Learn's folder is apps/halkyon, Todo's apps/myrmex; every package of
ours takes the prefix halkyone_ (halkyone_halkyon_*, halkyone_myrmex_*,
halkyone_train_*, halkyone_meditate_*, halkyone_app, halkyone_base_* and
the other shared ones; halkyon_oidc_* keeps its name, D11). Halkyon and
Myrmex take the app IDs one.halky.halkyon and one.halky.myrmex (D10);
Train and Meditate keep theirs, while every app's Android namespace,
Kotlin package and method channels move to one.halky. The snaps are
halkyon and myrmex (D17), each built in a clone with its recipe in
place of snap/, as Train's and Todo's were.
Serverpod finds a database's migrations by its module's name, which
changed with the packages':
- each server's new, empty migration ("rename") records itself under
the new names and deletes the rows under the old ones;
- deploy/redeploy.sh copies each database's record to the new name
before the migrations (carry_module), so the renamed servers find
their databases migrated; a copy, never a move, so a deploy failing
before the migration commits leaves the old rows in place;
- Train and Meditate keep their devices' databases: halkyone_app's
carryMigrationRecord copies their record before the sync engine
opens them (openPersonDatabase);
- the client migrations' generated moduleName getters, one line each,
say the new names: Serverpod's client asserts in debug builds that
every migration names the module, and create-migration never writes
a migration's files again.
Train's WorkManager work is enqueued under new names, the former ones
cancelled: the work kept names the workers' former classes.
The release tool: an app's tags of its earlier names count as its
history (legacyTagPrefixes), the shared packages' former paths count
for its version, and every snap is built in a clone (atRoot gone).
The databases, Docker images and Compose project keep their names
until step 5.
BREAKING CHANGE: Halkyon (Learn) and Myrmex (Todo) are new apps to
Android and the Snap Store: installs of app.halkyon.learn and
app.halkyon.todo don't update to them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An instance's salt of another length made the device's cryptography throw
an ArgumentError, a wrapping's nonce a RangeError, and libsodium or the
keyring may throw their own; none was a refusal, so the step's error
escaped and the sheet stayed busy, which can't be closed. halkyon_keys
now checks the lengths of what comes from elsewhere before libsodium sees
it (KeyRefusal.malformed: a salt, a wrapping, a sealed key's box, a sealed
payload), the device's cryptography turns anything else into the general
failure, and so does every password cubit, the error logged by its type
alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Data keys were sealed to the account as anonymous sealed boxes, and the
register knows every account's public key: it could have sealed a key of
its own under an existing key ID, and a device would have encrypted new
content with a key the register holds (the second reading's M7, latent
until step 4 encrypts anything). sealDataKey now signs the box, with the
account it is sealed to and a label, by the sealer's Ed25519 key, and
openDataKey checks that signature against the sealer it expects (the
account itself, or whoever shared the store) before opening anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017's step 1, on libsodium (sodium 4.1.0+1, whose build hook
compiles the libsodium 1.0.22 it ships: a C compiler and make wherever
it builds):
- Argon2id (64 MiB, 3 passes, kept with the account and never below
that) makes a master key, which libsodium's KDF splits into SRP's
secret (x) and the key-encryption key.
- The account's X25519 and Ed25519 key pairs, their private halves
wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under the KEK and under the recovery
key, bound to their public keys.
- A 24-word BIP-39 recovery phrase (the English list, MIT) and the
recovery key derived from it.
- Data keys sealed to the account with crypto_box_seal, bound to their
IDs; content in ADR 0002's envelope, encrypted with a data key and
signed with Ed25519 (detached), bound to a context the caller names.
- Secrets in libsodium's guarded memory where its API takes them.
- Tests: libsodium's Argon2id known answers, BIP-39's English vectors,
round trips and every refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
