feat(keys): halkyon_keys, an account's keys on the device

ADR 0017's step 1, on libsodium (sodium 4.1.0+1, whose build hook
compiles the libsodium 1.0.22 it ships: a C compiler and make wherever
it builds):
- Argon2id (64 MiB, 3 passes, kept with the account and never below
  that) makes a master key, which libsodium's KDF splits into SRP's
  secret (x) and the key-encryption key.
- The account's X25519 and Ed25519 key pairs, their private halves
  wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under the KEK and under the recovery
  key, bound to their public keys.
- A 24-word BIP-39 recovery phrase (the English list, MIT) and the
  recovery key derived from it.
- Data keys sealed to the account with crypto_box_seal, bound to their
  IDs; content in ADR 0002's envelope, encrypted with a data key and
  signed with Ed25519 (detached), bound to a context the caller names.
- Secrets in libsodium's guarded memory where its API takes them.
- Tests: libsodium's Argon2id known answers, BIP-39's English vectors,
  round trips and every refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
This commit is contained in:
Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 2026-10-20 12:01:52 +02:00
commit 3bc0bae6e3
Signed by: raisondetredev
GPG key ID: 07F6FCF405488B64

View file

@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:typed_data';
import 'package:halkyon_keys/halkyon_keys.dart';
import 'package:sodium/sodium_sumo.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
Future<void> main() async {
final sodium = await SodiumSumoInit.init();
Matcher refusedFor(KeyRefusal reason) => throwsA(
isA<KeyRefused>().having((refused) => refused.reason, 'reason', reason),
);
group('data keys, sealed to the account', () {
final account = AccountKeys.generate(sodium);
final dataKey = DataKey.generate(sodium, 'agenda-2026');
final sealed = sealDataKey(sodium, dataKey, account.encryptionPublicKey);
test("any device that opens the account opens the store's key", () {
final opened = openDataKey(
sodium,
sealed,
keyId: 'agenda-2026',
keys: account,
);
expect(opened.keyId, 'agenda-2026');
expect(opened.key.extractBytes(), dataKey.key.extractBytes());
});
test("another account's keys don't open it", () {
expect(
() => openDataKey(
sodium,
sealed,
keyId: 'agenda-2026',
keys: AccountKeys.generate(sodium),
),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongKeyOrTampered),
);
});
test('a sealed key changed is refused', () {
final tampered = Uint8List.fromList(sealed)..[40] ^= 1;
expect(
() => openDataKey(
sodium,
tampered,
keyId: 'agenda-2026',
keys: account,
),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongKeyOrTampered),
);
});
test("a key sealed under one ID doesn't open as another's: a server "
"can't swap stores' keys", () {
expect(
() => openDataKey(
sodium,
sealed,
keyId: 'studyset-7',
keys: account,
),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongDataKey),
);
});
test('an ID must be 1 to 255 bytes', () {
expect(() => DataKey.generate(sodium, ''), throwsArgumentError);
expect(
() => DataKey.generate(sodium, 'x' * 256),
throwsArgumentError,
);
});
});
group('content, sealed and signed', () {
final author = AccountKeys.generate(sodium);
final dataKey = DataKey.generate(sodium, 'agenda-2026');
final context = utf8.encode('agenda_item/0192f3a4');
final plainText = Uint8List.fromList(
utf8.encode('{"title": "Study N3: 34 cards"}'),
);
final sealed = sealContent(
sodium,
plainText: plainText,
dataKey: dataKey,
author: author,
context: context,
);
Uint8List open(
SealedContent what, {
DataKey? withKey,
Uint8List? signedBy,
List<int>? at,
}) => openContent(
sodium,
what,
dataKey: withKey ?? dataKey,
authorSigningPublicKey: signedBy ?? author.signingPublicKey,
context: at ?? context,
);
test("opens with the data key, its signature the author's", () {
expect(open(sealed), plainText);
expect(sealed.keyId, 'agenda-2026');
expect(sealed.nonce, hasLength(24));
expect(sealed.signature, hasLength(64));
// The payload is no plain text.
expect(
utf8.decode(sealed.payload, allowMalformed: true),
isNot(contains('Study')),
);
});
test('every sealing takes a new nonce', () {
final again = sealContent(
sodium,
plainText: plainText,
dataKey: dataKey,
author: author,
context: context,
);
expect(again.nonce, isNot(sealed.nonce));
expect(again.payload, isNot(sealed.payload));
});
test('another data key is refused, even under the same ID', () {
expect(
() => open(sealed, withKey: DataKey.generate(sodium, 'studyset-7')),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongDataKey),
);
expect(
() => open(sealed, withKey: DataKey.generate(sodium, 'agenda-2026')),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongKeyOrTampered),
);
});
test('a payload, nonce, ID or signature changed is refused as forged', () {
SealedContent changed({
String? keyId,
Uint8List? nonce,
Uint8List? payload,
Uint8List? signature,
}) => SealedContent(
keyId: keyId ?? sealed.keyId,
nonce: nonce ?? sealed.nonce,
payload: payload ?? sealed.payload,
signature: signature ?? sealed.signature,
);
for (final tampered in [
changed(payload: Uint8List.fromList(sealed.payload)..[0] ^= 1),
changed(nonce: Uint8List.fromList(sealed.nonce)..[23] ^= 1),
changed(signature: Uint8List.fromList(sealed.signature)..[10] ^= 1),
changed(signature: sealed.signature.sublist(1)),
]) {
expect(() => open(tampered), refusedFor(KeyRefusal.forgedSignature));
}
// Another ID than the key's is caught before anything else.
expect(
() => open(changed(keyId: 'agenda-2027')),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.wrongDataKey),
);
});
test("someone else's signature, or content moved to another row, is "
'refused', () {
expect(
() => open(
sealed,
signedBy: AccountKeys.generate(sodium).signingPublicKey,
),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.forgedSignature),
);
expect(
() => open(sealed, at: utf8.encode('agenda_item/0192f3a5')),
refusedFor(KeyRefusal.forgedSignature),
);
});
test('content resealed by someone holding the data key but not the '
"author's signing key doesn't pass as the author's", () {
final forger = AccountKeys.generate(sodium);
final forged = sealContent(
sodium,
plainText: Uint8List.fromList(utf8.encode('{"title": "forged"}')),
dataKey: dataKey,
author: forger,
context: context,
);
expect(() => open(forged), refusedFor(KeyRefusal.forgedSignature));
expect(open(forged, signedBy: forger.signingPublicKey), isNotEmpty);
});
});
}