halkyon/packages/halkyon_base_server/test/integration/register/member_test.dart

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import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:typed_data';
import 'package:clock/clock.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/base.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/deletion_notices.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/instance_api.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/people.dart' show maxClockSkew;
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/register_protocol.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/remote_register.dart';
import 'package:serverpod/serverpod.dart';
import 'package:serverpod_auth_idp_server/core.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
import '../support/fixtures.dart';
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
import '../support/password_device.dart';
import '../test_tools/serverpod_test_tools.dart';
const _secret = 'a shared secret only the instance knows';
final _learn = Uri.parse('http://learn.test:8082');
/// The instance's register, in memory: what a member asks it, and what it
/// answers.
final class _Register implements AccountRegister {
final accounts = <UuidValue>{};
final addresses = <String, UuidValue>{};
final gitHub = <String, UuidValue>{};
final profiles = <UuidValue, Profile>{};
final codes = <UuidValue, ({String address, String code})>{};
/// The calls asked, by name, in their order.
final asked = <String>[];
final networks = <String>[];
final deleted = <UuidValue>[];
/// What [knownAccounts] was asked about, call by call.
final askedAbout = <Set<UuidValue>>[];
bool offered = true;
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
/// Whether it offers password sign-in.
bool passwordOffered = true;
/// The accounts with a password, and those with an authenticator too.
final passwords = <UuidValue>{};
final authenticated = <UuidValue>{};
/// The people a password was set for with a GitHub sign-in of the
/// member's made just now.
final freshGitHubSignIns = <UuidValue>{};
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
/// What a password sign-in proves; null refuses it.
PasswordProof? proof;
/// Thrown by every call while set: the register refusing, or down.
Exception? failing;
/// The hosts sign-ins were bound to, as members named them.
final hosts = <String>[];
Future<T> _answer<T>(String call, T Function() answer) async {
asked.add(call);
if (failing case final error?) {
throw error;
}
return answer();
}
/// [person] as an account with the address [address].
void add(UuidValue person, {String? address}) {
accounts.add(person);
if (address != null) {
addresses[address] = person;
}
}
@override
Future<Profile?> profileOf(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
_answer('profileOf', () => profiles[person]);
@override
Future<Map<UuidValue, Profile>> profilesOf(
Session session,
Set<UuidValue> people,
) => _answer(
'profilesOf',
() => {
for (final person in people) person: ?profiles[person],
},
);
@override
Future<Profile?> profileByHandle(Session session, String handle) => _answer(
'profileByHandle',
() => profiles.values
.where((profile) => profile.handle.toLowerCase() == handle)
.firstOrNull,
);
@override
Future<UuidValue?> personWithHandle(Session session, String handle) =>
_answer(
'personWithHandle',
() => profiles.entries
.where((entry) => entry.value.handle.toLowerCase() == handle)
.firstOrNull
?.key,
);
@override
Future<Profile> saveProfile(
Session session,
UuidValue person, {
required String handle,
required String displayName,
required String bio,
required List<String> links,
}) => _answer(
'saveProfile',
() => profiles[person] = Profile(
handle: handle,
address: '$handle@learn.test',
displayName: displayName,
bio: bio,
links: links,
pageUrl: 'https://learn.test/@$handle',
handleFixed: false,
),
);
@override
Future<ProfileRefusal?> checkHandle(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
String handle,
) => _answer('checkHandle', () => null);
@override
Future<Profile> checkLinks(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
_answer('checkLinks', () => profiles[person]!);
@override
Future<Profile> setAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person, ByteData png) =>
_answer('setAvatar', () => profiles[person]!);
@override
Future<Profile> removeAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
_answer('removeAvatar', () => profiles[person]!);
@override
Future<void> removeProfile(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
_answer('removeProfile', () => profiles.remove(person));
@override
Future<void> fixHandle(Session session, UuidValue person) =>
_answer('fixHandle', () {});
@override
Future<bool> emailSignInOffered(Session session) =>
_answer('emailSignInOffered', () => offered);
@override
Future<UuidValue> sendSignInCode(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String language,
required EmailCodePurpose purpose,
required String network,
}) => _answer('sendSignInCode', () {
networks.add(network);
final request = const Uuid().v7obj();
codes[request] = (address: address, code: 'K7QX-M2PD');
return request;
});
@override
Future<void> linkGitHub(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required String gitHubUserId,
}) => _answer('linkGitHub', () {
accounts.add(person);
gitHub[gitHubUserId] = person;
});
@override
Future<UuidValue?> accountWithGitHub(Session session, String gitHubUserId) =>
_answer('accountWithGitHub', () => gitHub[gitHubUserId]);
@override
Future<SignInWays> signInWaysOf(Session session, UuidValue person) => _answer(
'signInWaysOf',
() => SignInWays(
gitHub: gitHub.containsValue(person),
email: addresses.containsValue(person),
