halkyon/deploy/redeploy.sh

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ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
#!/bin/sh
# Deploys learn.halkyon.eu from main. The only command deploy's keys may run: deploy's
# ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the server pins both to this script, CI's from the server itself:
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
#
# restrict,from="127.0.0.1,::1",command="/home/deploy/halkyon-learn/deploy/redeploy.sh" ssh-ed25519 … (CI deploy trigger)
# restrict,command="/home/deploy/halkyon-learn/deploy/redeploy.sh" ssh-ed25519 … (manual deploys)
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
#
# CI passes the commit it has checked. This deploys it only
# - while it is still the tip of main (otherwise the CI run of the newer tip deploys),
# - as a fast-forward of the deployed commit,
# - if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers, as the deployed
# checkout lists them (so no commit can add its own key),
# dumps the database first (the last 3 dumps stay in ~/backups; Train's too where .env
# switches Train on, compose.train.yaml), applies the migrations
# before switching to the new server, starts it once more after a migration (see below),
# and fails unless that server answers afterwards. A failure leaves the checkout at the deployed commit, so
# running the CI job again retries. By hand, with your own key, which passes the commit as CI does:
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
#
# ssh sahaquiel-deploy <commit>
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
set -eu
main() {
commit=${SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:-${1:-}}
case $commit in
'' | *[!0-9a-f]*) fail 'expects the full commit to deploy (40 hex digits)' ;;
esac
[ ${#commit} -eq 40 ] || fail 'expects the full commit to deploy (40 hex digits)'
cd "$HOME/halkyon-learn"
# One deploy at a time.
exec 9>"$HOME/.redeploy.lock"
flock 9
git fetch -q origin main
tip=$(git rev-parse origin/main)
if [ "$tip" != "$commit" ]; then
echo "main is at $tip now, not $commit: the CI run of $tip deploys that."
return 0
fi
deployed=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
if [ "$deployed" = "$commit" ]; then
echo "$commit is deployed already."
return 0
fi
git merge-base --is-ancestor "$deployed" "$commit" ||
fail "$commit is no fast-forward of the deployed $deployed"
unsigned=$(git log --format='%H %G? %GP' "$deployed..$commit" |
while read -r each status key; do
case $status in
# G: good signature; U: good, by a key deploy's keyring doesn't vouch for
# (the list below does the vouching).
G | U) [ -n "$key" ] && grep -qx "$key" deploy/allowed-signers && continue ;;
esac
echo "$each"
done)
[ -z "$unsigned" ] || fail "not signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers: $unsigned"
echo "Deploying $commit (was $deployed)."
git merge -q --ff-only "$commit"
trap back_out EXIT
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
cd deploy
# Train's server, where .env switches it on (compose.train.yaml): built, dumped,
# migrated and waited for as Learn's.
train=
if docker compose config --services | grep -qx train-server; then
train=yes
fi
# Build while the running server keeps serving; then dump, migrate, switch.
docker compose build -q server dictionaries
if [ -n "$train" ]; then
docker compose build -q train-server brouter
fi
# Train's own map, where .env switches it on (compose.maps.yaml).
if docker compose config --services | grep -qx map-tiles; then
docker compose build -q map-tiles
fi
# Train's place search, where .env switches it on (compose.search.yaml).
if docker compose config --services | grep -qx photon; then
docker compose build -q photon
fi
dump halkyon_learn
if [ -n "$train" ]; then
dump halkyon_train
fi
# Migrations as a run of their own, before the switch: Serverpod's maintenance role
# applies them and exits with 0 only if that worked. Each migration is one
# transaction, so a failing one stops the deploy here and the running server keeps
# serving the schema it knows. (Until the switch, the old server serves the new
# schema; migrations that only add, as they should, keep that harmless.)
docker compose run --rm --no-deps -e role=maintenance server --apply-migrations
if [ -n "$train" ]; then
docker compose run --rm --no-deps -e role=maintenance train-server --apply-migrations
