Commit graph halkyon/packages/halkyon_base_server/test/integration/register/register_test.dart
Author SHA1 Message Date
5fb28bd817
fix(auth): a new recovery phrase takes the password too
password.setRecoveryKeys took a session and a TOTP code alone, so a phone
signed in with its authenticator beside it could set a phrase of its
holder's own and, through the phrase's reset, a new password, never
knowing the old one. It now takes the old password's SRP proof (from
beginChange, the caller's own) and a TOTP or recovery code, as changing
the password does: one owner proof for both (_proveOwner), forwarded by
members, asked for in the account section's New recovery phrase.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 14:12:41 +02:00
ae57cbe864
feat(auth)!: codes by mail no longer sign in
ADR 0017, step 3 (D4: nobody signs in with email codes yet, so the
password replaces them outright). `emailCode.verifyCode`,
`emailSignIn.signIn` and the switch token go, with the register's
`verifySignInCode` and `completeEmailSwitch` and their operations
between services. `emailCode.sendCode` stays, now without a session
(signing up and getting back in have none), as what proves an address
for a password's setup, a sign-up, a setup never finished and the
resets; `accountRecovery.sendCode`, which did that for the resets,
goes. The `switchChallengeId` column stays: Serverpod's challenges
still link a completion token, and older servers read it during a
deploy.

The apps: halkyon_app's email sign-in (its bloc, sheet, gateway calls
and the start screen's Continue with email) goes; Learn's profile and
Todo's account sheet show `AccountSecuritySection` (a password set up
by someone anonymous or signing in with GitHub, whose end it names;
the authenticators; changing the password; new recovery codes and
phrase), which reads anew after every change the repository makes.

BREAKING CHANGE: Learn's `minimumAppBuild` is 22: builds up to 21 sign
in with the endpoints that went. Todo was never released and stays at
build 1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 14:12:41 +02:00
d00da1f24a
feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.

A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.

A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 14:12:40 +02:00
f8076dcacf
feat(auth): ways in for accounts without a working password
ADR 0017, step 3. Signing up takes an address a mailed code proves and
a password's setup, without a session (`passwordSignIn.signUp`): an
address nobody has becomes a new identified account, and an account
with the address but no password (codes by mail before; no keys exist,
so nothing waits) takes the password, keeping its ID. A setup never
finished signs in with its password and a code mailed to the address it
began with, until an authenticator is confirmed, which also calls off a
reset of the account waiting; any other account takes no code by mail
in place of its second factor and leaves the code unused. A reset of
the whole account waiting no longer counts as having had an
authenticator, so its owner isn't locked out until it completes.

Members forward both through the register; the tests' shared helpers
move into `support/password_support.dart`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 14:12:34 +02:00
892fba97e8
fix(auth): adding an authenticator takes a code from one confirmed before
Enrolling and confirming an authenticator took only a session, so whoever
held one (a stolen token) could add a second factor of their own, then use
its codes to remove the owner's and make new recovery codes.

While the account has a confirmed authenticator, confirming another now
also takes a code from one of those (`existingCode`, each step's code once
as signing in takes it, within the same 10 tries an hour), refused as
`wrongExistingCode`; it is checked only once the new one's code is right,
so a wrong one uses none. The first authenticator, and the first after a
reset carried out, need none. Members forward it to the register.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-22 18:11:12 +02:00
a3a8ed3890
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets
The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never
leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017),
with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister:

- password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys
  and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the
  address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified
  under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed.
- passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or
  recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as
  an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike.
- authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound
  to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the
  first, the last one kept.
- accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the
  password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password
  set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new
  keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a
  sign-in calling it off.
- An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or
  GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered,
  and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go.

Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes
their rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-22 18:11:10 +02:00
65c5cd740d
feat(accounts): one account across an instance's services (ADR 0016)
halkyon_base runs as the instance's register or as one of its members.
The register keeps the ways in, handles and profiles; members ask it
over HTTP with the instance's shared secret (instanceSecret), and open
sessions of their own for its accounts, under the same account ID.

- AccountsMode from the environment: INSTANCE_MEMBERS on the register,
  ACCOUNT_REGISTER_URL on a member. Learn always holds the register
  (Explore joins the profiles); Todo is a member where it is set.
- AccountRegister: LocalRegister, RemoteRegister, an in-memory one in
  tests. Calls between services on the web server, refused without the
  secret (constant-time compare); a server needing it doesn't start
  without it.
- Deleting an account deletes it everywhere: notices per member kept in
  the deletion's transaction (account_deletion_notice), told at once and
  hourly until confirmed; members prune daily whom the register no longer
  knows, never while it knows none of them or can't be reached.
- Deploy: INSTANCE_SECRET and INSTANCE_MEMBERS in compose and .env.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-22 18:11:07 +02:00