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
password: passwords.contains(person),
authenticator: authenticated.contains(person),
passwordOnly:
passwords.contains(person) && authenticated.contains(person),
),
);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<bool> passwordSignInOffered(Session session) =>
_answer('passwordSignInOffered', () => passwordOffered);
@override
Future<void> setPassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required PasswordSetup setup,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
bool freshGitHubSignIn = false,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
}) => _answer('setPassword', () {
add(person);
passwords.add(person);
if (freshGitHubSignIn) {
freshGitHubSignIns.add(person);
}
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
@override
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordSignIn(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String network,
}) => _answer('beginPasswordSignIn', () {
networks.add(network);
return PasswordChallenge(
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
salt: ByteData(16),
costs: newPasswordCosts,
serverValue: ByteData(384),
);
});
PasswordProof _proven() =>
proof ??
(throw PasswordRefusedException(
reason: PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
));
@override
Future<PasswordProof> completePasswordSignIn(
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData clientValue,
required ByteData clientProof,
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
required String host,
fix(auth): codes wait after ten wrong in a row, and the owner is told Whoever knew the password could guess codes at 10 an hour forever, unnoticed, each guess checked against every authenticator (the second reading's M4). Every code an account's second factor refuses after a right password (sign-in, a phrase's reset, a change) or from a signed-in device (removing an authenticator, new recovery codes, the code from one confirmed before) now counts, per account, from every network; after every tenth in a row no code is taken (codesWait, saying until when), an hour, then twice as long each time, a day at the most (longestCodeWait, second_factor_waits.dart): at a day, ten guesses a day still have about a 1 % chance a year against one authenticator, so the first wait mails the owner that someone knows their password. The instance keeps no address, so sign-in and the phrase's reset now send the address the device typed (and its language), used only for that mail after its hash is checked against the account's. A code accepted clears it all. Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema): CREATE TABLE "second_factor_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY, "authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures" bigint NOT NULL, "waits" bigint NOT NULL, "waitUntil" timestamp, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT NULL) with a unique index on "authUserId": a new table, nothing touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:47:38 +02:00
String? address,
String? language,
}) {
hosts.add(host);
return _answer('completePasswordSignIn', _proven);
}
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<UuidValue> signUpWithCode(
Session session, {
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
required PasswordSetup setup,
}) => _answer('signUpWithCode', () {
final account = const Uuid().v7obj();
add(account);
passwords.add(account);
return account;
});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<AuthenticatorEnrolment> enrolAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required String name,
required String label,
}) => _answer(
'enrolAuthenticator',
() => AuthenticatorEnrolment(
authenticator: const Uuid().v7obj(),
uri: 'otpauth://totp/learn.test:$label',
),
);
@override
Future<List<String>> confirmAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required UuidValue authenticator,
required String code,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
OwnerProof? proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
}) => _answer('confirmAuthenticator', () {
authenticated.add(person);
return const ['K7QX-M2PD'];
});
@override
Future<List<Authenticator>> authenticatorsOf(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
) => _answer('authenticatorsOf', () => const <Authenticator>[]);
@override
Future<void> removeAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required UuidValue authenticator,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
OwnerProof? proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
}) => _answer('removeAuthenticator', () {});
@override
Future<List<String>> newRecoveryCodes(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
}) => _answer('newRecoveryCodes', () => const ['K7QX-M2PD']);
@override
Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData clientValue,
required ByteData clientProof,
required String address,
required String language,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
UuidValue? keyChallenge,
ByteData? signature,
required String host,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
}) => _answer(
'resetAuthenticator',
() => ResetPending(takesEffectAt: DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 23)),
);
@override
Future<KeyProofChallenge> beginKeyProof(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String network,
}) => _answer('beginKeyProof', () {
networks.add(network);
return KeyProofChallenge(
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
nonce: ByteData(32),
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
recoveryKeys: WrappedKeys(nonce: ByteData(24), cipherText: ByteData(112)),
);
});
/// The moment a reset ended the account's sessions at the register.
