halkyon-days/halkyon
Watch
1
0
Fork
You've already forked halkyon
 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases 37 Packages Wiki Activity Actions

docs(auth): reading the full reading's fixes (ADR 0017)

Browse source 
ADR 0017 gets "Reading the fixes (21 Oct 2026)": each finding and what
was done, and "The rules as they stand" brought up to date (resets take
effect once 72 hours outside hold-outs passed and lapse 30 days after
they were asked; GitHub-only accounts go 30 days after the end; a member
takes the register's moment by its own clock; nothing secret copied on
the device). The module README and Learn's AGENTS.md say the same.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
This commit is contained in:
Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 2026-10-21 16:49:57 +02:00
commit 8d6c54ef22
Signed by: raisondetredev
GPG key ID: 07F6FCF405488B64
1 changed files with 80 additions and 16 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
apps/learn/AGENTS.md
View file

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ A spaced-repetition learning app: studysets of flashcards, reviewed on an FSRS s
- **Authentication**: server-side sessions (`ServerSideSessionsConfigFromPasswords`), not JWT, for immediate revocation. Scopes are copied onto the session row, so changing a person's scopes means updating their session rows too.
- **Identity**: `AuthUser` is the person; identity providers (anonymous, GitHub, an email address with a password) attach to it. Content references `AuthUser`, never a provider account. A person may sign in with GitHub and with an address and password, one of each (`account.signInWays`, which also says whether they have a password and a confirmed authenticator); the Profile tab lists their ways in, adds GitHub where offered, and holds halkyon_app's `AccountSecuritySection` (setting up a password, the authenticators, changing it).
- **A password and an authenticator** (ADR 0017, built 2026-10-20 for build 22; halkyon_base's and halkyon_app's READMEs): the only way an identified person signs in besides GitHub, which is deprecated. The address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a, `passwordSignIn.begin` and `complete`, the verifier and the account's wrapped keys on the register) and a code from an authenticator app (TOTP, mandatory) or a recovery code. An address nobody has is answered as an account's would be (decoys from `signInDecoyKey`), and every wrong credential is refused alike (`wrongCredentials`). Lost authenticator: the password and a mailed code (or the recovery phrase) turn it off 72 hours later, a mail at the start, a sign-in with a code calling it off; lost password: the recovery phrase's signature and a code set a new one, keys kept, or without the phrase a mailed code resets the whole account (new keys) after the same 72 hours. While the owner is held out of signing in (codes waiting, the address's ceiling filled), a waiting reset is pushed to 72 hours after it ends; one that took effect and wasn't carried out lapses a week later; the Profile tab's account section shows waiting resets, called off with the password and a code (ADR 0017's full reading). An account with a password and a confirmed authenticator no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub (`usePassword`); where passwords are offered, no new GitHub account is linked (`deprecated`), and from `GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS` on GitHub signs nobody in and pruning forgets every GitHub ID, deleting first the accounts that signed in with GitHub alone (no address), which the app warns of until then (D2; the full reading's M1). Password sign-in is on only where the passwords hold `totpKey`, `recoveryCodeKey` and `signInDecoyKey` (`TOTP_KEY`, `RECOVERY_CODE_KEY`, `SIGN_IN_DECOY_KEY` in `deploy/.env`) and email sign-in is set up (`passwordSignIn` in `instance.basics()`). On the device (halkyon_app): signing up shows the recovery phrase once and checks three of its words before anything reaches the instance; signing in checks SRP's M2 and opens the keys before the session is put in place; an authenticator still to set up is set up with the session held back; the unlocked keys stay in the system's keyring per instance and person, gone once another person signs in or nobody. A session alone never gets a code checked (ADR 0017's third reading, as Proton has it): every signed-in change of how the account is secured (adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password, deleting) takes the password and a code (`OwnerProof`), each sheet asking for both; a session's wrong proofs count for it alone and the tenth in a row ends it, never making the account's codes wait. Nor does a session alone set a first password or confirm a first authenticator (the fourth reading): an account with an address proves it by a code mailed there (`firstPassword`), one that signs in with GitHub alone by a GitHub sign-in of the last 10 minutes (the app offers a password right after one, before the person's app, and asks for GitHub anew when the instance says `signInAgain`), and the first authenticator takes the password. A change of password ends the account's other sessions and every reset all of them, the authenticators' included as the sign-in carries it out, on every service of the instance (`sessions_ended_notice`). ADR 0017's "The rules as they stand" lists who changes what with which proofs.
