halkyon/packages/halkyon_base_server/lib/src/register/account_register.dart

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import 'dart:typed_data';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/generated/protocol.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/halkyon_base.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/accounts_mode.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/local_register.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/remote_register.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_base_server/src/register/sessions_ended.dart';
import 'package:halkyon_oidc_server/oidc.dart';
import 'package:serverpod/serverpod.dart';
/// The instance's register of accounts (ADR 0016): what one person is across
/// every service of the instance, kept by the service its operator names.
/// This server asks it here for everything the register keeps, so the same
/// call works whether this server holds the register itself
/// ([LocalRegister]) or is one of its members.
///
/// A person is named by their account ID, which is their `AuthUser`'s ID in
/// every service of the instance.
abstract interface class AccountRegister {
/// The register [pod] asks: its own database while it holds the register
/// (also unconfigured, as tests of a host's own code run), else the
/// register's server ([RemoteRegister]), which needs the instance's shared
/// secret.
static AccountRegister of(Serverpod pod) =>
_ofPod[pod] ??
switch (HalkyonBase.maybeOf(pod)?.accounts) {
MemberOfRegister(:final register) => RemoteRegister(
register,
secret:
instanceSecretOf(pod) ??
(throw StateError(
'A member of an instance needs its shared secret: set '
'instanceSecret in the passwords (INSTANCE_SECRET).',
)),
),
HoldsRegister() || null => const LocalRegister(),
};
/// Puts [register] in place of the one [pod] asks, or with null the one its
/// configuration names back: tests do.
static void use(Serverpod pod, AccountRegister? register) =>
_ofPod[pod] = register;
static final _ofPod = Expando<AccountRegister>('Account register');
/// [person]'s public profile, as apps see it; null for none.
Future<Profile?> profileOf(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// The public profiles of those of [people] who have one, by person.
Future<Map<UuidValue, Profile>> profilesOf(
Session session,
Set<UuidValue> people,
);
/// The public profile whose handle is [handle], whatever its case; null for
/// none.
Future<Profile?> profileByHandle(Session session, String handle);
/// The person whose handle is [handle], whatever its case; null for none.
/// For a host's own code (who is blocked, who wrote), never for apps:
/// profiles never say whose they are.
Future<UuidValue?> personWithHandle(Session session, String handle);
/// Saves [person]'s public profile, making it if they have none. Throws
/// `ProfileRefusedException` when it can't be saved (see
/// `ProfileRefusal`): a handle someone else has, whatever its case, or a
/// new handle once theirs is fixed.
Future<Profile> saveProfile(
Session session,
UuidValue person, {
required String handle,
required String displayName,
required String bio,
required List<String> links,
});
/// Why [handle] couldn't be [person]'s, as saving it would refuse it; null
/// when it can.
Future<ProfileRefusal?> checkHandle(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
String handle,
);
/// Checks which of [person]'s links' pages link back to their profile's
/// page with `rel="me"`, and keeps the answer; at most 10 times an hour.
/// Throws `ProfileNotFoundException` while they have no profile.
Future<Profile> checkLinks(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Shows [png] as [person]'s avatar: a PNG of at most 1 MB. Throws
/// `ProfileRefusedException` for anything else, and
/// `ProfileNotFoundException` while they have no profile.
Future<Profile> setAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person, ByteData png);
/// Shows no avatar for [person] any more. Throws
/// `ProfileNotFoundException` while they have no profile.
Future<Profile> removeAvatar(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Removes [person]'s public profile, freeing its handle; nothing when they
/// have none. Throws `ProfileRefusedException` once their handle is fixed.
Future<void> removeProfile(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Fixes [person]'s handle, as others now refer to it (Halkyon Learn: their
/// first publish); nothing when it is fixed already or they have no
/// profile.
Future<void> fixHandle(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Whether people can sign in with an email address: the register mails
/// the codes.
Future<bool> emailSignInOffered(Session session);
/// Mails a code for [purpose] to [address] in [language], the codes asked
/// for from [network] counted; the request it answers. Refusals as
/// `sendSignInCode`'s.