DateTime endedBefore = DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 20, 12);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> resetPasswordWithPhrase(
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData signature,
required NewPassword password,
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
required String host,
fix(auth): codes wait after ten wrong in a row, and the owner is told Whoever knew the password could guess codes at 10 an hour forever, unnoticed, each guess checked against every authenticator (the second reading's M4). Every code an account's second factor refuses after a right password (sign-in, a phrase's reset, a change) or from a signed-in device (removing an authenticator, new recovery codes, the code from one confirmed before) now counts, per account, from every network; after every tenth in a row no code is taken (codesWait, saying until when), an hour, then twice as long each time, a day at the most (longestCodeWait, second_factor_waits.dart): at a day, ten guesses a day still have about a 1 % chance a year against one authenticator, so the first wait mails the owner that someone knows their password. The instance keeps no address, so sign-in and the phrase's reset now send the address the device typed (and its language), used only for that mail after its hash is checked against the account's. A code accepted clears it all. Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema): CREATE TABLE "second_factor_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY, "authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures" bigint NOT NULL, "waits" bigint NOT NULL, "waitUntil" timestamp, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT NULL) with a unique index on "authUserId": a new table, nothing touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:47:38 +02:00
String? address,
String? language,
}) => _answer(
'resetPasswordWithPhrase',
() => (account: _proven().account, endedBefore: endedBefore),
);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<ResetPending> startAccountReset(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String language,
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
}) => _answer(
'startAccountReset',
() => ResetPending(takesEffectAt: DateTime.utc(2026, 10, 23)),
);
@override
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> completeAccountReset(
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Session session, {
required String address,
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
required PasswordSetup setup,
}) => _answer(
'completeAccountReset',
() => (account: _proven().account, endedBefore: endedBefore),
);
/// The sessions kept by the password changes asked, by person.
final changed = <UuidValue, UuidValue?>{};
@override
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordChange(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
}) => _answer(
'beginPasswordChange',
() => PasswordChallenge(
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
salt: ByteData(16),
costs: newPasswordCosts,
serverValue: ByteData(384),
),
);
@override
Future<void> changePassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
required NewPassword password,
UuidValue? keepSession,
}) => _answer('changePassword', () {
changed[person] = keepSession;
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
changedWith.add(proof);
});
@override
Future<void> setRecoveryKeys(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
required WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
required ByteData recoveryProofKey,
}) => _answer('setRecoveryKeys', () {});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
@override
Future<void> deleteAccount(
Session session,
UuidValue person, {
DeletionProof? proof,
}) => _answer('deleteAccount', () {
deleted.add(person);
deletedWith.add(proof);
accounts.remove(person);
});
/// The proofs deletions came with, as the member bound them.
