`ContentCipher` makes a person's data keys, sealed to their account and
signed by it, opens them, and seals and opens a row's content with them for
the row it is stored in (`SodiumContentCipher`, on the isolate it is used
on, as rows are read and written one by one; `FakeContentCipher` for
tests). A sealed payload holds the signature, then the ciphertext.
`AccountCrypto.newDeviceKeys` makes the key pairs an anonymous person's
device encrypts their private studysets with (ADR 0017, point 9, not built
before); setting a password keeps them as the account's
(`keepingKeys` with a new phrase), so nothing they made private is lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The account's tiles show a spinner on Sign out or Delete account while it
runs, start neither again meanwhile, and say once, in a snack bar, why one
failed ("Couldn't delete your account: the instance wasn't reached. Try
again."; "Couldn't sign out on this device. Try again."), in English and
German. The session gate no longer builds the person's app anew for that:
only the tiles follow it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Both went through the launch screen (SessionStateLoading), which closed the
person's app before asking the instance; a failure then opened it again
with no word of why. The person's state stays now, saying what is under
way (`busy`), and a failure keeps them signed in with why (`problem`). An
instance out of reach still signs out on the device (Serverpod's
signOutDevice), as signing out of a borrowed device must work offline, so
only the device's own storage fails a sign-out; a deletion fails whenever
the instance isn't reached or refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017's rules as they stand, halkyon_app's README and Learn's
AGENTS.md: where an instance offers passwords, the apps offer no Add GitHub
and no hint on adding it, an anonymous person's Sign in with GitHub reaches
only the account someone has, and every refusal says why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Where an instance offers password sign-in, GitHub is added to nobody (ADR
0017, D2), yet the start screen still said "then add GitHub" after a GitHub
account nobody has, and every refusal but an unknown account read
"Couldn't sign in with GitHub." (the end-to-end test of 21 Oct).
- The gateway tells from one read of the basics whether GitHub signs in and
whether it is added to people (`gitHubOffer`, in place of
`gitHubClientId`); the GitHub bloc keeps it (`Ready.linking`) for the
profile, with why an attempt failed (`Ready.problem`).
- The instance's `usePassword`, `deprecated` and `ended` become problems of
their own (`gitHubSignInProblemOf`), worded by `gitHubProblemText` and on
the start screen; an anonymous person refused a link is told the GitHub
account is nobody's and offered the password instead.
- Where passwords are offered, the start screen offers an account to create
in place of the app's hint on adding GitHub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017 gets "The short reading": its findings, the developer's four
decisions of 21 Oct, and what changed. "The rules as they stand" says a
reset takes effect 14 days after it was asked at the latest, that a member
keeps the session a reset signed in and deletes nobody while the register
is out of reach, and no longer claims every secret is kept out of every
capture: Android holds them back, Windows from 10 2004, macOS from
screenshots but not ScreenCaptureKit on macOS 15 and later, iOS covers
the app switcher's picture alone, Linux nothing. The module's and
halkyon_app's READMEs and Learn's AGENTS.md follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
- Deleting an identified account whose security can't be read (the
instance out of reach) says so and deletes nothing; it went on to a
deletion by the session alone, refused for an account with a password,
and the person saw a spinner, then nothing. A refusal still leaves the
session's own deletion.
- InstanceChoice's sharesStorage is required, so no app leaves it out and
removes a folder another instance uses.
- A PasswordUnlock forgotten is spent: its secrets read again fail
(StateError) rather than make a proof or a wrapping of zeros.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
On Apple's systems a keychain read finds only the entries of its own
accessibility, so forgetting everyone's keys but one person's missed those
builds before had kept with the default or first_unlock_this_device: they
stayed after signing out, a switch of person or removing the instance (the
short reading's L5). forgetAllBut now also reads the keyring with every
accessibility a build used and deletes each entry found by name, which a
delete finds whatever its accessibility; one that can't be read now holds
back none of the others. The repository's forgetting, run as the person
changes and not awaited, catches a keyring that can't be read (a locked
device), where its error went unhandled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
SecretScreen built its child alone, and a stack around it with the cover
while the app was away (iOS), so each switch of apps built the child anew:
a phrase field lost its focus, its caret and what the keyboard was
composing (the short reading's L4). It always builds the stack now, laid
out as the child alone (StackFit.passthrough), the cover in it only while
away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The fields the recovery phrase is typed back into offered the system's
Copy, Cut and Share, and Ctrl+C and Ctrl+X copied what was selected (the
short reading's L3), so the phrase could still reach clipboard histories,
cloud clipboards or another app. Their menu now offers Paste and Select
all alone, and the field's own copy and cut, overridden from above, do
nothing. The comment on the recovery codes no longer speaks of Copy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The short reading's H1: open(2) takes its mode among variable arguments,
which Apple's Arm passes on the stack, so bound with three fixed ones it
read the mode from whatever the stack held: a phrase or recovery codes
saved on an Apple silicon Mac could be readable by everyone. It is bound
as variadic now (VarArgs), and every file written is made 0600 through its
descriptor (fchmod), checked.
