailSignInRefusal.tooManyCodes,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.emailCode.sendCode(
|
|
|
|
|
asAnna(),
|
|
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'de',
|
fix(auth): a code by mail serves only what it was asked for
Codes by mail were tied to nothing but their address (the re-review's
seventh finding): a hostile instance could answer that a setup never
finished, have the person type a code into it, relay it to start the real
instance's account reset, and 72 hours later relay a second to finish it
with its own password and keys; the mail said "to sign in" whatever the
code was for. A code is now asked for a purpose (signUp, finishSetup,
authenticatorReset, accountReset, deletion), only that purpose takes it (any
other is refused as no longer valid, leaving the code as it was), and its
mail says what it would do ("to reset your account on learn.halkyon.eu: a
new password and new keys, and what was encrypted with the old ones is
lost") and to type it only in the app on that instance, nowhere else. The
app asks for each code with the purpose of its step.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "email_code_request" ADD COLUMN "purpose" text; nullable,
so the requests of the last 15 minutes before it stay, taken by nothing
and forgotten within the hour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:21:37 +02:00
|
|
|
purpose: EmailCodePurpose.signUp,
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<EmailSignInRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(error) => error.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
EmailSignInRefusal.tooManyCodes,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('an account signing in again is the same person here', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await issueSession(session, ben, method: 'test');
|
|
|
|
|
await issueSession(session, ben, method: 'test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await AuthUser.db.count(session, where: (t) => t.id.equals(ben)),
|
|
|
|
|
1,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
3,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('an account the register proved is identified here even where '
|
|
|
|
|
'linking its way in was cut off', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final success = await issueSession(session, anna, method: 'test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(success.authUserId, anna);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await scopesOf(anna), contains(identified.name));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await ServerSideSession.db.findById(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
annasPhone,
|
|
|
|
|
))!.scopeNames,
|
|
|
|
|
contains(identified.name),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('email sign-in is offered as the register offers it', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).emailSignIn,
|
|
|
|
|
isTrue,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
register.offered = false;
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).emailSignIn,
|
|
|
|
|
isFalse,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('the basics still answer while the register is out of reach, '
|
|
|
|
|
'without email sign-in', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final basics = await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(basics.emailSignIn, isFalse);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(basics.app, testApp);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('the ways in are those the register knows', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.gitHub['1001'] = ben;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final ways = await endpoints.account.signInWays(asBen());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(ways.toJson(), SignInWays(gitHub: true, email: true).toJson());
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
group('passwords, by asking the register (ADR 0017)', () {
|
|
|
|
|
test('sign the account the register proved in here, made a person '
|
|
|
|
|
'here the first time, the device network passed on', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final carla = const Uuid().v7obj();
|
|
|
|
|
register.proof = PasswordProof(
|
|
|
|
|
account: carla,
|
|
|
|
|
serverProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
needsAuthenticator: false,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final challenge = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.begin(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
address: 'carla@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
final signedIn = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.complete(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: challenge.challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
fix(auth): every call with a code after the password takes the address
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'en',
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, [
|
|
|
|
|
'beginPasswordSignIn',
|
|
|
|
|
'completePasswordSignIn',
|
|
|
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.networks, hasLength(1));
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
// Bound to the host the device addressed: this member's.
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.hosts, [testHost]);
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
expect(signedIn.authUserId, carla);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await scopesOf(carla), {identified.name});
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await ServerSideSession.db.find(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(carla),
|
|
|
|
|
)).single.method,
|
|
|
|
|
passwordMethod,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(auth)!: the first authenticator takes the password, and a reset ends every session
The fourth reading's second finding: a stolen session outlived the reset
of the authenticators (carrying it out ended no session) and confirmed
the account's first authenticator on its own code alone, ahead of the
owner, so the owner's confirmation and sign-in were refused after.
- Carrying out a reset of the authenticators ends every session of the
account, on the register at once and on every member by notice, as the
other resets do; the sign-in that carries it out gets its session after
that moment (PasswordProof.sessionsEndedBefore, issueSessionAfter).