final deletedWith = <DeletionProof?>[];
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
final changedWith = <OwnerProof>[];
@override
Future<Set<UuidValue>> knownAccounts(
Session session,
Set<UuidValue> people,
) => _answer('knownAccounts', () {
askedAbout.add(people);
return people.intersection(accounts);
});
}
void main() {
withServerpod(
'A member of an instance',
// Sessions issued and revoked, and deletions in transactions of their
// own: these tests delete what they make instead.
rollbackDatabase: RollbackDatabase.disabled,
(sessionBuilder, endpoints) {
late Session session;
late Serverpod pod;
late _Register register;
/// Anonymous here, signed in on her phone.
late UuidValue anna;
late UuidValue annasPhone;
/// An account of the register, identified here, signed in on his
/// laptop.
late UuidValue ben;
late UuidValue bensLaptop;
/// Whose data the host deleted.
late List<UuidValue> hostDeleted;
setUp(() async {
hostDeleted = [];
useBase(
sessionBuilder,
accounts: MemberOfRegister(_learn),
deletePersonData: [
(session, person, transaction) async {
hostDeleted.add(person);
return null;
},
],
);
session = sessionBuilder.build();
pod = session.serverpod;
await _deleteAll(session);
useInstanceSecret(pod, _secret);
register = _Register();
AccountRegister.use(pod, register);
anna = await newAnonymousPerson(session);
annasPhone = await signInNewDevice(session, anna);
ben = (await AuthServices.instance.authUsers.create(
session,
scopes: {identified},
)).id;
register.add(ben, address: 'ben@example.org');
bensLaptop = await signInNewDevice(session, ben, scopes: {identified});
});
tearDown(() async {
AccountRegister.use(pod, null);
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
await _deleteAll(sessionBuilder.build());
});
TestSessionBuilder asAnna() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
anna.uuid,
{},
authId: annasPhone.uuid,
),
);
TestSessionBuilder asBen() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
ben.uuid,
{identified},
authId: bensLaptop.uuid,
),
);
TestSessionBuilder notSignedIn() => sessionBuilder.copyWith(
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.unauthenticated(),
);
Future<Set<String>> scopesOf(UuidValue person) async =>
(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, person))!.scopeNames;
group('signs in by asking the register', () {
test('which mails the code, its device network passed on', () async {
await endpoints.emailCode.sendCode(
asAnna(),
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'de',
purpose: EmailCodePurpose.signUp,
);
expect(register.asked, ['sendSignInCode']);
expect(register.codes.values.single.address, 'anna@example.org');
expect(register.networks, hasLength(1));
});
test('and refuses as the register refuses', () async {
register.failing = EmailSignInRefusedException(
reason: EmailSignInRefusal.tooManyCodes,
);
await expectLater(
endpoints.emailCode.sendCode(
asAnna(),
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'de',
purpose: EmailCodePurpose.signUp,
),
throwsA(
isA<EmailSignInRefusedException>().having(
(error) => error.reason,
'reason',
EmailSignInRefusal.tooManyCodes,
),
),
);
});
test('an account signing in again is the same person here', () async {
await issueSession(session, ben, method: 'test');
await issueSession(session, ben, method: 'test');
expect(
await AuthUser.db.count(session, where: (t) => t.id.equals(ben)),
1,
);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
),
3,
);
});
test('an account the register proved is identified here even where '
'linking its way in was cut off', () async {
final success = await issueSession(session, anna, method: 'test');
expect(success.authUserId, anna);
expect(await scopesOf(anna), contains(identified.name));
expect(
(await ServerSideSession.db.findById(
session,
annasPhone,
))!.scopeNames,
contains(identified.name),
);
});
test('email sign-in is offered as the register offers it', () async {
expect(
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).emailSignIn,
isTrue,
);
register.offered = false;
expect(
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).emailSignIn,
isFalse,
);
});
test('the basics still answer while the register is out of reach, '
'without email sign-in', () async {
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
final basics = await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn());
expect(basics.emailSignIn, isFalse);
expect(basics.app, testApp);
});
test('the ways in are those the register knows', () async {
register.gitHub['1001'] = ben;
final ways = await endpoints.account.signInWays(asBen());
expect(ways.toJson(), SignInWays(gitHub: true, email: true).toJson());
});
});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
group('passwords, by asking the register (ADR 0017)', () {
test('sign the account the register proved in here, made a person '
'here the first time, the device network passed on', () async {
final carla = const Uuid().v7obj();
register.proof = PasswordProof(
account: carla,
serverProof: ByteData(32),
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
needsAuthenticator: false,
);
final challenge = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.begin(
notSignedIn(),
address: 'carla@example.org',
);
final signedIn = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.complete(
notSignedIn(),
challenge: challenge.challenge,
clientValue: ByteData(384),
clientProof: ByteData(32),
totpCode: '123456',
host: testHost,
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'en',
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
);
expect(register.asked, [
'beginPasswordSignIn',
'completePasswordSignIn',
]);
expect(register.networks, hasLength(1));
// Bound to the host the device addressed: this member's.
