Tizian 「ティツィアーン」
bc499713b8
ADR 0017's step 1. Generic over group and hash (SrpGroup); production takes RFC 5054's 3072-bit group with SHA-256. k = H(N | PAD(g)), u = H(PAD(A) | PAD(B)), K = H(PAD(S)), M1 = H(H(N) xor H(g) | H(I) | s | PAD(A) | PAD(B) | K), M2 = H(PAD(A) | M1 | K). A and B must lie in 1..N-1 and u must not be 0; a and b are 256 bits from Random.secure(); proofs are compared in constant time. x comes from the caller (halkyon_keys makes it); RFC 5054's own x is there for the vectors only. - The register's half in halkyon_base_server (base.dart: srpChallenge, srpVerify), the device's written by hand in halkyon_base_client (srp.dart: SrpClient, srpVerifier). Serverpod's generator cleans and writes only a client's lib/src/protocol/ (serverpod_cli 4.0.4's _getDirectoriesRequiringCleaning; a generate leaves srp/ untouched). - Tests: RFC 5054 Appendix B on both halves; the client against the register, succeeding and every refusal. - The module's tests depend on its client, and pub resolves every member's dev dependencies, so Learn's server image takes the module's client into its workspace too. - The format check covers the hand-written half. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
16 lines
540 B
Dart
16 lines
540 B
Dart
/// SRP-6a's client side (ADR 0017): the device proves it knows the password
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/// without sending it, and checks that the register holds the verifier made
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/// at sign-up. Hand-written beside the generated client: Serverpod's
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/// generator only ever writes and cleans `lib/src/protocol/`.
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library;
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export 'src/srp/srp_client.dart'
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show
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SrpClient,
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SrpClientProof,
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SrpClientRefusal,
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SrpClientRefused,
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SrpClientStep,
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rfc5054PrivateValue,
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srpVerifier;
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export 'src/srp/srp_group.dart';
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