feat(base): SimpleLogin accounts' keys without SRP, signing up in one call (ADR 0020, step 3)
An account that signs in with SimpleLogin keeps its keys under a password that signs nobody in (D19): `account_password` keeps the password's own proof key (Ed25519, `passwordProofKey`) in place of SRP's verifier, which becomes nullable. The migration adds the column and drops the NOT NULL, nothing else. - `simpleLogin.signUp(attempt, handle, setup)`: someone new whose identity waits under the attempt gets, in one transaction, an account (identified), the link, a profile with the handle and the keys; then a session (D18). Refused, the identity still waiting, for a setup out of range and a handle refused as saving a profile refuses it. - `simpleLogin.checkHandle(attempt, handle)`: whether someone new could take a handle, at most 30 an hour per attempt and 60 per network. - `simpleLogin.complete` says, for an account, whether it has its keys and its handle, and keeps the sign-in ten minutes under its attempt, the account as its caller: D20's confirmation for the changes to come. - `keys.begin`, `keys.unlock`: the keys for a signed-in device once the password is proven with its proof key, for a nonce, bound to the base URL the device addressed; wrong proofs counted per session as ADR 0017's. - An authenticator is enrolled only for a password that signs in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the four new operations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
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@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ Endpoints, under the nickname `base` in a host's client (`client.modules.base.em
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| `passwordSignIn` | `begin`, `complete`: SRP-6a's two steps with a code from an authenticator (or a recovery code; a setup never finished, a code by mail); a session. `signUp`: an account at the address a mailed code proves, with a password; a session | without a session |
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| `authenticator` | `enrol`, `confirm` (the first brings ten recovery codes; another takes a code from one confirmed before), `list`, `remove`, `newRecoveryCodes` | signed in |
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| `accountRecovery` | `resetAuthenticator`, `beginKeyProof`, `resetPassword` (with the recovery phrase), `startAccountReset`, `completeAccountReset` | without a session |
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| `simpleLogin` | `begin(platform)`: an attempt and SimpleLogin's address to open, at most 30 an hour per network; `complete(attempt, code)`: signed out, a session for the account with that SimpleLogin ID, or for someone new the handle suggested from their name (their account comes with step 3); signed in, SimpleLogin added to the caller's account, who becomes `identified` | anyone |
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| `simpleLogin` | `begin(platform)`: an attempt and SimpleLogin's address to open, at most 30 an hour per network; `complete(attempt, code)`: signed out, a session for the account with that SimpleLogin ID, or for someone new the handle suggested from their name; signed in, SimpleLogin added to the caller's account, who becomes `identified`; for an account, whether it has its keys and its handle, the attempt standing ten minutes for the sign-in; `checkHandle(attempt, handle)`: whether someone new could take a handle, at most 30 an hour per attempt and 60 per network; `signUp(attempt, handle, setup)`, without a session: someone new's account, `identified`, with the handle and the keys the device made; a session | anyone |
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| `keys` | `begin`, `unlock`: the caller's keys for their device, once the password is proven with its own proof key (an account that signs in with SimpleLogin, Halkyon Learn's ADR 0020, D19); the tenth wrong proof in a row ends the session, as ADR 0017's do | signed in |
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| `gitHubUpgrade` | `upgrade`: links a GitHub account to the caller, who becomes `identified`; refused where passwords or SimpleLogin are offered (deprecated) | signed in |
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| `gitHubSignIn` | `signIn`: a session for whoever has that GitHub account, unless they sign in with a password; none once `GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS` has come | without a session |
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| `emailCode` | `sendCode`: a code by mail, which proves the address and signs nobody in | anyone |
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@ -53,7 +54,13 @@ Endpoints, under the nickname `base` in a host's client (`client.modules.base.em
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(`halkyon_oidc_identity`, the provider `simplelogin`): one per account, each an
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account's. Someone new's identity waits 30 minutes under the attempt's ID, with a
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handle suggested from the name SimpleLogin shared (`handleFromName`: `anna_mueller`,
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a number added where taken), which nothing keeps.
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a number added where taken), which nothing keeps. Signing up (`signUp`, D18) takes
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the identity and makes the account in one transaction: `identified`, linked, a
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profile with the handle (refused as saving a profile refuses it) and the keys, the
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password's own proof key (Ed25519) in place of SRP's verifier (D19). The password
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opens the keys and signs nobody in, so such an account has no authenticator (`enrol`
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refuses it `noPassword`). A sign-in into an account keeps its attempt ten minutes
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more, the account its caller: it confirms a change the device asks for next (D20).
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- SimpleLogin's forwarding page (Halkyon Learn's ADR 0020; `addSimpleLoginCallbackRoute`,
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on the register, on halkyon_oidc's `addOidcCallbackForwarding`, ADR 0023):
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`/simplelogin-callback`, the one address the instance's SimpleLogin
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@ -198,7 +205,8 @@ Built on the three parts above, on the register (members forward every step thro
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- **Tables** (`serverOnly`, each row deleted with its person by `deletePerson`):
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`account_password` (one per account: Argon2id's salt and costs, SRP's verifier padded
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to N, the public keys, the private keys wrapped under the password and under the
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to N, or for an account that signs in with SimpleLogin the password's proof key in its
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place, the public keys, the private keys wrapped under the password and under the
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recovery phrase), `totp_authenticator` (the secret sealed with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under
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a key derived from `totpKey`, bound to the row's account and ID; `confirmedAt`;
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`lastStep`), `recovery_code` (keyed hashes), `sign_in_challenge` (a step begun: SRP's b
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