fi
switched=yes
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
docker compose up -d --remove-orphans
# Caddy reads its Caddyfile when it starts, and `up` doesn't restart it for a
# changed file it mounts. Nor would `caddy reload` see the change: Docker
# mounts a single file by its inode, and git writes a changed file anew, so
# the container keeps the old one (found 2026-10-10). A changed Caddyfile, or a
# sidecar's site, therefore recreates the container, which mounts the new file; the
# certificates are in a volume, and the instance is away for seconds.
if ! git diff --quiet "$deployed" "$commit" -- Caddyfile 'sidecars/*.caddy'; then
docker compose up -d --force-recreate --no-deps caddy
fi
wait_until_answering server
if [ -n "$train" ]; then
wait_until_answering train-server
fi
# After a migration the new server is started once more. The sync engine
# (serverpod_offline_sync v0.0.10) reconciles its registry of synced tables as a
# server first uses the database; when a migration changed a synced table, that
# changes the registry, and the server then rebuilds every space's projections in
# every session until it stops (issue #150): after v0.13.0's deploy every request
# took a minute or two, and syncs failed, until the server was restarted
# (2026-10-13). The maintenance run doesn't spare it. Started again, the server
# finds the registry as the first start left it.
if ! git diff --quiet "$deployed" "$commit" -- ../apps/learn/halkyon_learn_server/migrations; then
docker compose restart server
wait_until_answering server
fi
# Train's server too: it syncs through the same engine.
if [ -n "$train" ] &&
! git diff --quiet "$deployed" "$commit" -- ../apps/train/halkyon_train_server/migrations; then
docker compose restart train-server
wait_until_answering train-server
fi
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
trap - EXIT
docker image prune -f >/dev/null
echo "Deployed $commit."
}
# Dumps the database $1 (halkyon_learn, halkyon_train), as it is before the new server
# applies its migrations; as the instance's superuser, halkyon_learn.
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
dump() {
mkdir -p "$HOME/backups"
file="$HOME/backups/$1-$(git rev-parse --short "$deployed")-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ).dump"
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
(
umask 077
docker compose exec -T postgres pg_dump -U halkyon_learn -Fc "$1" >"$file"
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
)
echo "Database dumped to $file ($(du -h "$file" | cut -f1))."
# Only the newest 3 (decided 2026-10-02): they are the deploys' way back, not backups;
# those go off-site. Every file people keep is in each of them, so fewer leave room.
# (ls is safe here: the names are ours, letters, digits and dashes.)
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
# shellcheck disable=SC2012
ls -1t "$HOME"/backups/"$1"-*.dump | tail -n +4 | xargs -r rm --
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
}
# Waits up to a minute for the new server $1 (server, train-server) to answer inside the
# stack's network.
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
wait_until_answering() {
tries=0
while [ $tries -lt 30 ]; do
if docker compose exec -T caddy wget -q -O /dev/null "http://$1:8080/" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "The $1 answers."
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
return 0
fi
tries=$((tries + 1))
sleep 2
done
docker compose logs --tail 40 "$1" >&2
fail "the $1 doesn't answer a minute after the switch"
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
}
# A failed deploy puts the checkout back at the deployed commit, so running the CI job
# again retries. Failing after the switch, it also brings the containers back as that
# commit has them (found 2026-10-14: Caddy couldn't start on the new network, and the
# instance stayed down until they were brought back by hand), on the new images, which
# fit the database the migrations have changed. Before the switch, the running
# containers were never touched.
back_out() {
cd "$HOME/halkyon-learn"
git reset -q --hard "$deployed"
echo "The checkout is back at $deployed." >&2
if [ "${switched:-}" = yes ]; then
(cd deploy && docker compose up -d --remove-orphans) >&2 &&
echo "The containers are back as $deployed has them." >&2
fi
}
ci: check every push on sahaquiel and deploy a green main Pushes to main were deployed by hand. Now Forgejo Actions runs tool/check.sh on every push, and a green main deploys learn.halkyon.eu by itself. The runner (forgejo-runner v13.1.0) runs on sahaquiel as the unprivileged user `runner`, with jobs directly on the host: containers would take Docker access, which is root on the production server, and Forgejo warns that host jobs have no isolation from the runner's user. So its systemd unit (deploy/runner/forgejo-runner.service) provides it: /home and the Docker socket invisible, Docker's container networks unreachable, no capabilities, two cores and 3 GB at most, lowest priority. It is registered to this repository only, with the UUID and token of Forgejo's "Create new runner" (the old `register` is deprecated); the token reaches it as a systemd credential. The configuration (deploy/runner/config.yml) was dry-run against v13.1.0, the unit rates 1.8 in `systemd-analyze security`. CI runs on pushes only: a pull request from a fork would run its code on the production server. The deploy job calls deploy/redeploy.sh as `deploy`, through a key that authorized_keys pins to that script and to connections from sahaquiel itself. The script deploys the commit CI checked while it is still main's tip, as a fast-forward, only if every new commit is signed by a key in deploy/allowed-signers (as the deployed checkout lists them), after dumping the database (the last ten are kept), and fails unless the server answers afterwards; a failure puts the checkout back. Tested against the local stack: refusals of a malformed argument, a stale commit, a forged unsigned commit and a non-fast-forward, a real deploy with its dump, a repeat, and a failed build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-09-30 21:49:04 +02:00
fail() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
# All of the above is read before anything runs, so the script can update its own file.
main "$@"
exit