fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses
Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host, what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host; in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped password are refused, nothing changing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
This commit is contained in:
parent
009970faab
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36 changed files with 966 additions and 137 deletions
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@ -96,11 +96,13 @@ abstract interface class AccountCrypto() {
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});
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/// The answer to [challenge] (SRP's B and the account's salt) with what
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/// [unlock] holds.
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/// [unlock] holds, its identity bound to [host], the instance as the
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/// device addresses it.
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Future<SrpAnswer> answer(
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PasswordUnlock unlock,
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge,
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);
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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});
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/// The account's keys [wrapped] under the password, opened with
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/// [unlock]'s key and checked against its public keys.
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@ -127,15 +129,18 @@ abstract interface class AccountCrypto() {
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required Uint8List signingPublicKey,
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});
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/// The signature proving the recovery [phrase] for [challenge]: by the
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/// phrase's own proof key, derived from it alone while it is typed and
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/// kept nowhere, never the account's signing key, which every signed-in
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/// device keeps. Refused (`PasswordProblem.notAPhrase`) for what is no
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/// recovery phrase.
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/// The signature proving the recovery [phrase] for [challenge] on
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/// [host], for the new [password] it sets (or, without one, for an
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/// authenticator's reset): by the phrase's own proof key, derived from it
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/// alone while it is typed and kept nowhere, never the account's signing
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/// key, which every signed-in device keeps. Refused
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/// (`PasswordProblem.notAPhrase`) for what is no recovery phrase.
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Future<ByteData> signKeyProof(
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String phrase,
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge,
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);
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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protocol.NewPassword? password,
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});
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/// A new recovery phrase for [keys]: the keys wrapped under it, and the
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/// public half of its proof key.
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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ typedef PasswordWays = ({
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/// up before a new sign-in is put in place). Every refusal is a
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/// `PasswordFailed`. Tests replace it with a fake.
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abstract interface class PasswordGateway() {
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/// The host the device addresses the instance by, which SRP's identity
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/// and the recovery phrase's proofs are bound to (ADR 0017): a hostile
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/// instance relaying them to the real one gets nothing the real one
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/// takes.
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String get host;
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/// Whether the instance offers password sign-in, and until when GitHub
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/// sign-in lasts there (null for no end set).
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Future<({bool offered, DateTime? gitHubEnds})> offers();
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@ -146,7 +146,11 @@ class PasswordRepository(
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String? code,
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}) async {
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final challenge = await _challengeOf(unlocked);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(unlocked._unlock, challenge);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(
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unlocked._unlock,
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challenge,
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host: _gateway.host,
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);
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final signedIn = await _gateway.complete(
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challenge,
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answer,
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@ -326,7 +330,7 @@ class PasswordRepository(
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salt: Uint8List.sublistView(challenge.salt),
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costs: challenge.costs,
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);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(unlock, challenge);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(unlock, challenge, host: _gateway.host);
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await _gateway.change(
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challenge,
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answer,
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@ -362,7 +366,7 @@ class PasswordRepository(
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);
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await _gateway.setRecoveryKeys(
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challenge,
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await _crypto.answer(unlock, challenge),
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await _crypto.answer(unlock, challenge, host: _gateway.host),
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totpCode: code.replaceAll(' ', ''),
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keys: phrase._recoveryKeys,
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proofKey: phrase._recoveryProofKey,
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@ -390,10 +394,18 @@ class PasswordRepository(
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// Opened only to say here, rather than on the instance, that the
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// phrase doesn't fit.
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await _openWithPhrase(keyChallenge, phrase);
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signature = await _crypto.signKeyProof(phrase, keyChallenge);
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signature = await _crypto.signKeyProof(
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phrase,
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keyChallenge,
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host: _gateway.host,
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);
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}
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final challenge = await _challengeOf(unlocked);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(unlocked._unlock, challenge);
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final answer = await _crypto.answer(
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unlocked._unlock,
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challenge,
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host: _gateway.host,
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);
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return await _gateway.resetAuthenticator(
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challenge,
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answer,
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@ -419,11 +431,19 @@ class PasswordRepository(
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final typed = address.trim();
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final challenge = await _gateway.beginKeyProof(typed);
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final keys = await _openWithPhrase(challenge, phrase);
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final signature = await _crypto.signKeyProof(phrase, challenge);
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final password = await _crypto.newPassword(newPassword, keys);
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// The proof signs this password and this instance's host: nobody
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// between swaps in another, or relays it elsewhere.
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final signature = await _crypto.signKeyProof(
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phrase,
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challenge,
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host: _gateway.host,
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password: password,
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);
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final grant = await _gateway.resetPassword(
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challenge,
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signature,
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password: await _crypto.newPassword(newPassword, keys),
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password: password,
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totpCode: totpCode?.replaceAll(' ', ''),
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recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
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);
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@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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/// What the clients it makes for itself send through; tests give a fake.