expect(register.hosts, [testHost]);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
expect(signedIn.authUserId, carla);
expect(await scopesOf(carla), {identified.name});
expect(
(await ServerSideSession.db.find(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(carla),
)).single.method,
passwordMethod,
);
});
test('sign up at the register, the new account signed in here, '
'identified', () async {
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
final signedUp = await endpoints.passwordSignIn.signUp(
notSignedIn(),
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
setup: device.setup(),
);
expect(register.asked, ['signUpWithCode']);
expect(register.passwords, {signedUp.authUserId});
expect(await scopesOf(signedUp.authUserId), {identified.name});
expect(
(await ServerSideSession.db.find(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(signedUp.authUserId),
)).single.method,
passwordMethod,
);
});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
test('refuse as the register refuses, signing nobody in', () async {
final people = await AuthUser.db.count(session);
await expectLater(
endpoints.passwordSignIn.complete(
notSignedIn(),
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
clientValue: ByteData(384),
clientProof: ByteData(32),
host: testHost,
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'en',
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
),
throwsA(
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
(error) => error.reason,
'reason',
PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
),
),
);
expect(await AuthUser.db.count(session), people);
});
test('set one at the register, the person becoming identified '
'here', () async {
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
await endpoints.password.set(
asAnna(),
setup: device.setup(),
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
);
expect(register.passwords, {anna});
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
expect(await scopesOf(anna), contains(identified.name));
expect(
await AnonymousAccount.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(anna),
),
0,
);
});
test(
'tell the register whether the session asking was made by a '
'GitHub sign-in of the last ten minutes (the fourth reading)',
() async {
final device = await PasswordDevice.make();
Future<void> setFrom(UuidValue device_) => endpoints.password.set(
sessionBuilder.copyWith(
authentication: AuthenticationOverride.authenticationInfo(
anna.uuid,
{},
authId: device_.uuid,
),
),
setup: device.setup(),
request: const Uuid().v7obj(),
code: 'K7QX-M2PD',
);
final old = await withClock(
Clock.fixed(DateTime.now().subtract(const Duration(minutes: 11))),
() => signInNewDevice(session, anna, method: gitHubMethod),
);
await setFrom(old);
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
await setFrom(annasPhone);
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, isEmpty);
await setFrom(
await signInNewDevice(session, anna, method: gitHubMethod),
);
expect(register.freshGitHubSignIns, {anna});
},
);
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
test('are offered as the register offers them, and not while it is '
'out of reach', () async {
expect(
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
isTrue,
);
register.passwordOffered = false;
expect(
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
isFalse,
);
register
..passwordOffered = true
..failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
expect(
(await endpoints.instance.basics(notSignedIn())).passwordSignIn,
isFalse,
);
});
test('keep GitHub from signing into an account that has one, as '
'the register knows it', () async {
register.gitHub['1001'] = ben;
expect(await gitHubAccountToSignIn(session, '1001'), ben);
register
..passwords.add(ben)
..authenticated.add(ben);
await expectLater(
gitHubAccountToSignIn(session, '1001'),
throwsA(
isA<GitHubSignInRefusedException>().having(
(error) => error.reason,
'reason',
GitHubSignInRefusal.usePassword,
),
),
);
});
});
group('profiles', () {
test('are saved and found at the register', () async {
final saved = await endpoints.profile.save(
asBen(),
'Ben',
'Ben',
'',
const [],
);
expect(register.profiles[ben]!.toJson(), saved.toJson());
expect(