M1: macOS's sandbox lets an app reach the file the person chose and
nothing beside it, so the file made beside it was refused and nothing
could be saved; Learn's sandbox allowed reading chosen files alone, so its
exports never saved on macOS either. There, writePrivately now writes the
chosen file itself (decided by the developer on 21 Oct): opened without
following a link or waiting on a pipe and without truncating, refused with
nothing written unless fstat finds a file of the own user's, then made
0600 and emptied. Both apps' entitlements grant reading and writing the
files the person chooses. Linux keeps the new file renamed over it.
The reading's nits: the buffer is wiped whatever happens, an interrupted
call is made again (EINTR), the file made beside a chosen one is named
apart from it so a name as long as a folder takes still saves, the folder
is flushed after the rename, and Linux reads a file's type and owner with
statx, alike on every architecture, where __lxstat's version differed
(riscv64's was wrong). The test of another user's file is skipped as root.
The in-place path is tested on Linux; none of it has run on a Mac.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An account deleted at GitHub's end whose host step after the deletion's
transaction failed counts as deleted, its GitHub ID gone with it, not as
one to try again (the short reading). The app's text for an account that
signs in with GitHub alone named the end as the day it would be deleted;
it is deleted 30 days later (gitHubAccountsKeptAfterEnd), which the text
now says, in English and German.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
A person still anonymous on a member was deleted there on the session
alone while the register was out of reach (the reading of the fixes' B1).
But the register may have linked them while their becoming identified on
the member failed, so with both failing, an account of the register's went
without its proof (the short reading's L2). A member now refuses every
deletion while it can't ask the register (decided by the developer on
21 Oct).
In the app, signing out of an anonymous account, which deletes it, signs
the device out all the same when the deletion fails, as a switch already
leaves one behind: the account is left to the instance's pruning of
anonymous accounts unused for 90 days. signInWays gets its doc comment
back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes noted that the main isolate's
copies of SRP's x and the key-encryption key, Dart's own bytes, stayed
for as long as the sign-in sheet's cubit lived, and after every change's
proof.
PasswordUnlock.forget zeroes them: the sign-in cubit wipes what the
password unlocked once signed in, once another password replaced it, and
as it closes; a change's or deletion's proof wipes what it unlocked once
its answer is made. The fake crypto's proof copies its bytes, as a real
one is new bytes. halkyon_keys' README says what is wiped and what isn't.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes noted that macOS and Windows can
keep a window out of screen captures, which SecretScreen didn't ask.
PlatformScreenGuard now asks the app's window on Android, macOS and
Windows (asksOn), and both apps' runners answer app.halkyon/screen_guard,
counting what shows: macOS's MainFlutterWindow sets sharingType = .none,
Windows' FlutterWindow WDA_EXCLUDEFROMCAPTURE (Windows 10 2004 on;
before, WDA_MONITOR, black in captures). Neither runner was built here
(Linux): to be tried on each system.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that SignInWaysState kept
Equatable's default text, which debug builds log with the address, and
that an unreadable sign_in.json logged its FormatException, whose message
holds the file's text; and that the account section's Delete caught only
refusals, so a keyring that couldn't be read escaped and the tap did
nothing.
The state says only whether an address is kept; the file's error logs its
type alone. Reading what keeps the account counts the keys as not here
where the keyring can't be read, and Delete goes on whatever the reading
met, failing as the session bloc says if it must.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that the device keeps
http://host/ and https://host/ in one place (folder, session key, keyring
prefix): someone with a stored http://host/ who added https://host/ and
then removed the first deleted the second's folder, session and keys while
it was in use, losing unsynced changes, and an anonymous account for good.
