A password sign-in whose account carries the warning (a session ended
for ten wrong proofs in a row) shows it before the sign-in is put in
place: when, what it means, and to change the password if it wasn't
the owner. Dismiss clears it on the instance through the held-back
session; Remind me later signs in and keeps it. The account section
shows it above the change of password, with Dismiss, while it stands.
Nothing identifies the session or its device.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The app's side of the owner's proof (OwnerProof, the third reading): adding
an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one and new
recovery codes now ask for the current password beside the code, as
changing the password, a new phrase and deleting already did; one
challenge and one answer per sheet (OwnerAnswer). A wrong password or code
reads as the one refusal the instance gives.
Deleting chooses a code by mail from what the instance says
(secondFactorWorks), no longer from whether an authenticator was ever
confirmed: with the authenticators' reset taken effect but not carried
out, the app offered a code field the instance refused (the fourth
finding). Signed-in calls take no address any more, so a device that
doesn't know it changes the password as any other; deleting by mail asks
for the address only where the device doesn't know it, as the code goes
there (the fifth finding).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
When a member's clock ran more than its allowance behind the register's,
the session after a reset was refused as unavailable (the re-review's tenth
finding), after the register had already reset the account and ended every
session, and the app read it as "this instance has no password sign-in".
It now has a refusal of its own (passwordChanged): the app says the password
was changed and to sign in again with the new one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Wrong codes for removing an authenticator, new recovery codes or confirming
one counted toward the account's waits (the re-review's third finding): a
stolen session alone, without the password, could keep the owner's codes
waiting for up to a day at a time, renewed without end, holding them out
of signing in and of changing the password, the way to end that session,
and nobody was mailed. Those codes now count per session, where the session
is (the register's own, or a member's, which forwards the code): each try
counted before its code is checked (one statement, so tries sent at once
count each), a code accepted clearing the count, and the tenth wrong in a
row ending the session (sessionEnded; the device says it was signed out).
A try that checked no code (a refusal of something else) is taken back.
The account's waits now count only codes after a right password, and the
per-account ten tries an hour, which a session could fill as well, go.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "session_code_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"sessionId" uuid NOT NULL, "authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures"
bigint NOT NULL, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT NULL) with a unique index on
"sessionId": a new table, nothing touched. Its rows go with a code
accepted, with the person, and hourly once their session is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The register can't check a password it never sees, and should its
database leak, the verifier and the keys wrapped under the password fall
to guessing at Argon2id's cost (the second reading's M8). Devices now
refuse a new password shorter than 12 characters, counted as code points
once normalised (halkyon_keys' checkNewPassword), at sign-up, a reset
keeping the keys and a change alike, before anything is derived; the new
password's field says so, and the refusal has its own text (en, de).
Signing in takes any length, so a password set before keeps working.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An impostor instance refused; a lost authenticator's reset by the
recovery phrase; the password alone signing in once a reset took
effect, an authenticator set up first; starting an account's reset
without the phrase, and finishing one with new keys and a new phrase;
in the account section, removing an authenticator (a code, never the
last), new recovery codes, and a change of password refused for a wrong
current one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
password.setRecoveryKeys took a session and a TOTP code alone, so a phone
signed in with its authenticator beside it could set a phrase of its
holder's own and, through the phrase's reset, a new password, never
knowing the old one. It now takes the old password's SRP proof (from
beginChange, the caller's own) and a TOTP or recovery code, as changing
the password does: one owner proof for both (_proveOwner), forwarded by
members, asked for in the account section's New recovery phrase.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017, step 3: widget tests driving the sheets as a person would,
on halkyon_app's fakes: signing in with a code (a wrong one refused
alike), an account never finished signing in with a code by mail and
setting up its authenticator (QR code, key, recovery codes saved), a
lost authenticator's reset, creating an account (the phrase shown and
three of its words checked before anything reaches the instance), the
recovery phrase getting back in, and the account section (a password
offered to someone anonymous; an authenticator added only with a code
from one before; the password changed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