- Confirming the first authenticator takes the password's proof for a
change's challenge, without a code (proveOwnersPassword), counted per
session as the owner's proofs are: a session of a lost phone, or of a
setup never finished, claims no second factor.
The app sends the password with every confirmation: the sign-up's, a
reset's and the account section's (which asks for it), and a sign-in's
own unlock where the session is still held back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:43:22 +02:00
|
|
|
test('carrying out a reset of the authenticators, end the sessions '
|
|
|
|
|
'here made before the register ended them, the new one staying '
|
|
|
|
|
'(the fourth reading)', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final endedBefore = DateTime.now().toUtc();
|
|
|
|
|
register.proof = PasswordProof(
|
|
|
|
|
account: anna,
|
|
|
|
|
serverProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
needsAuthenticator: true,
|
|
|
|
|
sessionsEndedBefore: endedBefore,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final challenge = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.begin(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
final signedIn = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.complete(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: challenge.challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
|
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'en',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(signedIn.authUserId, anna);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, annasPhone),
|
|
|
|
|
isNull,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
final left = await ServerSideSession.db.find(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(anna),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(left, hasLength(1));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(left.single.createdAt.isBefore(endedBefore), isFalse);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-21 11:46:01 +02:00
|
|
|
test("count a proof whose answer the register couldn't give, as it "
|
|
|
|
|
'may have checked it (the fourth reading)', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.authenticator.newRecoveryCodes(
|
|
|
|
|
asAnna(),
|
|
|
|
|
proof: OwnerProof(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(isA<RegisterUnavailableException>()),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await SessionCodeFailures.db.findFirstRow(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.sessionId.equals(annasPhone),
|
|
|
|
|
))?.failures,
|
|
|
|
|
1,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-20 14:41:16 +02:00
|
|
|
test('sign up at the register, the new account signed in here, '
|
|
|
|
|
'identified', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final signedUp = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.signUp(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
|
|
|
|
|
setup: device.setup(),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, ['signUpWithCode']);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.passwords, {signedUp.authUserId});
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await scopesOf(signedUp.authUserId), {identified.name});
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await ServerSideSession.db.find(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(signedUp.authUserId),
|
|
|
|
|
)).single.method,
|
|
|
|
|
passwordMethod,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
test('refuse as the register refuses, signing nobody in', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final people = await AuthUser.db.count(session);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.passwordSignIn.complete(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
fix(auth): every call with a code after the password takes the address
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'en',
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(error) => error.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.count(session), people);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('set one at the register, the person becoming identified '
|
|
|
|
|
'here', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.password.set(
|
|
|
|
|
asAnna(),
|
|
|
|
|
setup: device.setup(),
|
|
|
|
|
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.passwords, {anna});
|
fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
|
|
|
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
expect(await scopesOf(anna), contains(identified.name));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await AnonymousAccount.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(anna),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(auth)!: a first password takes a fresh proof of the account's way in
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 11:31:22 +02:00
|
|
|
test(
|
|
|
|
|
'tell the register whether the session asking was made by a '
|
|
|
|
|
'GitHub sign-in of the last ten minutes (the fourth reading)',
|
|
|
|
|
() async {
|
|
|
|
|
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> setFrom(UuidValue device_) => endpoints.password.set(
|
|
|
|
|
sessionBuilder.copyWith(
|
|
|
|
|
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
|
|
|
|
|
anna.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
|
authId: device_.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
setup: device.setup(),
|
|
|
|
|
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
final old = await withClock(
|
|
|
|
|
Clock.fixed(DateTime.now().subtract(const Duration(minutes: 11))),
|
|
|
|
|
() => signInNewDevice(session, anna, method: gitHubMethod),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
await setFrom(old);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
await setFrom(annasPhone);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
await setFrom(
|
|
|
|
|
await signInNewDevice(session, anna, method: gitHubMethod),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, {anna});
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:
- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.
Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
|
|
|
test('are offered as the register offers them, and not while it is '
|
|
|
|
|
'out of reach', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
|
|
|
|
|
isTrue,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
register.passwordOffered = false;
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
|
|
|
|
|
isFalse,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
register
|
|
|
|
|
..passwordOffered = true
|
|
|
|
|
..failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
|
|
|
|
|
isFalse,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('keep GitHub from signing into an account that has one, as '
|
|
|
|
|
'the register knows it', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.gitHub['1001'] = ben;
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await gitHubAccountToSignIn(session, '1001'), ben);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
register
|
|
|
|
|
..passwords.add(ben)
|
|
|
|
|
..authenticated.add(ben);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
gitHubAccountToSignIn(session, '1001'),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<GitHubSignInRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(error) => error.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
GitHubSignInRefusal.usePassword,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
group('profiles', () {
|
|
|
|
|
test('are saved and found at the register', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final saved = await endpoints.profile.save(
|
|
|
|
|
asBen(),
|
|
|
|
|
'Ben',
|
|
|
|
|
'Ben',
|
|
|
|
|
'',
|
|
|
|
|
const [],
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.profiles[ben]!.toJson(), saved.toJson());
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await endpoints.profiles.byHandle(asAnna(), 'ben')).toJson(),
|
|
|
|
|
saved.toJson(),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await profileOf(session, ben))!.toJson(), saved.toJson());
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await PublicProfile.db.count(session), 0);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test("have their page at the register's address, where this "
|
|
|
|
|
"server's sends its visitors", () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.profile.save(asBen(), 'Ben', 'Ben', '', const []);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final page = await profilePage(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
'@ben',
|
|
|
|
|
host: 'todo.test',
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(page.status, 308);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(page.location, 'https://learn.test/@Ben');
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
group('deleting the account', () {
|
|
|
|
|
test('of an identified person deletes it at the register, which '
|
|
|
|
|
'tells every member, and here at once', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.account.delete(asBen());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.deleted, [ben]);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, [ben]);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-20 21:59:42 +02:00
|
|
|
test("passes the password's proof on to the register, bound to "
|
|
|
|
|
'the host the device addressed here', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.account.delete(
|
|
|
|
|
asBen(),
|
|
|
|
|
proof: DeletionProof(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
|
|
|
|
host: 'LOCALHOST',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.deleted, [ben]);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.deletedWith.single?.host, testHost);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.deletedWith.single?.totpCode, '123456');
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
test('of an anonymous person deletes it here alone', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.account.delete(asAnna());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, [anna]);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('is refused while the register is out of reach, deleting '
|
|
|
|
|
'nothing here', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.account.delete(asBen()),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(isA<RegisterUnavailableException>()),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
1,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
group('told by the register that an account is gone', () {
|
|
|
|
|
Future<InstanceAnswer> tell(
|
|
|
|
|
Object? account, {
|
|
|
|
|
String? authorization = 'Bearer $_secret',
|
|
|
|
|
}) => answerRegister(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
jsonEncode({'account': account}),
|
|
|
|
|
authorization: authorization,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('deletes that person here with their sessions, and nobody '
|
|
|
|
|
'else', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final answer = await tell(ben.uuid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(answer.status, 200);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, [ben]);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('confirms an account it never had', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(const Uuid().v7())).status, 200);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('refuses without the instance secret, or with a wrong one, '
|
|
|
|
|
'deleting nobody', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
for (final authorization in [
|
|
|
|
|
null,
|
|
|
|
|
'Bearer wrong',
|
|
|
|
|
'Basic $_secret',
|
|
|
|
|
]) {
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await tell(ben.uuid, authorization: authorization)).status,
|
|
|
|
|
401,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(ben.uuid)).status, 401);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('refuses what it cannot read', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
for (final account in [null, 7, 'not an id']) {
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(account)).status, 400, reason: '$account');
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await answerRegister(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
'not JSON',
|
|
|
|
|
authorization: 'Bearer $_secret',
|
|
|
|
|
)).status,
|
|
|
|
|
400,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('is answered by no register', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(ben.uuid)).status, 404);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
group('told by the register that sessions ended (ADR 0017)', () {
|
|
|
|
|
Future<InstanceAnswer> tell(
|
|
|
|
|
Map<String, Object?> body, {
|
|
|
|