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final http.Client Function()? _httpClient,
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}) implements PasswordGateway {
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@override
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String get host => Uri.parse(_client.host).host;
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@override
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Future<({bool offered, DateTime? gitHubEnds})> offers() => _failing(() async {
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final basics = await _base.instance.basics();
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@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
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request: _idOf(request),
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code: code,
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host: host,
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);
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return PasswordSignedIn(
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grant: _grantOf(
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@ -186,6 +190,7 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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totpCode: totpCode,
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recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
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password: password,
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host: host,
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),
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);
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@ -206,6 +211,7 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
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recoveryKeys: keys,
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recoveryProofKey: proofKey,
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host: host,
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),
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);
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@ -230,6 +236,7 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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code: code,
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keyChallenge: keyChallenge?.challenge,
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signature: signature,
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host: host,
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)).takesEffectAt,
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);
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@ -254,6 +261,7 @@ class ServerpodPasswordGateway(
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password: password,
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totpCode: totpCode,
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recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
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host: host,
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),
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),
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);
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@ -390,6 +398,10 @@ PasswordProblem _problemOf(protocol.PasswordRefusal reason) => switch (reason) {
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protocol.PasswordRefusal.noReset => PasswordProblem.noReset,
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protocol.PasswordRefusal.wrongExistingCode =>
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PasswordProblem.wrongExistingCode,
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// The instance answers by another name than the device addressed it by:
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// what the device proved is bound to that name, so nothing it says can
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// be taken as the instance's.
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protocol.PasswordRefusal.otherInstance => PasswordProblem.instanceUnproven,
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};
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/// Keeps one session in memory, for a client used once.
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@ -85,13 +85,14 @@ class SodiumAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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@override
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Future<SrpAnswer> answer(
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PasswordUnlock unlock,
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge,
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) async {
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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}) async {
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final group = srp.SrpGroup.rfc5054Group3072;
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final (:clientValue, :proof) = await Isolate.run(() {
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final client = srp.SrpClient(group);
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final step = client.respond(
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identity: challenge.challenge.toBytes(),
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identity: srp.passwordIdentity(challenge.challenge.toBytes(), host),
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salt: Uint8List.sublistView(challenge.salt),
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privateValue: _numberOf(unlock.srpSecret),
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serverValue: _numberOf(Uint8List.sublistView(challenge.serverValue)),
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@ -205,8 +206,10 @@ class SodiumAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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@override
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Future<ByteData> signKeyProof(
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String phrase,
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge,
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) => Isolate.run(
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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protocol.NewPassword? password,
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}) => Isolate.run(
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() => _guarded(() async {
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final sodium = await SodiumSumoInit.init();
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final KeyPair proof;
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@ -222,6 +225,11 @@ class SodiumAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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message: srp.keyProofMessage(
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challenge.challenge.toBytes(),
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Uint8List.sublistView(challenge.nonce),
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host: host,
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purpose: password == null
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? srp.KeyProofPurpose.authenticatorReset
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: srp.KeyProofPurpose.passwordReset,
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digest: password == null ? const [] : _digestOf(password),
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),
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secretKey: proof.secretKey,
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),
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@ -256,6 +264,17 @@ class SodiumAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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);
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}
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/// [password]'s digest, which a phrase's proof for it signs.
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Uint8List _digestOf(protocol.NewPassword password) => srp.newPasswordDigest(
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salt: Uint8List.sublistView(password.salt),
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algorithm: password.costs.algorithm,
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opsLimit: password.costs.opsLimit,
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memLimit: password.costs.memLimit,
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verifier: Uint8List.sublistView(password.verifier),
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keysNonce: Uint8List.sublistView(password.passwordKeys.nonce),
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keysCipherText: Uint8List.sublistView(password.passwordKeys.cipherText),
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);
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/// Argon2id's [costs] as an instance named them, refused
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/// ([PasswordProblem.unsafeCosts]) outside the bounds every account is
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/// within, before anything is derived: below them guessing the password
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@ -145,8 +145,9 @@ class FakeAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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@override
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Future<SrpAnswer> answer(
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PasswordUnlock unlock,
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge,
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) async => SrpAnswer(
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protocol.PasswordChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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}) async => SrpAnswer(
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clientValue: ByteData(384),
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clientProof: ByteData.sublistView(unlock.srpSecret),
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verifies: (serverProof) =>
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@ -200,8 +201,10 @@ class FakeAccountCrypto() implements AccountCrypto {
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@override
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Future<ByteData> signKeyProof(
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String phrase,
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge,
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) async {
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protocol.KeyProofChallenge challenge, {
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required String host,
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protocol.NewPassword? password,
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}) async {
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if (phrase.trim().split(RegExp(r'\s+')).length != 24) {
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throw const PasswordFailed(PasswordProblem.notAPhrase);
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}
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@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ final class FakePasswordAccount(
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/// passwords proved by [FakeAccountCrypto]'s answers. The signed-in person
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/// is [_auth]'s. [failing] makes every call fail as without a connection.
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class FakePasswordGateway(final AuthGateway _auth) implements PasswordGateway {
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@override
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String get host => 'halkyon.example';
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/// Whether the instance offers password sign-in.