The places keep the names installs made (InstanceStorage.sharesWith says
which addresses share one): choosing an address the device keeps where a
known one is puts it in that one's place in the list, and removing an
address forgets nothing another known one uses. The build's own instance
keeps its place apart. Learn and Todo pass the storage's rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that first_unlock_this_device
left the account's private keys readable on a locked phone once it had
been unlocked after starting, which is what forensic tools extract from a
stolen one; and that, the accessibility being part of every keychain
lookup, an entry kept with another class stayed unseen and made the next
write fail as a duplicate, so that person couldn't finish signing in on
that device.
As the developer decided, the keys are kept unlocked_this_device (still
never in a backup nor in iCloud Keychain); nothing decrypts with them
while the device is locked. Keeping keys deletes the entry first, which a
delete finds whatever its class.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that the recovery phrase
typed back (recovering, resetting an authenticator, finishing a reset
that keeps the keys) showed all 24 words in a plain field, in Android's
recent apps, screenshots and iOS's app switcher, while people switch
apps to read it; and the three words typed back at sign-up alike.
PhraseField and PhraseCheckFields now show inside a SecretScreen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that writePrivately made
the file, then set it to 0600: another local user could open it in that
window and keep reading what was written after; and that where the path
was a link or another user's file, chmod failed and the secret was
written into it anyway.
On Linux and macOS it now makes a new file beside the one chosen, 0600
as it is created (O_EXCL, O_NOFOLLOW), writes through the descriptor that
made it, and renames it over the chosen path, so the old file is never
written into; a symbolic link or another user's file is refused, with
nothing written (lstat through FFI, by each system's layout). Windows
writes in place, with its folder's rights.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found that copied recovery codes
and authenticator keys still reached clipboard histories (Windows, KDE's
Klipper, Gboard, Samsung's) and cloud clipboards, as no Flutter engine
marks a copy as sensitive, and that on Android an app in the background
can't empty the clipboard again, so the minute's clearing often never
happened.
As the developer decided: recovery codes are saved, like the phrase; an
authenticator's key is scanned as a QR code, opened in the authenticator
app, or typed from the screen. copySecret and its texts go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The reading of the full reading's fixes found (C1) that refusing a member
whose clock ran ahead protected only the reset's own session: a session
made on that member in the gap, by whoever knew the old password, outlived
both the member's ending and the register's notice.
issueSessionAfter now ends every session of the account here made before
the register's moment or before now, whichever is later, then makes the
new one, neither waiting nor refusing; and the register sends its clock
with each notice (sentAt), so a member takes the moment by its own clock
(as long before now as it was before it was sent), ending the gap's
sessions and leaving those made since. The passwordChanged refusal, sent
only by the clock checks, goes with them (unreleased).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017's full-reading part says what the device's fixes did: the
clipboard, plain HTTP refused but on this machine, sheets never left busy,
what Save leaves, secrets out of debug logs, keyboards, screenshots and
backups, memory, and the real cryptography against the register's checks.
halkyon_app's README says what an app must add (its activity's screen
guard), Learn's AGENTS.md the HTTPS rule for instances.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The register's tests make the device's side from made-up bytes, and the
app's from fakes; nothing held what the device's real cryptography
(libsodium, on isolates) makes to what the register takes. Now
register_interop_test.dart does: a new account's setup passes
isPasswordSetup, the device's SRP answer checks with the register's
srpVerify and its M2 with the device, bound to the instance and the
purpose (another instance's or a change's identity refused), the keys
open as made, a new password passes isNewPassword, and the phrase's proof
for it checks against the phrase's own key, never the account's, with
the device's framing of the message the register's. halkyon_base_server
exports the checks it uses; halkyon_app takes it as a dev dependency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The recovery phrase, recovery codes and an authenticator's QR code and
key now show inside a SecretScreen: on Android it holds FLAG_SECURE while
it shows (through a channel each app's MainActivity answers, counting
holds, as several may show at once; ScreenGuard.kt), so screenshots,
screen recordings and the recents view don't get them; on iOS, which has
no such flag, it covers them while the app isn't in front, so the app
switcher's picture doesn't hold them (Dart-side, not checked on a device).