|
String? authorization = 'Bearer $_secret',
|
|
|
|
|
}) => answerSessionsEnded(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
jsonEncode(body),
|
|
|
|
|
authorization: authorization,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Future<DateTime> createdAt(UuidValue id) async =>
|
|
|
|
|
(await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, id))!.createdAt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('ends those of the account made before the moment, but the one '
|
|
|
|
|
'kept and those made since, and nobody else', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final bensPhone = await signInNewDevice(session, ben);
|
|
|
|
|
final endedBefore = (await createdAt(
|
|
|
|
|
bensPhone,
|
|
|
|
|
)).add(const Duration(microseconds: 1));
|
|
|
|
|
await Future<void>.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 5));
|
|
|
|
|
final bensTablet = await signInNewDevice(session, ben);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final answer = await tell({
|
|
|
|
|
'account': ben.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
'endedBefore': endedBefore.toIso8601String(),
|
|
|
|
|
'keepSession': bensLaptop.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(answer.status, 200);
|
|
|
|
|
final left = {
|
|
|
|
|
for (final row in await ServerSideSession.db.find(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
))
|
|
|
|
|
row.id!,
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
expect(left, {bensLaptop, bensTablet});
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, annasPhone),
|
|
|
|
|
isNotNull,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('refuses without the secret and what it cannot read, and is '
|
|
|
|
|
'answered by no register, ending nothing', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final everything = {
|
|
|
|
|
'account': ben.uuid,
|
|
|
|
|
'endedBefore': DateTime.now().toUtc().toIso8601String(),
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(everything, authorization: null)).status, 401);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await tell(everything, authorization: 'Bearer wrong')).status,
|
|
|
|
|
401,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
(await tell({'account': ben.uuid, 'endedBefore': 'soon'})).status,
|
|
|
|
|
400,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell({'account': ben.uuid})).status, 400);
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder);
|
|
|
|
|
expect((await tell(everything)).status, 404);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, bensLaptop),
|
|
|
|
|
isNotNull,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
group('changing a password, by asking the register (ADR 0017)', () {
|
|
|
|
|
test('keeps the session asking: its ID goes to the register, which '
|
|
|
|
|
'tells every service', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final challenge = await endpoints.password.beginChange(asBen());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.password.change(
|
|
|
|
|
asBen(),
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
proof: OwnerProof(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: challenge.challenge,
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
host: 'LOCALHOST',
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
password: NewPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
salt: ByteData(16),
|
|
|
|
|
costs: newPasswordCosts,
|
|
|
|
|
verifier: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, ['beginPasswordChange', 'changePassword']);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.changed, {ben: bensLaptop});
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
// Bound to the host the device addressed here.
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.changedWith.single.host, testHost);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.changedWith.single.totpCode, '123456');
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test("counts its own session's wrong proofs, which the register "
|
|
|
|
|
'refuses: the tenth in a row ends the session here', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = PasswordRefusedException(
|
|
|
|
|
reason: PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
Future<List<String>> newCodes() =>
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.authenticator.newRecoveryCodes(
|
|
|
|
|
asBen(),
|
|
|
|
|
proof: OwnerProof(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '000000',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
for (var i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
newCodes(),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(refusal) => refusal.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2026-10-21 12:05:18 +02:00
|
|
|
expect(register.warned, isEmpty);
|
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked
The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end:
nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed
authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As
Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now
takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a
change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator
once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new
phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator
is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one
takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a
confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so
no success passes a proof unchecked.
A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared
only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They
never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever
knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it
(the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a
change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an
hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP
code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no
second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells
(secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing
there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong
proof.
The app follows in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
newCodes(),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(refusal) => refusal.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
PasswordRefusal.sessionEnded,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, bensLaptop),
|
|
|
|
|
isNull,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
2026-10-21 12:05:18 +02:00
|
|
|
// The owner's warning is the register's to keep.