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bool offered = true;
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|
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@ -161,48 +161,83 @@ void main() {
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);
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});
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test("signs the key proof with the phrase's own proof key, whose public "
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"half the setup carries: never the account's key, which a signed-in "
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'device keeps', () async {
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final challenge = protocol.KeyProofChallenge(
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challenge: protocol.UuidValue.fromString(
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'01994a3c-7b2e-7c00-8a1b-0123456789ab',
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),
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nonce: ByteData.sublistView(Uint8List.fromList(List.filled(32, 9))),
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encryptionPublicKey: ByteData.sublistView(
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account.keys.encryptionPublicKey,
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),
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signingPublicKey: ByteData.sublistView(account.keys.signingPublicKey),
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recoveryKeys: account.setup.recoveryKeys,
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);
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final signature = await crypto.signKeyProof(account.phrase, challenge);
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final sodium = await SodiumSumoInit.init();
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bool verifies(Uint8List publicKey) => sodium.crypto.sign.verifyDetached(
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message: srp.keyProofMessage(
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challenge.challenge.toBytes(),
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List.filled(32, 9),
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),
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signature: Uint8List.sublistView(signature),
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publicKey: publicKey,
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);
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expect(
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verifies(Uint8List.sublistView(account.setup.recoveryProofKey)),
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isTrue,
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);
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expect(verifies(account.keys.signingPublicKey), isFalse);
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await expectLater(
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crypto.signKeyProof('not a phrase', challenge),
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throwsA(
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isA<PasswordFailed>().having(
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(failed) => failed.problem,
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'problem',
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PasswordProblem.notAPhrase,
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test(
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"signs the key proof with the phrase's own proof key, whose public "
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"half the setup carries, for the instance's host and the password it "
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"sets: never the account's key, which a signed-in device keeps",
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() async {
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final challenge = protocol.KeyProofChallenge(
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challenge: protocol.UuidValue.fromString(
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'01994a3c-7b2e-7c00-8a1b-0123456789ab',
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),
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),
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);
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});
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nonce: ByteData.sublistView(Uint8List.fromList(List.filled(32, 9))),
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encryptionPublicKey: ByteData.sublistView(
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account.keys.encryptionPublicKey,
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),
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signingPublicKey: ByteData.sublistView(account.keys.signingPublicKey),
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recoveryKeys: account.setup.recoveryKeys,
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);
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final password = await crypto.newPassword(
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'another battery staple',
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account.keys,
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);
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final signature = await crypto.signKeyProof(
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account.phrase,
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challenge,
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host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
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password: password,
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);
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final sodium = await SodiumSumoInit.init();
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bool verifies(
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Uint8List publicKey, {
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String host = 'learn.halkyon.eu',
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List<int>? digest,
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}) => sodium.crypto.sign.verifyDetached(
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message: srp.keyProofMessage(
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challenge.challenge.toBytes(),
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List.filled(32, 9),
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host: host,
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purpose: srp.KeyProofPurpose.passwordReset,
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digest:
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digest ??
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srp.newPasswordDigest(
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salt: Uint8List.sublistView(password.salt),
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algorithm: password.costs.algorithm,
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opsLimit: password.costs.opsLimit,
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memLimit: password.costs.memLimit,
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verifier: Uint8List.sublistView(password.verifier),
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keysNonce: Uint8List.sublistView(password.passwordKeys.nonce),
|
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keysCipherText: Uint8List.sublistView(
|
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password.passwordKeys.cipherText,
|
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),
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),
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),
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signature: Uint8List.sublistView(signature),
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publicKey: publicKey,
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);
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final proofKey = Uint8List.sublistView(account.setup.recoveryProofKey);
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expect(verifies(proofKey), isTrue);
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expect(verifies(account.keys.signingPublicKey), isFalse);
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expect(verifies(proofKey, host: 'learn.evil.example'), isFalse);
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expect(verifies(proofKey, digest: List.filled(32, 0)), isFalse);
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await expectLater(
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crypto.signKeyProof(
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'not a phrase',
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challenge,
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host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
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),