Future<UuidValue> sendSignInCode(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String language,
required EmailCodePurpose purpose,
required String network,
});
/// Links the GitHub account [gitHubUserId] to [person] (an account of the
/// register, under their ID). Refusals as `linkGitHubAccount`'s.
Future<void> linkGitHub(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required String gitHubUserId,
});
/// The account that signs in with the GitHub account [gitHubUserId]; null
/// for none.
Future<UuidValue?> accountWithGitHub(Session session, String gitHubUserId);
/// Whether people sign in with SimpleLogin (ADR 0020): the register has
/// the instance's SimpleLogin app, and its operator offers it.
Future<bool> simpleLoginOffered(Session session);
/// Begins a SimpleLogin sign-in for the app and platform [marker] names,
/// by [caller] if signed in, the sign-ins begun from [network] counted.
/// Refusals as `beginSimpleLogin`'s.
Future<OidcStart> beginSimpleLogin(
Session session, {
required String marker,
UuidValue? caller,
required String network,
});
/// Ends the SimpleLogin sign-in [attempt] with SimpleLogin's [code], as
/// [caller] (null signed out) began it: how it ended, the account signed
/// in to, which the member issues its own session for. Refusals as
/// `completeSimpleLogin`'s.
Future<SimpleLoginProof> completeSimpleLogin(
Session session, {
required UuidValue attempt,
required String code,
UuidValue? caller,
});
feat(base): SimpleLogin accounts' keys without SRP, signing up in one call (ADR 0020, step 3) An account that signs in with SimpleLogin keeps its keys under a password that signs nobody in (D19): `account_password` keeps the password's own proof key (Ed25519, `passwordProofKey`) in place of SRP's verifier, which becomes nullable. The migration adds the column and drops the NOT NULL, nothing else. - `simpleLogin.signUp(attempt, handle, setup)`: someone new whose identity waits under the attempt gets, in one transaction, an account (identified), the link, a profile with the handle and the keys; then a session (D18). Refused, the identity still waiting, for a setup out of range and a handle refused as saving a profile refuses it. - `simpleLogin.checkHandle(attempt, handle)`: whether someone new could take a handle, at most 30 an hour per attempt and 60 per network. - `simpleLogin.complete` says, for an account, whether it has its keys and its handle, and keeps the sign-in ten minutes under its attempt, the account as its caller: D20's confirmation for the changes to come. - `keys.begin`, `keys.unlock`: the keys for a signed-in device once the password is proven with its proof key, for a nonce, bound to the base URL the device addressed; wrong proofs counted per session as ADR 0017's. - An authenticator is enrolled only for a password that signs in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the four new operations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 21:49:44 +02:00
/// Whether someone new whose SimpleLogin identity waits under [attempt]
/// could take [handle], the checks from [network] counted; null where they
/// could. Refusals as `checkSimpleLoginHandle`'s.
Future<ProfileRefusal?> checkSimpleLoginHandle(
Session session, {
required UuidValue attempt,
required String handle,
required String network,
});
/// Signs up someone new whose SimpleLogin identity waits under [attempt],
/// with [handle] and the keys [setup] describes: the new account's ID,
/// which the member issues its own session for. Refusals as
/// `signUpWithSimpleLogin`'s.