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.warned, {ben});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('ends the session all the same when the register, down, '
|
|
|
|
|
"can't be told to warn its owner", () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register
|
|
|
|
|
..failing = PasswordRefusedException(
|
|
|
|
|
reason: PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
..notingFails = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
for (var i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.authenticator.newRecoveryCodes(
|
|
|
|
|
asBen(),
|
|
|
|
|
proof: OwnerProof(
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
clientValue: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
clientProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '000000',
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(refusal) => refusal.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
|
|
|
|
i < 9
|
|
|
|
|
? PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials
|
|
|
|
|
: PasswordRefusal.sessionEnded,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, bensLaptop),
|
|
|
|
|
isNull,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked.last, 'noteSessionEndedForProofs');
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.warned, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test("passes its person's dismissing of the warning to the register, "
|
|
|
|
|
"never another's", () async {
|
|
|
|
|
await endpoints.password.dismissSessionEndedWarning(asBen());
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.dismissed, {ben});
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.password.dismissSessionEndedWarning(
|
|
|
|
|
sessionBuilder.copyWith(
|
|
|
|
|
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.unauthenticated(),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(isA<ServerpodUnauthenticatedException>()),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.dismissed, {ben});
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('a reset ends the sessions here made before the register ended '
|
|
|
|
|
'them, the new one made after', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register
|
|
|
|
|
..proof = PasswordProof(
|
|
|
|
|
account: ben,
|
|
|
|
|
serverProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
needsAuthenticator: false,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
..endedBefore = DateTime.now().toUtc();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
final signedIn = await endpoints.accountRecovery.resetPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
signature: ByteData(64),
|
|
|
|
|
password: NewPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
salt: ByteData(16),
|
|
|
|
|
costs: newPasswordCosts,
|
|
|
|
|
verifier: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
fix(auth): every call with a code after the password takes the address
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'en',
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(signedIn.authUserId, ben);
|
|
|
|
|
final left = await ServerSideSession.db.find(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(left.single.id, isNot(bensLaptop));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
left.single.createdAt.isBefore(register.endedBefore),
|
|
|
|
|
isFalse,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
fix(auth): a capped wait, a long instance secret, writes of their own columns
Three of the second reading's lows:
- A member waits at most 5 seconds (maxClockSkew) for the register's
moment before making a session after a reset; a clock further behind
is refused at once (unavailable, logged), rather than holding the
request for as long as the clocks differ.
- instanceSecret, which lets a service set passwords and delete accounts
for anyone, stops the server when set shorter than 32 characters, as
the password keys do.
- A change of password, a reset keeping the keys and a new phrase each
write their own columns alone (writeNewPassword, columns: in
setRecoveryKeys), so one made from the row as it was before another
never undoes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:30:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test("waits a few seconds at most for the register's moment: a "
|
|
|
|
|
'clock further behind is refused at once, and signs nobody in, '
|
|
|
|
|
'rather than holding the request', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register
|
|
|
|
|
..proof = PasswordProof(
|
|
|
|
|
account: ben,
|
|
|
|
|
serverProof: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
needsAuthenticator: false,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
..endedBefore = DateTime.now().toUtc().add(
|
|
|
|
|
const Duration(minutes: 1),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
final watch = Stopwatch()..start();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
endpoints.accountRecovery.resetPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
notSignedIn(),
|
|
|
|
|
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
|
|
|
|
|
signature: ByteData(64),
|
|
|
|
|
password: NewPassword(
|
|
|
|
|
salt: ByteData(16),
|
|
|
|
|
costs: newPasswordCosts,
|
|
|
|
|
verifier: ByteData(384),
|
|
|
|
|
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
|
|
|
|
|
nonce: ByteData(24),
|
|
|
|
|
cipherText: ByteData(112),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
totpCode: '123456',
|
|
|
|
|
host: testHost,
|
fix(auth): every call with a code after the password takes the address
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 23:08:25 +02:00
|
|
|
address: 'anna@example.org',
|
|
|
|
|
language: 'en',
|
fix(auth): a capped wait, a long instance secret, writes of their own columns
Three of the second reading's lows:
- A member waits at most 5 seconds (maxClockSkew) for the register's
moment before making a session after a reset; a clock further behind
is refused at once (unavailable, logged), rather than holding the
request for as long as the clocks differ.
- instanceSecret, which lets a service set passwords and delete accounts
for anyone, stops the server when set shorter than 32 characters, as
the password keys do.