(await endpoints.profiles.byHandle(asAnna(), 'ben')).toJson(),
saved.toJson(),
);
expect((await profileOf(session, ben))!.toJson(), saved.toJson());
expect(await PublicProfile.db.count(session), 0);
});
test("have their page at the register's address, where this "
"server's sends its visitors", () async {
await endpoints.profile.save(asBen(), 'Ben', 'Ben', '', const []);
final page = await profilePage(
session,
'@ben',
host: 'todo.test',
);
expect(page.status, 308);
expect(page.location, 'https://learn.test/@Ben');
});
});
group('deleting the account', () {
test('of an identified person deletes it at the register, which '
'tells every member, and here at once', () async {
await endpoints.account.delete(asBen());
expect(register.deleted, [ben]);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNull);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
),
0,
);
expect(hostDeleted, [ben]);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
});
test("passes the password's proof on to the register, bound to "
'the host the device addressed here', () async {
await endpoints.account.delete(
asBen(),
proof: DeletionProof(
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
clientValue: ByteData(384),
clientProof: ByteData(32),
totpCode: '123456',
host: 'LOCALHOST',
),
);
expect(register.deleted, [ben]);
expect(register.deletedWith.single?.host, testHost);
expect(register.deletedWith.single?.totpCode, '123456');
});
test('of an anonymous person deletes it here alone', () async {
await endpoints.account.delete(asAnna());
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNull);
expect(hostDeleted, [anna]);
});
test('is refused while the register is out of reach, deleting '
'nothing here', () async {
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
await expectLater(
endpoints.account.delete(asBen()),
throwsA(isA<RegisterUnavailableException>()),
);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
),
1,
);
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
});
});
group('told by the register that an account is gone', () {
Future<InstanceAnswer> tell(
Object? account, {
String? authorization = 'Bearer $_secret',
}) => answerRegister(
session,
jsonEncode({'account': account}),
authorization: authorization,
);
test('deletes that person here with their sessions, and nobody '
'else', () async {
final answer = await tell(ben.uuid);
expect(answer.status, 200);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNull);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
),
0,
);
expect(hostDeleted, [ben]);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
});
test('confirms an account it never had', () async {
expect((await tell(const Uuid().v7())).status, 200);
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
});
test('refuses without the instance secret, or with a wrong one, '
'deleting nobody', () async {
for (final authorization in [
null,
'Bearer wrong',
'Basic $_secret',
]) {
expect(
(await tell(ben.uuid, authorization: authorization)).status,
401,
);
}
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
expect((await tell(ben.uuid)).status, 401);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
expect(hostDeleted, isEmpty);
});
test('refuses what it cannot read', () async {
for (final account in [null, 7, 'not an id']) {
expect((await tell(account)).status, 400, reason: '$account');
}
expect(
(await answerRegister(
session,
'not JSON',
authorization: 'Bearer $_secret',
)).status,
400,
);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
});
test('is answered by no register', () async {
useBase(sessionBuilder);
expect((await tell(ben.uuid)).status, 404);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
});
});
group('told by the register that sessions ended (ADR 0017)', () {
Future<InstanceAnswer> tell(
Map<String, Object?> body, {
String? authorization = 'Bearer $_secret',
}) => answerSessionsEnded(
session,
jsonEncode(body),
authorization: authorization,
);
Future<DateTime> createdAt(UuidValue id) async =>
(await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, id))!.createdAt;
test('ends those of the account made before the moment, but the one '
'kept and those made since, and nobody else', () async {
final bensPhone = await signInNewDevice(session, ben);