Future<UuidValue> signUpWithSimpleLogin(
Session session, {
required UuidValue attempt,
required String handle,
required KeysSetup setup,
});
feat(base): mending a broken SimpleLogin link with the handle and the recovery phrase (ADR 0020, D7) Someone whose SimpleLogin identity is new to the register but who has an account ("I already have one") names their handle and proves the account's recovery phrase; the new identity takes the old one's place. - `simpleLogin.beginMend(attempt, handle)`: the keys wrapped under the phrase's key, the public keys and a nonce, for the account with that handle (whatever its case). Only an account with keys and a SimpleLogin identity is mended, a link it had, as nobody adds SimpleLogin signed out (D10); a handle nobody has, or any other account's, gets a decoy from `signInDecoyKey`, the same each time. At most 10 an hour per handle and 30 per network. - `simpleLogin.mend(attempt, proof)`: the phrase's proof for `mendLink`, binding the attempt (`mendLinkDigest`, on both sides), so a proof relayed from another sign-in links nobody's identity but the device's own; checked for the waiting identity first, which leaves the proof unspent. Every session of the account ends, in every service, and the sign-in stands ten minutes for a change, such as a lost password. - SimpleLogin needs `SIGN_IN_DECOY_KEY` alone of ADR 0017's three keys (`signInDecoyKeyOf`); `addInstanceRoutes` stops a server with a SimpleLogin app and without it (`checkSimpleLoginMending`). - Members ask the register for both; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 22:26:58 +02:00
/// The first step of mending the SimpleLogin link of the account with
/// [handle] for someone whose identity waits under [attempt], the begins
/// from [network] counted. Refusals as `beginSimpleLoginMend`'s.
Future<KeyProofChallenge> beginSimpleLoginMend(
Session session, {
required UuidValue attempt,
required String handle,
required String network,
});
/// Mends the SimpleLogin link of the account whose recovery phrase
/// [proof] proved, with the identity waiting under [attempt]: the account
/// signed in to, which the member issues its own session for, after
/// [SimpleLoginProof.endedBefore]. Refusals as `mendSimpleLogin`'s.
Future<SimpleLoginProof> mendSimpleLogin(
Session session, {
required UuidValue attempt,
required KeysProof proof,
});
feat(base): SimpleLogin accounts' keys without SRP, signing up in one call (ADR 0020, step 3) An account that signs in with SimpleLogin keeps its keys under a password that signs nobody in (D19): `account_password` keeps the password's own proof key (Ed25519, `passwordProofKey`) in place of SRP's verifier, which becomes nullable. The migration adds the column and drops the NOT NULL, nothing else. - `simpleLogin.signUp(attempt, handle, setup)`: someone new whose identity waits under the attempt gets, in one transaction, an account (identified), the link, a profile with the handle and the keys; then a session (D18). Refused, the identity still waiting, for a setup out of range and a handle refused as saving a profile refuses it. - `simpleLogin.checkHandle(attempt, handle)`: whether someone new could take a handle, at most 30 an hour per attempt and 60 per network. - `simpleLogin.complete` says, for an account, whether it has its keys and its handle, and keeps the sign-in ten minutes under its attempt, the account as its caller: D20's confirmation for the changes to come. - `keys.begin`, `keys.unlock`: the keys for a signed-in device once the password is proven with its proof key, for a nonce, bound to the base URL the device addressed; wrong proofs counted per session as ADR 0017's. - An authenticator is enrolled only for a password that signs in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the four new operations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 21:49:44 +02:00
/// The first step of [person] proving their password with its proof key
/// (an account that signs in with SimpleLogin). Refusals as
/// `beginPasswordKeyProof`'s.
Future<KeysChallenge> beginPasswordKeyProof(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
);
/// [person]'s keys for a device, once [proof] proved their password for
/// it. Refusals as `unlockKeys`'s.
Future<DeviceKeys> unlockKeys(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
KeysProof proof,
);
feat(base): the changes of SimpleLogin accounts' keys, each with the password and a fresh sign-in (ADR 0020, D20) Every change takes the password's proof by its own proof key (the recovery phrase's for a lost password) and a SimpleLogin sign-in of the last ten minutes on the device (`KeysOwnerProof`, its attempt), as ADR 0017's take the password and a code. The sign-in is checked before the proof and taken with the change, so a wrong proof leaves it standing and each sign-in serves one change. - `keys.set(attempt, setup, handle?)`: the first keys of an account that SimpleLogin was added to (anonymous before, or signing in with GitHub or a code), with the handle where it has none; the sign-in alone, as there is no password to prove yet. - `keys.changePassword`, `keys.beginPhrase` and `keys.resetPassword` (a lost password, with the phrase): every other session ends, in every service, as ADR 0017's change has it. - `keys.setRecoveryKeys`: a new phrase. - `account.delete(keysProof)`: an account without SRP's verifier deletes itself with the proof and the sign-in; `requireOwnerToDelete` no longer asks such an account for SRP. - `newKeysPasswordDigest` on both sides, held to each other by a test; a challenge purpose of its own for the phrase's proof while signed in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the five new operations and the deletion's proof. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 22:11:49 +02:00
/// Gives [person], an account without keys that SimpleLogin was added to,
/// the keys [setup] describes and [handle] where it has none, with their
/// SimpleLogin sign-in under [attempt]. Refusals as `setFirstKeys`'.