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throwsA(
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isA<PasswordFailed>().having(
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(failed) => failed.problem,
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'problem',
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PasswordProblem.notAPhrase,
|
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),
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),
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);
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},
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);
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|
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test("a new phrase carries its proof key's public half, which its "
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'signatures verify under', () async {
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|
|
@ -237,6 +272,7 @@ void main() {
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]),
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),
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),
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host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
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);
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expect(answer.clientValue.lengthInBytes, group.length);
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|
|
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|
|
@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
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String? code,
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_isc.UuidValue? keyChallenge,
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_idt.ByteData? signature,
|
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required String host,
|
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}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_ippuf33k.ResetPending>(
|
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'halkyon_base.accountRecovery',
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'resetAuthenticator',
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|
|
@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
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'code': code,
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'keyChallenge': keyChallenge,
|
||||
'signature': signature,
|
||||
'host': host,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,6 +268,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
required _i95l60wq.NewPassword password,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_iacc.AuthSuccess>(
|
||||
'halkyon_base.accountRecovery',
|
||||
'resetPassword',
|
||||
|
|
@ -275,6 +278,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
'password': password,
|
||||
'totpCode': totpCode,
|
||||
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
|
||||
'host': host,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -445,6 +449,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required _i95l60wq.NewPassword password,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<void>(
|
||||
'halkyon_base.password',
|
||||
'change',
|
||||
|
|
@ -455,6 +460,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
'totpCode': totpCode,
|
||||
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
|
||||
'password': password,
|
||||
'host': host,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -471,6 +477,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required _i3so7e0p.WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
|
||||
required _idt.ByteData recoveryProofKey,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<void>(
|
||||
'halkyon_base.password',
|
||||
'setRecoveryKeys',
|
||||
|
|
@ -482,6 +489,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
|
||||
'recoveryKeys': recoveryKeys,
|
||||
'recoveryProofKey': recoveryProofKey,
|
||||
'host': host,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -522,6 +530,7 @@ class EndpointPasswordSignIn extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
_isc.UuidValue? request,
|
||||
String? code,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_ix90myvx.PasswordSignedIn>(
|
||||
'halkyon_base.passwordSignIn',
|
||||
'complete',
|
||||
|
|
@ -533,6 +542,7 @@ class EndpointPasswordSignIn extends _isc.EndpointRef {
|
|||
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
|
||||
'request': request,
|
||||
'code': code,
|
||||
'host': host,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -73,7 +73,12 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _isc.SerializableModel {
|
|||
/// Adding an authenticator to an account that has one confirmed takes a
|
||||
/// code from one of those, which is missing or isn't right: a session
|
||||
/// alone adds no second factor.
|
||||
wrongExistingCode;
|
||||
wrongExistingCode,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The device addressed this instance by another name than its own
|
||||
/// (`apiServer.publicHost`): what it proves is bound to the name it
|
||||
/// addressed, so the operator must configure the name devices use.
|
||||
otherInstance;
|
||||
|
||||
static PasswordRefusal fromJson(String name) {
|
||||
switch (name) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -111,6 +116,8 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _isc.SerializableModel {
|
|||
return PasswordRefusal.noReset;
|
||||
case 'wrongExistingCode':
|
||||
return PasswordRefusal.wrongExistingCode;
|
||||
case 'otherInstance':
|
||||
return PasswordRefusal.otherInstance;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
throw ArgumentError(
|
||||
'Value "$name" cannot be converted to "PasswordRefusal"',
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,14 +1,95 @@
|
|||
import 'dart:convert';
|
||||
import 'dart:typed_data';
|
||||
|
||||
/// What the device signs with the account's Ed25519 key, opened with the
|
||||
/// recovery phrase, to prove the phrase (ADR 0017): a label naming the
|
||||
/// purpose and its version, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes) and the
|
||||
/// register's nonce. The register checks the signature over the same bytes
|
||||
/// (halkyon_base_server's `key_proof.dart`).
|
||||
Uint8List keyProofMessage(List<int> challenge, List<int> nonce) =>
|
||||
Uint8List.fromList([
|
||||
...utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v1|'),
|
||||
...challenge,
|
||||
...nonce,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
|
||||
|
||||
// What the device proves and signs with, bound to the instance it addresses
|
||||
// (ADR 0017; the second reading's M6): a hostile instance a person was lured
|
||||
// into adding can't relay a sign-in or a phrase's proof to the real one,
|
||||
// which takes them only for its own host, nor swap in a password of its
|
||||
// own. halkyon_base_server's `key_proof.dart` makes the same bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
/// SRP's identity I for the sign-in [challenge] (its 16 bytes) on [host],
|
||||
/// the instance as the device addresses it, in lower case. SRP's x comes
|
||||
/// from Argon2id over the password and salt alone, so I only binds the
|
||||
/// proof: to this sign-in and to this instance.
|
||||
Uint8List passwordIdentity(List<int> challenge, String host) => _framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon srp identity v1'),
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
/// What proving the recovery phrase is for, by the words the message
|
||||
/// carries ([label]).
|
||||
enum KeyProofPurpose(final String label) {
|
||||
/// Asking for the reset of a lost authenticator.
|
||||
authenticatorReset('authenticator reset'),
|
||||
|
||||
/// Setting a new password, the keys staying.
|
||||
passwordReset('password reset'),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// What the device signs with the recovery phrase's proof key to prove the
|
||||
/// phrase: a label naming the format, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes),
|
||||
/// the register's nonce, the [host] the device addresses, the [purpose],
|
||||
/// and the [digest] of what it sets ([newPasswordDigest] for a new
|
||||
/// password; none for a reset of the authenticators), each framed by its
|
||||
/// length.
|
||||
Uint8List keyProofMessage(
|
||||
List<int> challenge,
|
||||
List<int> nonce, {
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
required KeyProofPurpose purpose,
|
||||
List<int> digest = const [],
|
||||
}) => _framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
utf8.encode(purpose.label),
|
||||
digest,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The SHA-256 of a new password as the device sends it (the salt,
|
||||
/// Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the keys wrapped under it), framed:
|
||||
/// what a phrase's proof for a new password signs, so nobody between the
|
||||
/// device and the register can swap in another.
