A key proof was a signature by the account's signing key, which every
signed-in device keeps in its keyring: whoever could read one, with a
code from its authenticator, set a new password without the password or
the phrase (the second reading's H1). The phrase now proves itself with
an Ed25519 key derived from its bits alone (halkyon_keys'
recoveryProofKeysOf, KDF context hlkrprf1, a sibling of the recovery
key), whose public half every setup, new phrase and account reset sends
and the register keeps (account_password.recoveryProofKey); the device
derives the secret half only while the phrase is typed. An account
without one (none exist outside development) proves no phrase until it
sets a new one; decoys check against a decoy proof key alike.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "account_password" ADD COLUMN "recoveryProofKey" bytea;
nullable, so rows made before keep working and no data is touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
An impostor instance refused; a lost authenticator's reset by the
recovery phrase; the password alone signing in once a reset took
effect, an authenticator set up first; starting an account's reset
without the phrase, and finishing one with new keys and a new phrase;
in the account section, removing an authenticator (a code, never the
last), new recovery codes, and a change of password refused for a wrong
current one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
Signing in (a code, a recovery code, an account never finished, a lost
authenticator by mail and by phrase, an impostor instance, no
connection), setting up (signing up, a password for someone signed in,
finishing an account's reset with new keys or the old), getting back in
(with the phrase, starting a reset without it) and the account section
(what keeps the account, its steps, adding an authenticator, a new
phrase), each as the states it emits.
They found that reading what keeps the account wrapped two refusals at
once in a ParallelWaitError, which no caller takes for one: offline, the
account section showed nothing. The first refusal now goes up as it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
PasswordKdf.fromJson refused costs below the floor but took any above it,
so an instance could ask a device for 100 GiB and crash the app at every
sign-in. It now refuses more than the register's own ceiling (16 passes,
1 GiB; KeyRefusal.excessivePasswordKdf), and the app reads either refusal,
before deriving or sending anything, as PasswordProblem.unsafeCosts with
a text of its own (before, costs below the floor read as keys missing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
password.setRecoveryKeys took a session and a TOTP code alone, so a phone
signed in with its authenticator beside it could set a phrase of its
holder's own and, through the phrase's reset, a new password, never
knowing the old one. It now takes the old password's SRP proof (from
beginChange, the caller's own) and a TOTP or recovery code, as changing
the password does: one owner proof for both (_proveOwner), forwarded by
members, asked for in the account section's New recovery phrase.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017, step 3: widget tests driving the sheets as a person would,
on halkyon_app's fakes: signing in with a code (a wrong one refused
alike), an account never finished signing in with a code by mail and
setting up its authenticator (QR code, key, recovery codes saved), a
lost authenticator's reset, creating an account (the phrase shown and
three of its words checked before anything reaches the instance), the
recovery phrase getting back in, and the account section (a password
offered to someone anonymous; an authenticator added only with a code
from one before; the password changed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
ADR 0017, step 3: halkyon_app's side, which Learn and Todo take.
- The account's cryptography on the device (`SodiumAccountCrypto`):
halkyon_keys and SRP's client half, each step on an isolate of its
own. sodium hands out results as views of native memory its
finalizers free once the isolate that made them ends, so everything
crossing back is copied first: a view read freed memory and crashed
the process.
- `PasswordGateway` on the module's endpoints (steps without a session
through a client holding none; an authenticator set up with a session
granted but not yet the device's), and `PasswordRepository` running
the flows: signing in (M2 checked, the keys opened before anything is
trusted), signing up, a password for someone signed in, an account
never finished, the authenticators, recovery codes, changing the
password, a new recovery phrase, and getting back in.
- The unlocked keys in the system's keyring per instance and person
(`SecureAccountKeyStore`), gone once another person signs in or
nobody, and with the instance's removal.
- The screens: the start screen's Sign in and Create an account (and
when GitHub sign-in ends), the sign-in sheet (codes, recovery codes,
an account never finished, a lost authenticator), the account's setup
(the recovery phrase shown once, three random words typed back before
anything reaches the instance; the authenticator's QR code, drawn
with pub.dev's qr; the recovery codes), getting back in, and the
account section (`AccountSecuritySection`).
- `FileSaver` moves from Learn into halkyon_app, for the phrase and the
codes in Todo too; `AppDependencies` names it and `passwords`.
- halkyon_keys rebuilds account keys from the secret keys a device kept;
the key proof's message is in halkyon_base_client, checked against
the register's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