Desktops do neither: a window loses focus whenever its person turns to a
password manager. Todo's debug APK builds with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
flutter_secure_storage's default accessibility on iOS and macOS
(unlocked) lets keychain items into encrypted backups, which restore on
another device. The account's unlocked keys are now kept
first_unlock_this_device (macOS through its data protection keychain, the
package's default there), and never synchronised to iCloud Keychain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The instance sends the URI an authenticator is set up from; one that
isn't otpauth: (a web page, an Android intent) was drawn as a QR code and
handed to the system to open. Now it is neither; the key stays to type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The fields for a password, a code and the recovery phrase's words already
turned suggestions and corrections off; keyboards (Gboard, SwiftKey) still
learnt what was typed into them unless told not to. They now are
(enableIMEPersonalizedLearning: false), and the two sheets taking the
whole phrase share one PhraseField.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Equatable's own text lists every field, and a debug build's bloc observer
logs every state, so an authenticator's otpauth URI with its secret, the
recovery codes and the address went into the log. The password states
(signing in, getting back in, adding an authenticator, a step of the
account section) and AuthenticatorSetup now say only where they stand, as
the setup and new-phrase states did; Learn's observer takes a writer so
its test holds what it logs to that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
On the desktop a saved file (a recovery phrase, recovery codes, an
archive with progress) is made the own user's alone (0600, chmod(2)
through the C library already in the process) on the emptied file before
anything is written, so no other user of the machine reads it; Windows'
files keep their folder's rights. On iOS, file_picker (darwin v2.1.2)
writes a copy into the app's temporary folder for the system's picker and
never removes it, saved or cancelled: it goes once the picker is done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An instance's salt of another length made the device's cryptography throw
an ArgumentError, a wrapping's nonce a RangeError, and libsodium or the
keyring may throw their own; none was a refusal, so the step's error
escaped and the sheet stayed busy, which can't be closed. halkyon_keys
now checks the lengths of what comes from elsewhere before libsodium sees
it (KeyRefusal.malformed: a salt, a wrapping, a sealed key's box, a sealed
payload), the device's cryptography turns anything else into the general
failure, and so does every password cubit, the error logged by its type
alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
What the app sends an instance (the proofs that sign in, the keys'
wrappings, every request a session carries) must not be read or changed on
the way, so an instance is reached over HTTPS, or over plain HTTP only on
this machine (localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1), as Jellyfin servers are. An
address over plain HTTP elsewhere is refused before anything is sent there.
One kept from before is never opened: the app says why, and offers another
instance or removing it from the device, never dropping it silently.
Development builds still use their own instance over HTTP (an emulator
reaches the developer's machine as 10.0.2.2); releases never.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The recovery phrase opens the account's keys; clipboard histories and
cloud clipboard sync would keep it beyond the app's reach. It is saved as
a file or written down. Recovery codes and an authenticator's key may be
copied, and the clipboard is emptied 60 s later if it still holds them;
they are no longer selectable, as the system's own copy wouldn't empty it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The full reading's part in ADR 0017 records the device's medium 1 as done
(the identity's purpose and digest, the base URL in place of the host, an
instance under a path taking no password sign-in), and "The rules as they
stand" says what "password" binds; the module's and halkyon_app's READMEs
say the same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The device's answer takes what it is made for and the digest of what it
sets, as the register now requires: the new password (made before the old
one's proof, which binds it), the new phrase's wrapping and proof key, the
authenticator confirmed (the first or another) or removed, new recovery
codes, calling resets off, deleting, and asking for an authenticator's
reset apart from signing in. proof_digests.dart maps the protocol's objects
onto the shared framing; the key proof's password digest uses it too.
The fake gateway refuses a proof made for anything but the call's own
change, as the register does, so every flow's tests hold the repository to
it; the fake's authenticators have UUIDs, as the register's do.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
SRP's identity and the recovery phrase's proof carried the host alone, so
instances on one host under another port, path or scheme could relay each
other's proofs (the full reading's device low 4). Both now carry the base
URL the device addresses, written alike on both sides
(canonicalInstanceUrl: scheme and host in lower case, the port only where
it isn't the scheme's own, the path ending in /); the register takes its
own public scheme, host and port (Serverpod serves at the root), a member
the URL it names, development anything.