|
||||
Uint8List newPasswordDigest({
|
||||
required List<int> salt,
|
||||
required String algorithm,
|
||||
required int opsLimit,
|
||||
required int memLimit,
|
||||
required List<int> verifier,
|
||||
required List<int> keysNonce,
|
||||
required List<int> keysCipherText,
|
||||
}) => Uint8List.fromList(
|
||||
sha256
|
||||
.convert(
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon new password v1'),
|
||||
salt,
|
||||
utf8.encode(algorithm),
|
||||
utf8.encode('$opsLimit'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('$memLimit'),
|
||||
verifier,
|
||||
keysNonce,
|
||||
keysCipherText,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.bytes,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/// [parts], each after its length in four bytes, big-endian, so no part
|
||||
/// can run into the next.
|
||||
Uint8List _framed(List<List<int>> parts) {
|
||||
final bytes = BytesBuilder(copy: false);
|
||||
for (final part in parts) {
|
||||
bytes
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 24) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 16) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 8) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte(part.length & 0xff)
|
||||
..add(part);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return bytes.takeBytes();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,20 +1,120 @@
|
|||
import 'dart:convert';
|
||||
|
||||
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_client/srp.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:test/test.dart';
|
||||
|
||||
/// [parts], each after its length in four bytes, big-endian.
|
||||
List<int> _framed(List<List<int>> parts) => [
|
||||
for (final part in parts) ...[
|
||||
(part.length >> 24) & 0xff,
|
||||
(part.length >> 16) & 0xff,
|
||||
(part.length >> 8) & 0xff,
|
||||
part.length & 0xff,
|
||||
...part,
|
||||
],
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
void main() {
|
||||
test('the key proof message is the label, the challenge and the nonce, as '
|
||||
final challenge = List.generate(16, (i) => i);
|
||||
final nonce = List.generate(32, (i) => 200 + i % 50);
|
||||
|
||||
test("SRP's identity is the label, the challenge and the host the device "
|
||||
'addresses, each framed by its length, the host in lower case', () {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
passwordIdentity(challenge, 'Learn.Halkyon.EU'),
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon srp identity v1'),
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
|
||||
]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
passwordIdentity(challenge, 'learn.halkyon.eu'),
|
||||
isNot(passwordIdentity(challenge, 'learn.halkyon.eu.evil.example')),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the key proof message is the label, the challenge, the nonce, the '
|
||||
'host, what it proves the phrase for and what that sets, framed, as '
|
||||
'the register checks it', () {
|
||||
final challenge = List.generate(16, (i) => i);
|
||||
final nonce = List.generate(32, (i) => 200 + i % 50);
|
||||
final digest = List.generate(32, (i) => i * 3);
|
||||
|
||||
final message = keyProofMessage(challenge, nonce);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
keyProofMessage(
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
|
||||
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.passwordReset,
|
||||
digest: digest,
|
||||
),
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('password reset'),
|
||||
digest,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
keyProofMessage(
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
|
||||
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.authenticatorReset,
|
||||
),
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
|
||||
challenge,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('authenticator reset'),
|
||||
<int>[],
|
||||
]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
expect(message, [
|
||||
...utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v1|'),
|
||||
...challenge,
|
||||
...nonce,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
test("a new password's digest is SHA-256 over its parts, framed: the "
|
||||
'salt, the costs, the verifier and the wrapping', () {
|
||||
final digest = newPasswordDigest(
|
||||
salt: [1, 2],
|
||||
algorithm: 'argon2id13',
|
||||
opsLimit: 3,
|
||||
memLimit: 67108864,
|
||||
verifier: [3, 4, 5],
|
||||
keysNonce: [6],
|
||||
keysCipherText: [7, 8],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
digest,
|
||||
sha256
|
||||
.convert(
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon new password v1'),
|
||||
[1, 2],
|
||||
utf8.encode('argon2id13'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('3'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('67108864'),
|
||||
[3, 4, 5],
|
||||
[6],
|
||||
[7, 8],
|
||||
]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.bytes,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
newPasswordDigest(
|
||||
salt: [1, 2],
|
||||
algorithm: 'argon2id13',
|
||||
opsLimit: 3,
|
||||
memLimit: 67108864,
|
||||
verifier: [3, 4, 5],
|
||||
keysNonce: [6],
|
||||
keysCipherText: [7, 9],
|
||||
),
|
||||
isNot(digest),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -194,7 +194,13 @@ Built on the three parts above, on the register (members forward every step thro
|
|||
session. A setup never finished (never a confirmed authenticator) signs in with a code
|
||||
mailed to the address it began with in its place (`request`, `code`), which calls off