final endedBefore = (await createdAt(
bensPhone,
)).add(const Duration(microseconds: 1));
await Future<void>.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 5));
final bensTablet = await signInNewDevice(session, ben);
final answer = await tell({
'account': ben.uuid,
'endedBefore': endedBefore.toIso8601String(),
'keepSession': bensLaptop.uuid,
});
expect(answer.status, 200);
final left = {
for (final row in await ServerSideSession.db.find(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
))
row.id!,
};
expect(left, {bensLaptop, bensTablet});
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, annasPhone),
isNotNull,
);
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
});
test('refuses without the secret and what it cannot read, and is '
'answered by no register, ending nothing', () async {
final everything = {
'account': ben.uuid,
'endedBefore': DateTime.now().toUtc().toIso8601String(),
};
expect((await tell(everything, authorization: null)).status, 401);
expect(
(await tell(everything, authorization: 'Bearer wrong')).status,
401,
);
expect(
(await tell({'account': ben.uuid, 'endedBefore': 'soon'})).status,
400,
);
expect((await tell({'account': ben.uuid})).status, 400);
useBase(sessionBuilder);
expect((await tell(everything)).status, 404);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, bensLaptop),
isNotNull,
);
});
});
group('changing a password, by asking the register (ADR 0017)', () {
test('keeps the session asking: its ID goes to the register, which '
'tells every service', () async {
final challenge = await endpoints.password.beginChange(asBen());
await endpoints.password.change(
asBen(),
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
proof: OwnerProof(
challenge: challenge.challenge,
clientValue: ByteData(384),
clientProof: ByteData(32),
host: 'LOCALHOST',
totpCode: '123456',
),
password: NewPassword(
salt: ByteData(16),
costs: newPasswordCosts,
verifier: ByteData(384),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
),
);
expect(register.asked, ['beginPasswordChange', 'changePassword']);
expect(register.changed, {ben: bensLaptop});
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
// Bound to the host the device addressed here.
expect(register.changedWith.single.host, testHost);
expect(register.changedWith.single.totpCode, '123456');
});
test("counts its own session's wrong proofs, which the register "
'refuses: the tenth in a row ends the session here', () async {
register.failing = PasswordRefusedException(
reason: PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
);
Future<List<String>> newCodes() =>
endpoints.authenticator.newRecoveryCodes(
asBen(),
proof: OwnerProof(
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
clientValue: ByteData(384),
clientProof: ByteData(32),
host: testHost,
totpCode: '000000',
),
);
for (var i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
await expectLater(
newCodes(),
throwsA(
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
(refusal) => refusal.reason,
'reason',
PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials,
),
),
);
}
await expectLater(
newCodes(),
throwsA(
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
(refusal) => refusal.reason,
'reason',
PasswordRefusal.sessionEnded,
),
),
);
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.findById(session, bensLaptop),
isNull,
);
});
test('a reset ends the sessions here made before the register ended '
'them, the new one made after', () async {
register
..proof = PasswordProof(
account: ben,
serverProof: ByteData(32),
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
needsAuthenticator: false,
)
..endedBefore = DateTime.now().toUtc();
final signedIn = await endpoints.accountRecovery.resetPassword(
notSignedIn(),
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
signature: ByteData(64),
password: NewPassword(
salt: ByteData(16),
costs: newPasswordCosts,
verifier: ByteData(384),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
),
totpCode: '123456',
host: testHost,
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'en',
);
expect(signedIn.authUserId, ben);
final left = await ServerSideSession.db.find(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
);
expect(left.single.id, isNot(bensLaptop));