The identity also gains a purpose and the digest of what a proof sets,
both empty so far (signing in), with the framing for a new phrase's and an
authenticator's digest beside the new password's: the owner's proofs bind
them next. Cross-tests hold both sides to the same bytes. OwnerProof's and
DeletionProof's host, and every endpoint's, become instanceUrl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The full reading's L1: the warning that ten wrong proofs ended a session is
there for the owner to learn of it, and any other session of the account
(another app on the same stolen phone) dismissed it. Now only a session
made after the warning dismisses it (signed in again, or the sign-in that
first shows it); an older one is refused (PasswordRefusal.signedInBefore,
its own text in English and German), and a new password clears it as
before. A member tells the register when its session asking was made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The full reading's M1 and L6: once GitHub IDs were forgotten at
GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS, an account that had signed in with GitHub alone
counted as anonymous, so a stolen session and any mailbox gave it a first
password and authenticator; and such accounts, with no way in left, were
never pruned. Now:
- at the end, the daily run that forgets the GitHub IDs first deletes the
accounts that sign in with GitHub alone (no address, so never a
password), with everything they have, members told (deletePerson); the
app tells them for the three months before that their account goes then
unless they set up a password (passwordSectionGitHubEndsDeletes, en/de);
- password.set adds an address without GitHub only for someone anonymous
where the session lives (anonymousHere, which a member tells the
register, as it tells freshGitHubSignIn); anyone else is refused before
any code is used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The full reading's H1: an owner could be kept from calling a reset off, and
the reset then went through. Whoever knew the password and had the mailbox
asked an authenticators' reset and kept the codes waiting, so the owner's
sign-ins were refused until it took effect; whoever had the mailbox filled
the address's proofs ceiling from three networks and completed an account
reset. Now every hold-out of the owner after a reset was asked (a wait
that begins, an attempt a wait refuses, a sign-in or proof refused by the
address's ceiling) moves the account's resets not carried out to take
effect no sooner than 72 hours after it ends (pushOutResets). A reset
carried out (the password alone signing in until an authenticator is
confirmed) is never pushed, nor a lapsed one brought back.
Signed-in devices are told too: SignInWays carries when a waiting reset
of each kind takes effect, the account section shows them with Call it
off, which takes the owner's proof (password and code; password.
callOffResets, forwarded by members) and calls every reset off, as no wait
holds a signed-in owner's proof back. Texts in English and German.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
A password sign-in whose account carries the warning (a session ended
for ten wrong proofs in a row) shows it before the sign-in is put in
place: when, what it means, and to change the password if it wasn't
the owner. Dismiss clears it on the instance through the held-back
session; Remind me later signs in and keeps it. The account section
shows it above the change of password, with Dismiss, while it stands.
Nothing identifies the session or its device.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The fourth reading's second finding: a stolen session outlived the reset
of the authenticators (carrying it out ended no session) and confirmed
the account's first authenticator on its own code alone, ahead of the
owner, so the owner's confirmation and sign-in were refused after.
- Carrying out a reset of the authenticators ends every session of the
account, on the register at once and on every member by notice, as the
other resets do; the sign-in that carries it out gets its session after
that moment (PasswordProof.sessionsEndedBefore, issueSessionAfter).
- Confirming the first authenticator takes the password's proof for a
change's challenge, without a code (proveOwnersPassword), counted per
session as the owner's proofs are: a session of a lost phone, or of a
setup never finished, claims no second factor.
The app sends the password with every confirmation: the sign-up's, a
reset's and the account section's (which asks for it), and a sign-in's
own unlock where the session is still held back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The fourth reading's first finding: password.set took a session alone,
so whoever took one made a GitHub-only account, or an address account
without a password, theirs for good (their address or password, their
authenticator; GitHub then refused the owner).
- An account with an address proves it anew: a code mailed to that
address for this (EmailCodePurpose.firstPassword, its own mail), never
the session alone, a code asked for anything else, or another address.
- An account that signs in with GitHub alone does it within 10 minutes of
a GitHub sign-in (the session's method and creation time, where the
session lives; members tell the register), refused signInAgain before
any code is used; the address it adds is proved as before.