|
||||
a reset of the account waiting; any other account takes no code by mail there and
|
||||
leaves it unused. SRP's identity I is the challenge's ID. An address nobody has (or whose
|
||||
leaves it unused. SRP's identity I is `passwordIdentity`: the challenge's ID and the
|
||||
host the device addressed (`host` on every proving call: in production it must be the
|
||||
server's `apiServer.publicHost`, else `otherInstance`; in development any, as an
|
||||
emulator reaches the machine as 10.0.2.2), so a hostile instance relaying a sign-in or
|
||||
a phrase's proof here gets nothing taken; a member forwards its own host, and the
|
||||
phrase's proof for a new password signs that password's digest
|
||||
(`newPasswordDigest`). An address nobody has (or whose
|
||||
account has no password) gets a salt and verifier from `signInDecoyKey` and the
|
||||
address's hash, the same queries and arithmetic, and the same refusal: a wrong
|
||||
password, an unknown address and a wrong, used or missing code are all
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ export 'src/password/authenticators.dart'
|
|||
forgetUnconfirmedAuthenticators,
|
||||
maxAuthenticators,
|
||||
unconfirmedAuthenticatorLifetime;
|
||||
export 'src/password/key_proof.dart' show keyProofMessage;
|
||||
export 'src/password/key_proof.dart'
|
||||
show KeyProofPurpose, keyProofMessage, newPasswordDigest, passwordIdentity;
|
||||
export 'src/password/password_config.dart';
|
||||
export 'src/password/passwords.dart'
|
||||
show
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -339,6 +339,11 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
type: _is.getType<_idt.ByteData?>(),
|
||||
nullable: true,
|
||||
),
|
||||
'host': _is.ParameterDescription(
|
||||
name: 'host',
|
||||
type: _is.getType<String>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
call:
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
|
@ -358,6 +363,7 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
code: params['code'],
|
||||
keyChallenge: params['keyChallenge'],
|
||||
signature: params['signature'],
|
||||
host: params['host'],
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
'beginKeyProof': _is.MethodConnector(
|
||||
|
|
@ -409,6 +415,11 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
type: _is.getType<String?>(),
|
||||
nullable: true,
|
||||
),
|
||||
'host': _is.ParameterDescription(
|
||||
name: 'host',
|
||||
type: _is.getType<String>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
call:
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
|
@ -424,6 +435,7 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
password: params['password'],
|
||||
totpCode: params['totpCode'],
|
||||
recoveryCode: params['recoveryCode'],
|
||||
host: params['host'],
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
'startAccountReset': _is.MethodConnector(
|
||||
|
|
@ -710,6 +722,11 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
type: _is.getType<_ijye8mcv.NewPassword>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
'host': _is.ParameterDescription(
|
||||
name: 'host',
|
||||
type: _is.getType<String>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
call:
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
|
@ -724,6 +741,7 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
totpCode: params['totpCode'],
|
||||
recoveryCode: params['recoveryCode'],
|
||||
password: params['password'],
|
||||
host: params['host'],
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
'setRecoveryKeys': _is.MethodConnector(
|
||||
|
|
@ -764,6 +782,11 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
type: _is.getType<_idt.ByteData>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
'host': _is.ParameterDescription(
|
||||
name: 'host',
|
||||
type: _is.getType<String>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
call:
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
|
@ -779,6 +802,7 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
recoveryCode: params['recoveryCode'],
|
||||
recoveryKeys: params['recoveryKeys'],
|
||||
recoveryProofKey: params['recoveryProofKey'],
|
||||
host: params['host'],
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
@ -846,6 +870,11 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
type: _is.getType<String?>(),
|
||||
nullable: true,
|
||||
),
|
||||
'host': _is.ParameterDescription(
|
||||
name: 'host',
|
||||
type: _is.getType<String>(),
|
||||
nullable: false,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
call:
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
|
@ -863,6 +892,7 @@ class Endpoints extends _is.EndpointDispatch {
|
|||
recoveryCode: params['recoveryCode'],
|
||||
request: params['request'],
|
||||
code: params['code'],
|
||||
host: params['host'],
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
'signUp': _is.MethodConnector(
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -73,7 +73,12 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _is.SerializableModel {
|
|||
/// Adding an authenticator to an account that has one confirmed takes a
|
||||
/// code from one of those, which is missing or isn't right: a session
|
||||
/// alone adds no second factor.
|
||||
wrongExistingCode;
|
||||
wrongExistingCode,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The device addressed this instance by another name than its own
|
||||
/// (`apiServer.publicHost`): what it proves is bound to the name it
|
||||
/// addressed, so the operator must configure the name devices use.
