halkyon/apps/todo/halkyon_todo_server/migrations/20261020185752014-recovery-proof-key/definition_project.json
Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 aea0c447fc
fix(auth)!: the recovery phrase is proved by a key of its own
A key proof was a signature by the account's signing key, which every
signed-in device keeps in its keyring: whoever could read one, with a
code from its authenticator, set a new password without the password or
the phrase (the second reading's H1). The phrase now proves itself with
an Ed25519 key derived from its bits alone (halkyon_keys'
recoveryProofKeysOf, KDF context hlkrprf1, a sibling of the recovery
key), whose public half every setup, new phrase and account reset sends
and the register keeps (account_password.recoveryProofKey); the device
derives the secret half only while the phrase is typed. An account
without one (none exist outside development) proves no phrase until it
sets a new one; decoys check against a decoy proof key alike.

Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "account_password" ADD COLUMN "recoveryProofKey" bytea;
nullable, so rows made before keep working and no data is touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 14:12:43 +02:00

29 lines
No EOL
780 B
JSON

{
"__className__": "serverpod.DatabaseDefinition",
"schemaVersion": 2,
"moduleName": "halkyon_todo",
"tables": [],
"installedModules": [
{
"__className__": "serverpod.DatabaseMigrationVersion",
"module": "halkyon_base",
"version": "20261020185619505-recovery-proof-key"
},
{
"__className__": "serverpod.DatabaseMigrationVersion",
"module": "serverpod",
"version": "20260824182259319"
},
{
"__className__": "serverpod.DatabaseMigrationVersion",
"module": "serverpod_auth_idp",
"version": "20260924105404509"
},
{
"__className__": "serverpod.DatabaseMigrationVersion",
"module": "serverpod_auth_core",
"version": "20260924105232991"
}
],
"migrationApiVersion": 1
}