- Anonymous people still become identified with a code to the address
they add.
The app mails the code to the person's own address (asking for it where
the device doesn't know it), offers a password right after a GitHub
sign-in (D2's "at their next sign-in") before the person's app, and asks
for a GitHub sign-in anew when the instance refuses an older one, keeping
the code typed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
The app's side of the owner's proof (OwnerProof, the third reading): adding
an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one and new
recovery codes now ask for the current password beside the code, as
changing the password, a new phrase and deleting already did; one
challenge and one answer per sheet (OwnerAnswer). A wrong password or code
reads as the one refusal the instance gives.
Deleting chooses a code by mail from what the instance says
(secondFactorWorks), no longer from whether an authenticator was ever
confirmed: with the authenticators' reset taken effect but not carried
out, the app offered a code field the instance refused (the fourth
finding). Signed-in calls take no address any more, so a device that
doesn't know it changes the password as any other; deleting by mail asks
for the address only where the device doesn't know it, as the code goes
there (the fifth finding).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
When a member's clock ran more than its allowance behind the register's,
the session after a reset was refused as unavailable (the re-review's tenth
finding), after the register had already reset the account and ended every
session, and the app read it as "this instance has no password sign-in".
It now has a refusal of its own (passwordChanged): the app says the password
was changed and to sign in again with the new one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An account whose setup never finished, or whose authenticators' reset took
effect, could not delete itself (the re-review's eighth finding): deletion
asked for a TOTP or recovery code it had no way to give. Such an account
now deletes itself with the password's proof and a code by mail to its
address asked for deleting (EmailCodePurpose.deletion, which nothing else
takes), the address checked against the account's as everywhere after the
password; an account whose second factor works still takes a code from it.
The app's deletion sheet asks for the password and mails the code there,
then takes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Codes by mail were tied to nothing but their address (the re-review's
seventh finding): a hostile instance could answer that a setup never
finished, have the person type a code into it, relay it to start the real
instance's account reset, and 72 hours later relay a second to finish it
with its own password and keys; the mail said "to sign in" whatever the
code was for. A code is now asked for a purpose (signUp, finishSetup,
authenticatorReset, accountReset, deletion), only that purpose takes it (any
other is refused as no longer valid, leaving the code as it was), and its
mail says what it would do ("to reset your account on learn.halkyon.eu: a
new password and new keys, and what was encrypted with the old ones is
lost") and to type it only in the app on that instance, nowhere else. The
app asks for each code with the purpose of its step.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "email_code_request" ADD COLUMN "purpose" text; nullable,
so the requests of the last 15 minutes before it stay, taken by nothing
and forgotten within the hour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Whoever guessed codes decided whether the owner was mailed (the re-review's
fourth finding): the address a sign-in sent was optional, so a guesser left
it out and no mail went, and a wait begun without a mail used up the one
mail there was. Every call carrying a code after the password or the phrase
proved (signing in, the phrase's reset, a change of password, a new phrase,
deletion) now takes the account's address and the language of its mails,
and is refused (wrongCredentials, as anything wrong after the password)
before any code is checked when the address isn't the account's; every
wait mails the owner, not only the first. The app sends the address the
person typed, or for changes while signed in the one this device signed in
with, and says so where it doesn't know it (addressUnknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Wrong codes for removing an authenticator, new recovery codes or confirming
one counted toward the account's waits (the re-review's third finding): a
stolen session alone, without the password, could keep the owner's codes
waiting for up to a day at a time, renewed without end, holding them out
of signing in and of changing the password, the way to end that session,
and nobody was mailed. Those codes now count per session, where the session
is (the register's own, or a member's, which forwards the code): each try
counted before its code is checked (one statement, so tries sent at once
count each), a code accepted clearing the count, and the tenth wrong in a
row ending the session (sessionEnded; the device says it was signed out).
A try that checked no code (a refusal of something else) is taken back.
The account's waits now count only codes after a right password, and the
per-account ten tries an hour, which a session could fill as well, go.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "session_code_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"sessionId" uuid NOT NULL, "authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures"
bigint NOT NULL, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT NULL) with a unique index on
"sessionId": a new table, nothing touched. Its rows go with a code
accepted, with the person, and hourly once their session is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