|
||||
otherInstance;
|
||||
|
||||
static PasswordRefusal fromJson(String name) {
|
||||
switch (name) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -111,6 +116,8 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _is.SerializableModel {
|
|||
return PasswordRefusal.noReset;
|
||||
case 'wrongExistingCode':
|
||||
return PasswordRefusal.wrongExistingCode;
|
||||
case 'otherInstance':
|
||||
return PasswordRefusal.otherInstance;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
throw ArgumentError(
|
||||
'Value "$name" cannot be converted to "PasswordRefusal"',
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import 'dart:typed_data';
|
|||
import 'package:clock/clock.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/auth/email.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/generated/protocol.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/password/key_proof.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/password/passwords.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/sessions_ended.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:serverpod/serverpod.dart';
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
|
|||
String? code,
|
||||
UuidValue? keyChallenge,
|
||||
ByteData? signature,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
final pod = session.serverpod;
|
||||
final keys = requirePasswordKeys(pod);
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
|
|||
challenge: challenge,
|
||||
clientValue: clientValue,
|
||||
clientProof: clientProof,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
);
|
||||
final to = normalizedAddress(address);
|
||||
if (to == null || addressHash(pod, to) != proved.addressHash) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,6 +83,8 @@ Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
|
|||
keys,
|
||||
challenge: keyChallenge,
|
||||
signature: signature,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.authenticatorReset,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (owner.authUserId != account) {
|
||||
throw refusedFor(PasswordRefusal.wrongCredentials);
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,6 +122,7 @@ Future<AccountSessionsEnded> resetPasswordWithPhrase(
|
|||
required NewPassword password,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
final keys = requirePasswordKeys(session.serverpod);
|
||||
if (!isNewPassword(password)) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -127,6 +133,9 @@ Future<AccountSessionsEnded> resetPasswordWithPhrase(
|
|||
keys,
|
||||
challenge: challenge,
|
||||
signature: signature,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.passwordReset,
|
||||
digest: newPasswordDigest(password),
|
||||
);
|
||||
final account = row.authUserId;
|
||||
await secondFactor(
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import 'dart:typed_data';
|
|||
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/common/network.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/generated/protocol.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/password/key_proof.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/password/passwords.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/account_register.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/people.dart';
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ class AccountRecoveryEndpoint extends Endpoint {
|
|||
String? code,
|
||||
UuidValue? keyChallenge,
|
||||
ByteData? signature,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) => AccountRegister.of(session.serverpod).resetAuthenticator(
|
||||
session,
|
||||
challenge: challenge,
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ class AccountRecoveryEndpoint extends Endpoint {
|
|||
code: code,
|
||||
keyChallenge: keyChallenge,
|
||||
signature: signature,
|
||||
host: deviceHostOn(session.serverpod, host),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The first step of proving the recovery phrase for [address]: the
|
||||
|
|
@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ class AccountRecoveryEndpoint extends Endpoint {
|
|||
required NewPassword password,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
final ended = await AccountRegister.of(session.serverpod)
|
||||
.resetPasswordWithPhrase(
|
||||
|
|
@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ class AccountRecoveryEndpoint extends Endpoint {
|
|||
password: password,
|
||||
totpCode: totpCode,
|
||||
recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
|
||||
host: deviceHostOn(session.serverpod, host),
|
||||
);
|
||||
return await issueSessionAfter(
|
||||
session,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,25 +1,125 @@
|
|||
import 'dart:convert';
|
||||
import 'dart:typed_data';
|
||||
|
||||
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart' as hashes;
|
||||
import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/generated/protocol.dart';
|
||||
import 'package:serverpod/serverpod.dart';
|
||||
|
||||
// Proving the recovery phrase (ADR 0017): the device opens the account's
|
||||
// private keys with the phrase and signs, with the Ed25519 key so opened,
|
||||
// what [keyProofMessage] makes of the register's challenge; the register
|
||||
// checks the signature against the account's public signing key. Only the
|
||||
// account's own key signs so: the phrase never leaves the device.
|
||||
// What a device proves and signs, bound to the instance it addresses (ADR
|
||||
// 0017; the second reading's M6): SRP's identity and the recovery phrase's
|
||||
// proof carry the host the device addressed, so a hostile instance a person
|
||||
// was lured into adding can't relay them to the real one, which takes them
|
||||
// only for its own host; and a phrase's proof for a new password signs that
|
||||
// password, so nobody between can swap in another. The phrase's proof key
|
||||
// is the phrase's own (`recoveryProofKey`), never the account's signing key.
|
||||
// halkyon_base_client's `key_proof.dart` makes the same bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
/// What the device signs to prove the recovery phrase: a label naming the
|
||||
/// purpose and its version, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes) and its nonce,
|
||||
/// so a signature made for one challenge, or for anything else the account
|
||||
/// signs, never counts for another.
|
||||
Uint8List keyProofMessage(UuidValue challenge, List<int> nonce) =>
|
||||
Uint8List.fromList([
|
||||
...utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v1|'),
|
||||
...challenge.toBytes(),
|
||||
...nonce,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
/// SRP's identity I for the sign-in [challenge] on [host] (in lower case):
|
||||
/// x comes from Argon2id over the password and salt alone, so I only binds
|
||||
/// the proof, to this sign-in and this instance.
|
||||
Uint8List passwordIdentity(UuidValue challenge, String host) => _framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon srp identity v1'),
|
||||
challenge.toBytes(),
|
||||
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
/// What proving the recovery phrase is for.
|
||||
enum KeyProofPurpose {
|
||||
/// Asking for the reset of a lost authenticator.
|
||||
authenticatorReset('authenticator reset'),
|
||||
|
||||
/// Setting a new password, the keys staying.
|
||||
passwordReset('password reset');
|
||||
|
||||
KeyProofPurpose(this.label);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The words the message carries.
