fix(auth)!: proofs are bound to the instance the device addresses

Nothing tied a sign-in's proof to the instance it was made for: an
instance a person was lured into adding could pass A, M1 and the code on
to the real register and get a session there, and pass a phrase's proof
on with a password of its own in place of the person's (the second
reading's M6). SRP's identity is now a label, the challenge's ID and
the host the device addressed (passwordIdentity, in halkyon_base_client
and halkyon_base_server alike), and the phrase's proof signs that host,
what it is for (an authenticator's reset or a new password) and the new
password's digest (key proof v2). Every proving call carries the host;
in production it must be the server's apiServer.publicHost (otherwise
otherInstance, which the app shows as an instance it can't trust), in
development any; a member forwards its own. The tests prove that a
relayed sign-in, a proof for another host or purpose, and a swapped
password are refused, nothing changing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
This commit is contained in:
Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 2026-10-20 21:20:12 +02:00
commit dab2c80524
Signed by: raisondetredev
GPG key ID: 07F6FCF405488B64
4 changed files with 966 additions and 137 deletions

View file

@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
String? code,
_isc.UuidValue? keyChallenge,
_idt.ByteData? signature,
required String host,
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_ippuf33k.ResetPending>(
'halkyon_base.accountRecovery',
'resetAuthenticator',
@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
'code': code,
'keyChallenge': keyChallenge,
'signature': signature,
'host': host,
},
);
@ -266,6 +268,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
required _i95l60wq.NewPassword password,
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
required String host,
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_iacc.AuthSuccess>(
'halkyon_base.accountRecovery',
'resetPassword',
@ -275,6 +278,7 @@ class EndpointAccountRecovery extends _isc.EndpointRef {
'password': password,
'totpCode': totpCode,
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
'host': host,
},
);
@ -445,6 +449,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
required _i95l60wq.NewPassword password,
required String host,
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<void>(
'halkyon_base.password',
'change',
@ -455,6 +460,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
'totpCode': totpCode,
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
'password': password,
'host': host,
},
);
@ -471,6 +477,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
String? recoveryCode,
required _i3so7e0p.WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
required _idt.ByteData recoveryProofKey,
required String host,
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<void>(
'halkyon_base.password',
'setRecoveryKeys',
@ -482,6 +489,7 @@ class EndpointPassword extends _isc.EndpointRef {
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
'recoveryKeys': recoveryKeys,
'recoveryProofKey': recoveryProofKey,
'host': host,
},
);
}
@ -522,6 +530,7 @@ class EndpointPasswordSignIn extends _isc.EndpointRef {
String? recoveryCode,
_isc.UuidValue? request,
String? code,
required String host,
}) => caller.callServerEndpoint<_ix90myvx.PasswordSignedIn>(
'halkyon_base.passwordSignIn',
'complete',
@ -533,6 +542,7 @@ class EndpointPasswordSignIn extends _isc.EndpointRef {
'recoveryCode': recoveryCode,
'request': request,
'code': code,
'host': host,
},
);

View file

@ -73,7 +73,12 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _isc.SerializableModel {
/// Adding an authenticator to an account that has one confirmed takes a
/// code from one of those, which is missing or isn't right: a session
/// alone adds no second factor.
wrongExistingCode;
wrongExistingCode,
/// The device addressed this instance by another name than its own
/// (`apiServer.publicHost`): what it proves is bound to the name it
/// addressed, so the operator must configure the name devices use.
otherInstance;
static PasswordRefusal fromJson(String name) {
switch (name) {
@ -111,6 +116,8 @@ enum PasswordRefusal implements _isc.SerializableModel {
return PasswordRefusal.noReset;
case 'wrongExistingCode':
return PasswordRefusal.wrongExistingCode;
case 'otherInstance':
return PasswordRefusal.otherInstance;
default:
throw ArgumentError(
'Value "$name" cannot be converted to "PasswordRefusal"',