- A change of password, a reset keeping the keys and a new phrase each
write their own columns alone (writeNewPassword, columns: in
setRecoveryKeys), so one made from the row as it was before another
never undoes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:30:19 +02:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(
|
|
|
|
|
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(error) => error.reason,
|
|
|
|
|
'reason',
|
2026-10-20 23:32:49 +02:00
|
|
|
PasswordRefusal.passwordChanged,
|
fix(auth): a capped wait, a long instance secret, writes of their own columns
Three of the second reading's lows:
- A member waits at most 5 seconds (maxClockSkew) for the register's
moment before making a session after a reset; a clock further behind
is refused at once (unavailable, logged), rather than holding the
request for as long as the clocks differ.
- instanceSecret, which lets a service set passwords and delete accounts
for anyone, stops the server when set shorter than 32 characters, as
the password keys do.
- A change of password, a reset keeping the keys and a new phrase each
write their own columns alone (writeNewPassword, columns: in
setRecoveryKeys), so one made from the row as it was before another
never undoes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:30:19 +02:00
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(watch.elapsed, lessThan(maxClockSkew));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
group('pruning', () {
|
|
|
|
|
late UuidValue carla;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
setUp(() async {
|
|
|
|
|
carla = (await AuthServices.instance.authUsers.create(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
scopes: {identified},
|
|
|
|
|
)).id;
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('deletes the identified people the register no longer knows, '
|
|
|
|
|
'asking only about those', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
final forgotten = await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(
|
|
|
|
|
session,
|
|
|
|
|
batch: 1,
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(forgotten, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.askedAbout.expand((people) => people), {ben, carla});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('deletes nobody while the register knows none of those asked '
|
|
|
|
|
'about, as a register misnamed or emptied would say', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.accounts.clear();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session), 0);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('deletes nobody while the register is out of reach', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
await expectLater(
|
|
|
|
|
forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session),
|
|
|
|
|
throwsA(isA<RegisterUnavailableException>()),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('does nothing on the register', () async {
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session), 0);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test('does not start without the secret where it would need it, and '
|
|
|
|
|
'needs none alone', () {
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder, accounts: HoldsRegister(members: [_learn]));
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(auth): a capped wait, a long instance secret, writes of their own columns
Three of the second reading's lows:
- A member waits at most 5 seconds (maxClockSkew) for the register's
moment before making a session after a reset; a clock further behind
is refused at once (unavailable, logged), rather than holding the
request for as long as the clocks differ.
- instanceSecret, which lets a service set passwords and delete accounts
for anyone, stops the server when set shorter than 32 characters, as
the password keys do.
- A change of password, a reset keeping the keys and a new phrase each
write their own columns alone (writeNewPassword, columns: in
setRecoveryKeys), so one made from the row as it was before another
never undoes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:30:19 +02:00
|
|
|
test('does not start with a secret shorter than 32 characters, alone '
|
|
|
|
|
'or not: it gates every account of the instance', () {
|
|
|
|
|
for (final accounts in [
|
|
|
|
|
const HoldsRegister(),
|
|
|
|
|
HoldsRegister(members: [_learn]),
|
|
|
|
|
MemberOfRegister(_learn),
|
|
|
|
|
]) {
|
|
|
|
|
useBase(sessionBuilder, accounts: accounts);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, 'x' * 31);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, 'x' * 32);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
|
|
|
test('asks the register at its address with the secret, and asks '
|
|
|
|
|
'nothing without one', () {
|
|
|
|
|
AccountRegister.use(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
AccountRegister.of(pod),
|
|
|
|
|
isA<RemoteRegister>()
|
|
|
|
|
.having((remote) => remote.register, 'register', _learn)
|
|
|
|
|
.having((remote) => remote.secret, 'secret', _secret),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(() => AccountRegister.of(pod), throwsStateError);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
|
|
|
MemberNotifier.of(pod),
|
|
|
|
|
isA<HttpMemberNotifier>().having(
|
|
|
|
|
(notifier) => notifier.secret,
|
|
|
|
|
'secret',
|
|
|
|
|
isNull,
|
|
|
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Future<void> _deleteAll(Session session) async {
|
|
|
|
|
await AuthUser.db.deleteWhere(session, where: (t) => t.id.notEquals(null));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|