expect(
left.single.createdAt.isBefore(register.endedBefore),
isFalse,
);
});
test("waits a few seconds at most for the register's moment: a "
'clock further behind is refused at once, and signs nobody in, '
'rather than holding the request', () async {
register
..proof = PasswordProof(
account: ben,
serverProof: ByteData(32),
encryptionPublicKey: ByteData(32),
signingPublicKey: ByteData(32),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
needsAuthenticator: false,
)
..endedBefore = DateTime.now().toUtc().add(
const Duration(minutes: 1),
);
final watch = Stopwatch()..start();
await expectLater(
endpoints.accountRecovery.resetPassword(
notSignedIn(),
challenge: const Uuid().v7obj(),
signature: ByteData(64),
password: NewPassword(
salt: ByteData(16),
costs: newPasswordCosts,
verifier: ByteData(384),
passwordKeys: WrappedKeys(
nonce: ByteData(24),
cipherText: ByteData(112),
),
),
totpCode: '123456',
host: testHost,
address: 'anna@example.org',
language: 'en',
),
throwsA(
isA<PasswordRefusedException>().having(
(error) => error.reason,
'reason',
PasswordRefusal.passwordChanged,
),
),
);
expect(watch.elapsed, lessThan(maxClockSkew));
expect(
await ServerSideSession.db.count(
session,
where: (t) => t.authUserId.equals(ben),
),
0,
);
});
});
group('pruning', () {
late UuidValue carla;
setUp(() async {
carla = (await AuthServices.instance.authUsers.create(
session,
scopes: {identified},
)).id;
});
test('deletes the identified people the register no longer knows, '
'asking only about those', () async {
final forgotten = await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(
session,
batch: 1,
);
expect(forgotten, 1);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNull);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, anna), isNotNull);
expect(register.askedAbout.expand((people) => people), {ben, carla});
});
test('deletes nobody while the register knows none of those asked '
'about, as a register misnamed or emptied would say', () async {
register.accounts.clear();
expect(await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session), 0);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
});
test('deletes nobody while the register is out of reach', () async {
register.failing = RegisterUnavailableException('test');
await expectLater(
forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session),
throwsA(isA<RegisterUnavailableException>()),
);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, ben), isNotNull);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
});
test('does nothing on the register', () async {
useBase(sessionBuilder);
expect(await forgetPeopleTheRegisterForgot(session), 0);
expect(register.asked, isEmpty);
expect(await AuthUser.db.findById(session, carla), isNotNull);
});
});
test('does not start without the secret where it would need it, and '
'needs none alone', () {
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
useBase(sessionBuilder, accounts: HoldsRegister(members: [_learn]));
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
useBase(sessionBuilder);
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
});
test('does not start with a secret shorter than 32 characters, alone '
'or not: it gates every account of the instance', () {
for (final accounts in [
const HoldsRegister(),
HoldsRegister(members: [_learn]),
MemberOfRegister(_learn),
]) {
useBase(sessionBuilder, accounts: accounts);
useInstanceSecret(pod, 'x' * 31);
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), throwsStateError);
useInstanceSecret(pod, 'x' * 32);
expect(() => checkInstanceSecret(pod), returnsNormally);
}
});
test('asks the register at its address with the secret, and asks '
'nothing without one', () {
AccountRegister.use(pod, null);
expect(
AccountRegister.of(pod),
isA<RemoteRegister>()
.having((remote) => remote.register, 'register', _learn)
.having((remote) => remote.secret, 'secret', _secret),
);
useInstanceSecret(pod, null);
expect(() => AccountRegister.of(pod), throwsStateError);
expect(
MemberNotifier.of(pod),
isA<HttpMemberNotifier>().having(
(notifier) => notifier.secret,
'secret',
isNull,
),
);
});
},
);
}
Future<void> _deleteAll(Session session) async {
await AuthUser.db.deleteWhere(session, where: (t) => t.id.notEquals(null));
}