2026-10-19 20:08:27 +02:00
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### AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED DO NOT MODIFY
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###
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### This file is generated by Serverpod when creating a migration, do not modify it
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### manually. If a collision is detected in this file when doing a code merge, resolve
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### the conflict by removing and recreating the conflicting migration.
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feat(todo): the server on halkyon_base
Todo's server includes halkyon_base (ADR 0014), configured for Todo:
its basics say it serves `todo`, sign-in mails name Halkyon Todo, the
source is this repository, minimumAppBuild 1. Authentication through
the module (anonymous, GitHub, email codes, server-side sessions) in
place of the scaffold's email-and-password provider; the module's
pruning scheduled once however often the server starts. The scaffold's
greeting, its Flutter web hosting, cloud storage and Docker files go;
session logs are never persisted. Todo was never deployed, so its
migrations start again with one initial migration. The root's lints
apply, with the four constructor rules off as on Learn's server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-19 21:56:12 +02:00
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20261019193547604
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refactor(profile): handles and profiles move into halkyon_base
People's public profiles are the instance's register's (ADR 0016), so
the module now holds them: the public_profile table (unchanged, so
Learn's migration records versions only; devices get the table empty,
as they hold every module's tables), the profile and profiles
endpoints under `base`, the handle rules, the link checks and the page
at /@handle, whose foot names the app as the host's configuration says
(profilePageNote). Deleting a person deletes their profile in the
module's core.
Hosts read profiles through the module (profileOf, profilesOf,
personWithHandle, fixHandle; saveProfile for their tests), behind an
AccountRegister that is this server's own database for now. Learn's
feedback, discussions and publishing ask it; publishing fixes the
handle just before it writes the release, outside its transaction.
Explore still joins the table in its search, so Learn holds the
register wherever it runs. Learn's app calls the module's endpoints;
a profile not found is ProfileNotFoundException. Todo's database gets
the table too (it was never deployed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-19 22:20:27 +02:00
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20261019201213254-profiles
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2026-10-19 23:10:08 +02:00
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20261019204122341-deletion-notices
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2026-10-20 13:32:21 +02:00
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20261020111950710-passwords
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feat(auth): change the password and the recovery phrase while signed in
ADR 0017, step 3. `password.beginChange` and `password.change` take the
old password's SRP proof and a TOTP or recovery code, and the same keys
wrapped under the new password; a session alone changes nothing, and an
account without a confirmed authenticator is told to set one up first.
`password.setRecoveryKeys` replaces the keys' wrapping under the
recovery phrase for a TOTP code, so a device holding the keys can make
a new phrase.
A change of password ends every other session of the account in every
service of the instance; resets of the password and of the account end
them all. The register ends its own and keeps a notice per member
(`sessions_ended_notice`, a migration that only creates it), told at
once and hourly until it confirms, as deletions are told: it names a
moment, so sessions made since stay, and the session that asked for a
change. A member answering one ends its sessions made before that
moment; a member signing someone in after a reset ends its own first
and makes the new session only once its clock is past the moment.
A reset not due says when it takes effect (`takesEffectAt` on
`PasswordRefusedException`), across members too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 14:53:58 +02:00
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20261020125124942-sessions-ended
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fix(auth)!: the recovery phrase is proved by a key of its own
A key proof was a signature by the account's signing key, which every
signed-in device keeps in its keyring: whoever could read one, with a
code from its authenticator, set a new password without the password or
the phrase (the second reading's H1). The phrase now proves itself with
an Ed25519 key derived from its bits alone (halkyon_keys'
recoveryProofKeysOf, KDF context hlkrprf1, a sibling of the recovery
key), whose public half every setup, new phrase and account reset sends
and the register keeps (account_password.recoveryProofKey); the device
derives the secret half only while the phrase is typed. An account
without one (none exist outside development) proves no phrase until it
sets a new one; decoys check against a decoy proof key alike.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
ALTER TABLE "account_password" ADD COLUMN "recoveryProofKey" bytea;
nullable, so rows made before keep working and no data is touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:03:15 +02:00
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20261020185752014-recovery-proof-key
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fix(auth): codes wait after ten wrong in a row, and the owner is told
Whoever knew the password could guess codes at 10 an hour forever,
unnoticed, each guess checked against every authenticator (the second
reading's M4). Every code an account's second factor refuses after a
right password (sign-in, a phrase's reset, a change) or from a signed-in
device (removing an authenticator, new recovery codes, the code from one
confirmed before) now counts, per account, from every network; after
every tenth in a row no code is taken (codesWait, saying until when), an
hour, then twice as long each time, a day at the most (longestCodeWait,
second_factor_waits.dart): at a day, ten guesses a day still have about a
1 % chance a year against one authenticator, so the first wait mails the
owner that someone knows their password. The instance keeps no address,
so sign-in and the phrase's reset now send the address the device typed
(and its language), used only for that mail after its hash is checked
against the account's. A code accepted clears it all.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "second_factor_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures" bigint NOT NULL, "waits"
bigint NOT NULL, "waitUntil" timestamp, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT
NULL) with a unique index on "authUserId": a new table, nothing
touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 21:47:38 +02:00
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20261020194229631-second-factor-waits
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fix(auth): a session's wrong codes end the session, not the account's codes
Wrong codes for removing an authenticator, new recovery codes or confirming
one counted toward the account's waits (the re-review's third finding): a
stolen session alone, without the password, could keep the owner's codes
waiting for up to a day at a time, renewed without end, holding them out
of signing in and of changing the password, the way to end that session,
and nobody was mailed. Those codes now count per session, where the session
is (the register's own, or a member's, which forwards the code): each try
counted before its code is checked (one statement, so tries sent at once
count each), a code accepted clearing the count, and the tenth wrong in a
row ending the session (sessionEnded; the device says it was signed out).
A try that checked no code (a refusal of something else) is taken back.
The account's waits now count only codes after a right password, and the
per-account ten tries an hour, which a session could fill as well, go.
Migration (module, Learn's and Todo's servers, Learn's device schema):
CREATE TABLE "session_code_failures" ("id" bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
"sessionId" uuid NOT NULL, "authUserId" uuid NOT NULL, "failures"
bigint NOT NULL, "updatedAt" timestamp NOT NULL) with a unique index on
"sessionId": a new table, nothing touched. Its rows go with a code
accepted, with the person, and hourly once their session is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 22:53:20 +02:00
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20261020204619863-session-code-tries
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