- **A password and an authenticator** (ADR 0017, built 2026-10-20 for build 22; halkyon_base's and halkyon_app's READMEs): the only way an identified person signs in besides GitHub, which is deprecated. The address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a, `passwordSignIn.begin` and `complete`, the verifier and the account's wrapped keys on the register) and a code from an authenticator app (TOTP, mandatory) or a recovery code. An address nobody has is answered as an account's would be (decoys from `signInDecoyKey`), and every wrong credential is refused alike (`wrongCredentials`). Lost authenticator: the password and a mailed code (or the recovery phrase) turn it off 72 hours later, a mail at the start, a sign-in with a code calling it off; lost password: the recovery phrase's signature and a code set a new one, keys kept, or without the phrase a mailed code resets the whole account (new keys) after the same 72 hours. A reset takes effect only once the owner had 72 hours outside hold-outs (codes waiting, the address's ceiling filled: each moves it on by the time it holds the owner out); one that took effect and wasn't carried out lapses a week later, and every reset 30 days after it was asked; the Profile tab's account section shows waiting resets, called off with the password and a code (ADR 0017's full reading). An account with a password and a confirmed authenticator no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub (`usePassword`); where passwords are offered, no new GitHub account is linked (`deprecated`), and from `GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS` on GitHub signs nobody in and, 30 days later (a date set wrong can be put right first), the register's pruning forgets every GitHub ID, deleting first the accounts that signed in with GitHub alone (no address), which the app warns of until then (D2; the full reading's M1). Password sign-in is on only where the passwords hold `totpKey`, `recoveryCodeKey` and `signInDecoyKey` (`TOTP_KEY`, `RECOVERY_CODE_KEY`, `SIGN_IN_DECOY_KEY` in `deploy/.env`) and email sign-in is set up (`passwordSignIn` in `instance.basics()`). On the device (halkyon_app): signing up shows the recovery phrase once and checks three of its words before anything reaches the instance; signing in checks SRP's M2 and opens the keys before the session is put in place; an authenticator still to set up is set up with the session held back; the unlocked keys stay in the system's keyring per instance and person, gone once another person signs in or nobody. A session alone never gets a code checked (ADR 0017's third reading, as Proton has it): every signed-in change of how the account is secured (adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password, deleting) takes the password and a code (`OwnerProof`), each sheet asking for both; a session's wrong proofs count for it alone and the tenth in a row ends it, never making the account's codes wait. Nor does a session alone set a first password or confirm a first authenticator (the fourth reading): an account with an address proves it by a code mailed there (`firstPassword`), one that signs in with GitHub alone by a GitHub sign-in of the last 10 minutes (the app offers a password right after one, before the person's app, and asks for GitHub anew when the instance says `signInAgain`), and the first authenticator takes the password. A change of password ends the account's other sessions and every reset all of them, the authenticators' included as the sign-in carries it out, on every service of the instance (`sessions_ended_notice`). ADR 0017's "The rules as they stand" lists who changes what with which proofs.
- **One account across the instance** (ADR 0016, decided 2026-10-19; halkyon_base's README): Learn's server holds the instance's register, so its tables keep every service's ways in, handles and profiles, and an account's ID is the `AuthUser` ID in every service. The instance's other services (Todo) are its members: they ask it over its web server (`/halkyon-base/register/…`, `addInstanceRoutes` in `server.dart`, never forwarded by Caddy) with the secret the services share (`instanceSecret`, `INSTANCE_SECRET` in `deploy/.env`), and a member's anonymous person adding a way in becomes an account here under the same ID. Deleting an account (here, or a member passing it on) keeps a notice per member in the same transaction (`account_deletion_notice`), told at once and hourly until each confirms (`tellMembersOfDeletions`). Learn's endpoints and code go through the module as on any register; nothing changes for Learn's apps.
- **GitHub keeps only the numeric GitHub ID**: our own slim login (halkyon_base's `github.dart`) on Serverpod's GitHub helpers; Serverpod's stock GitHub login endpoint, which stores name, email and avatar, is never exposed. GitHub sign-in is on only where the passwords hold `githubClientId` and `githubClientSecret` (in production `GITHUB_CLIENT_ID`/`GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET` in `deploy/.env`); the app asks halkyon_base's `instance.basics()`.
- **Linking keeps the person** (`GitHubUpgradeEndpoint`, `requireLogin`): the GitHub ID joins the signed-in anonymous person, who becomes identified and loses the anonymous identity, in one transaction. **Signing in** (`GitHubSignInEndpoint`) only reaches people who have a GitHub account already, and only without a session: Serverpod refuses to issue another person's session inside a signed-in call. Refusals are `GitHubSignInRefusedException` with a reason.