View file

@ -1,14 +1,95 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:typed_data';
/// What the device signs with the account's Ed25519 key, opened with the
/// recovery phrase, to prove the phrase (ADR 0017): a label naming the
/// purpose and its version, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes) and the
/// register's nonce. The register checks the signature over the same bytes
/// (halkyon_base_server's `key_proof.dart`).
Uint8List keyProofMessage(List<int> challenge, List<int> nonce) =>
Uint8List.fromList([
...utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v1|'),
...challenge,
...nonce,
]);
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
// What the device proves and signs with, bound to the instance it addresses
// (ADR 0017; the second reading's M6): a hostile instance a person was lured
// into adding can't relay a sign-in or a phrase's proof to the real one,
// which takes them only for its own host, nor swap in a password of its
// own. halkyon_base_server's `key_proof.dart` makes the same bytes.
/// SRP's identity I for the sign-in [challenge] (its 16 bytes) on [host],
/// the instance as the device addresses it, in lower case. SRP's x comes
/// from Argon2id over the password and salt alone, so I only binds the
/// proof: to this sign-in and to this instance.
Uint8List passwordIdentity(List<int> challenge, String host) => _framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon srp identity v1'),
challenge,
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
]);
/// What proving the recovery phrase is for, by the words the message
/// carries ([label]).
enum KeyProofPurpose(final String label) {
/// Asking for the reset of a lost authenticator.
authenticatorReset('authenticator reset'),
/// Setting a new password, the keys staying.
passwordReset('password reset'),
}
/// What the device signs with the recovery phrase's proof key to prove the
/// phrase: a label naming the format, the challenge's ID (its 16 bytes),
/// the register's nonce, the [host] the device addresses, the [purpose],
/// and the [digest] of what it sets ([newPasswordDigest] for a new
/// password; none for a reset of the authenticators), each framed by its
/// length.
Uint8List keyProofMessage(
List<int> challenge,
List<int> nonce, {
required String host,
required KeyProofPurpose purpose,
List<int> digest = const [],
}) => _framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
challenge,
nonce,
utf8.encode(host.toLowerCase()),
utf8.encode(purpose.label),
digest,
]);
/// The SHA-256 of a new password as the device sends it (the salt,
/// Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the keys wrapped under it), framed:
/// what a phrase's proof for a new password signs, so nobody between the
/// device and the register can swap in another.
Uint8List newPasswordDigest({
required List<int> salt,
required String algorithm,
required int opsLimit,
required int memLimit,
required List<int> verifier,
required List<int> keysNonce,
required List<int> keysCipherText,
}) => Uint8List.fromList(
sha256
.convert(
_framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon new password v1'),
salt,
utf8.encode(algorithm),
utf8.encode('$opsLimit'),
utf8.encode('$memLimit'),
verifier,
keysNonce,
keysCipherText,
]),
)
.bytes,
);
/// [parts], each after its length in four bytes, big-endian, so no part
/// can run into the next.
Uint8List _framed(List<List<int>> parts) {
final bytes = BytesBuilder(copy: false);
for (final part in parts) {
bytes
..addByte((part.length >> 24) & 0xff)
..addByte((part.length >> 16) & 0xff)
..addByte((part.length >> 8) & 0xff)
..addByte(part.length & 0xff)
..add(part);
}
return bytes.takeBytes();
}

View file

@ -1,20 +1,120 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_client/srp.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
/// [parts], each after its length in four bytes, big-endian.
List<int> _framed(List<List<int>> parts) => [
for (final part in parts) ...[
(part.length >> 24) & 0xff,
(part.length >> 16) & 0xff,
(part.length >> 8) & 0xff,
part.length & 0xff,
...part,
],
];
void main() {
test('the key proof message is the label, the challenge and the nonce, as '
final challenge = List.generate(16, (i) => i);
final nonce = List.generate(32, (i) => 200 + i % 50);
test("SRP's identity is the label, the challenge and the host the device "
'addresses, each framed by its length, the host in lower case', () {
expect(
passwordIdentity(challenge, 'Learn.Halkyon.EU'),
_framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon srp identity v1'),
challenge,
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
]),
);
expect(
passwordIdentity(challenge, 'learn.halkyon.eu'),
isNot(passwordIdentity(challenge, 'learn.halkyon.eu.evil.example')),
);
});
test('the key proof message is the label, the challenge, the nonce, the '
'host, what it proves the phrase for and what that sets, framed, as '
'the register checks it', () {
final challenge = List.generate(16, (i) => i);
final nonce = List.generate(32, (i) => 200 + i % 50);
final digest = List.generate(32, (i) => i * 3);
final message = keyProofMessage(challenge, nonce);
expect(
keyProofMessage(
challenge,
nonce,
host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.passwordReset,
digest: digest,
),
_framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
challenge,
nonce,
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
utf8.encode('password reset'),
digest,
]),
);
expect(
keyProofMessage(
challenge,
nonce,
host: 'learn.halkyon.eu',
purpose: KeyProofPurpose.authenticatorReset,
),
_framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v2'),
challenge,
nonce,
utf8.encode('learn.halkyon.eu'),
utf8.encode('authenticator reset'),
<int>[],
]),
);
});
expect(message, [
...utf8.encode('halkyon key proof v1|'),
...challenge,
...nonce,
]);
test("a new password's digest is SHA-256 over its parts, framed: the "
'salt, the costs, the verifier and the wrapping', () {
final digest = newPasswordDigest(
salt: [1, 2],
algorithm: 'argon2id13',
opsLimit: 3,
memLimit: 67108864,
verifier: [3, 4, 5],
keysNonce: [6],
keysCipherText: [7, 8],
);
expect(
digest,
sha256
.convert(
_framed([
utf8.encode('halkyon new password v1'),
[1, 2],
utf8.encode('argon2id13'),
utf8.encode('3'),
utf8.encode('67108864'),
[3, 4, 5],
[6],
[7, 8],
]),
)
.bytes,
);
expect(
newPasswordDigest(
salt: [1, 2],
algorithm: 'argon2id13',
opsLimit: 3,
memLimit: 67108864,
verifier: [3, 4, 5],
keysNonce: [6],
keysCipherText: [7, 9],
),
isNot(digest),
);
});
}