|
||||
final String label;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// What the device signs with the phrase's proof key: a label naming the
|
||||
/// format, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes), its nonce, the [host] the
|
||||
/// device addressed, the [purpose] and the [digest] of what it sets
|
||||
/// ([newPasswordDigest]), each framed by its length; so a signature made
|
||||
/// for one challenge, instance, purpose or password never counts for
|
||||
/// another.
|
||||
Uint8List keyProofMessage(
|
||||
UuidValue challenge,
|
||||
List<int> nonce, {
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
required KeyProofPurpose purpose,
|
||||
List<int> digest = const [],
|
||||
}) => _framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
|
||||
challenge.toBytes(),
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
|
||||
utf8.encode(purpose.label),
|
||||
digest,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The SHA-256 of [password] as the device sent it, framed: what a
|
||||
/// phrase's proof for it signs.
|
||||
Uint8List newPasswordDigest(NewPassword password) => Uint8List.fromList(
|
||||
hashes.sha256
|
||||
.convert(
|
||||
_framed([
|
||||
utf8.encode('halkyon new password v1'),
|
||||
Uint8List.sublistView(password.salt),
|
||||
utf8.encode(password.costs.algorithm),
|
||||
utf8.encode('${password.costs.opsLimit}'),
|
||||
utf8.encode('${password.costs.memLimit}'),
|
||||
Uint8List.sublistView(password.verifier),
|
||||
Uint8List.sublistView(password.passwordKeys.nonce),
|
||||
Uint8List.sublistView(password.passwordKeys.cipherText),
|
||||
]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.bytes,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/// [parts], each after its length in four bytes, big-endian.
|
||||
Uint8List _framed(List<List<int>> parts) {
|
||||
final bytes = BytesBuilder(copy: false);
|
||||
for (final part in parts) {
|
||||
bytes
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 24) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 16) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte((part.length >> 8) & 0xff)
|
||||
..addByte(part.length & 0xff)
|
||||
..add(part);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return bytes.takeBytes();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The host a device addressed this server by ([claimed]), which its proofs
|
||||
/// are bound to: where the server runs for real, only its own public host
|
||||
/// ([publicHost], `apiServer.publicHost`), refused otherwise
|
||||
/// ([PasswordRefusal.otherInstance]: the instance is configured under
|
||||
/// another name than the device reaches it by); in development whatever
|
||||
/// the device names, as an emulator reaches the developer's machine as
|
||||
/// 10.0.2.2 and a phone on the network by its address. A relaying
|
||||
/// instance gains nothing either way: the device's proof names the host it
|
||||
/// addressed, and the real one checks it for its own.
|
||||
String deviceHost({
|
||||
required String runMode,
|
||||
required String publicHost,
|
||||
required String claimed,
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
final host = claimed.trim().toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (runMode != ServerpodRunMode.development &&
|
||||
host != publicHost.trim().toLowerCase()) {
|
||||
throw PasswordRefusedException(reason: PasswordRefusal.otherInstance);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return host;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// [deviceHost] on [pod].
|
||||
String deviceHostOn(Serverpod pod, String claimed) => deviceHost(
|
||||
runMode: pod.runMode,
|
||||
publicHost: pod.config.apiServer.publicHost,
|
||||
claimed: claimed,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether [signature] is the account's Ed25519 signature ([publicKey], 32
|
||||
/// bytes) over [message]; false for anything malformed.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Future<void> changePassword(
|
|||
required ByteData clientProof,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
required NewPassword password,
|
||||
UuidValue? keepSession,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ Future<void> changePassword(
|
|||
clientProof: clientProof,
|
||||
totpCode: totpCode,
|
||||
recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
);
|
||||
await session.db.transaction((transaction) async {
|
||||
// UPDATE "account_password" SET "salt" = $1, "kdfAlgorithm" = $2,
|
||||
|
|
@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ Future<void> setRecoveryKeys(
|
|||
required ByteData clientProof,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
required WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
|
||||
required ByteData recoveryProofKey,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,6 +120,7 @@ Future<void> setRecoveryKeys(
|
|||
clientProof: clientProof,
|
||||
totpCode: totpCode,
|
||||
recoveryCode: recoveryCode,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// UPDATE "account_password" SET "recoveryKeysNonce" = $1,
|
||||
// "recoveryKeysCipherText" = $2, "recoveryProofKey" = $3,
|
||||
|
|
@ -150,6 +154,7 @@ Future<AccountPassword> _proveOwner(
|
|||
required ByteData clientProof,
|
||||
String? totpCode,
|
||||
String? recoveryCode,
|
||||
required String host,
|
||||
}) async {
|
||||
final proved = await provePassword(
|
||||
session,
|
||||
|
|
@ -157,6 +162,7 @@ Future<AccountPassword> _proveOwner(
|
|||
challenge: challenge,
|
||||
clientValue: clientValue,
|
||||
clientProof: clientProof,
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
);
|
||||
final row = proved.password;
|
||||
if (row.authUserId != person) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more
Loading…
Reference in a new issue