Future<void> setFirstKeys(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required UuidValue attempt,
required KeysSetup setup,
String? handle,
});
/// The first step of [person] proving their recovery phrase, signed in,
/// for a lost password (an account that signs in with SimpleLogin).
/// Refusals as `beginPhraseKeyProof`'s.
Future<KeyProofChallenge> beginPhraseKeyProof(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
);
/// Changes [person]'s password for their keys to [password], with
/// [proof]: every other session ends but [keepSession], in every service.
/// Refusals as `changeKeysPassword`'s.
Future<void> changeKeysPassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required KeysOwnerProof proof,
required KeysPassword password,
UuidValue? keepSession,
});
/// Sets [person]'s new [password] for their keys with the recovery
/// phrase's [proof], as [changeKeysPassword] does. Refusals as
/// `resetKeysPassword`'s.
Future<void> resetKeysPassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required KeysOwnerProof proof,
required KeysPassword password,
UuidValue? keepSession,
});
/// Replaces [person]'s recovery phrase's wrapping and proof key, with
/// [proof]. Refusals as `setKeysRecovery`'.
Future<void> setKeysRecovery(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required KeysOwnerProof proof,
required WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
required ByteData recoveryProofKey,
});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
/// How [person] signs in: with GitHub, an email address, a password and
/// whether an authenticator is confirmed; and their warning that a session
/// was ended for its wrong proofs, if any.
Future<SignInWays> signInWaysOf(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Warns [person] that a session of theirs was ended for ten wrong proofs
/// in a row (ADR 0017, the fourth reading), as of now: a member tells it
/// of its own sessions.
Future<void> noteSessionEndedForProofs(Session session, UuidValue person);
/// Dismisses [person]'s warning that a session was ended for its proofs.
Future<void> dismissSessionEndedWarning(
Session session,
UuidValue person, {
required DateTime? sessionMadeAt,
});
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
/// Whether people sign in with a password and TOTP (ADR 0017): the
/// register holds the keys it needs.
Future<bool> passwordSignInOffered(Session session);
/// Gives [person] the password [setup] describes, with the address [code]
/// proves for [request] (their own where they have one), and for one who
/// signs in with GitHub alone a GitHub sign-in of theirs made recently
/// ([freshGitHubSignIn], of the session asking); someone with neither
/// only while anonymous where the session lives ([anonymousHere]).
/// Replacing a setup never finished ends every other session of the
/// account but [keepSession]. Refusals as `setPassword`'s.
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Future<void> setPassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required PasswordSetup setup,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
bool freshGitHubSignIn = false,
bool anonymousHere = false,
UuidValue? keepSession,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// A password sign-in's first step for [address], the sign-ins begun from
/// [network] counted. Refusals as `beginPasswordSignIn`'s.
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordSignIn(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String network,
});
/// A password sign-in's second step: the account it proved, for the
/// caller's session; a [code] mailed for [request] in place of the second
/// factor of a setup never finished. Refusals as
/// `completePasswordSignIn`'s.
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Future<PasswordProof> completePasswordSignIn(
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData clientValue,
required ByteData clientProof,
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
required String instanceUrl,
required String address,
required String language,
});
/// Signs up with the address [code] proves for [request] and the password
/// [setup] describes: the account, new or one with the address and no
/// password, for the caller's session. Refusals as `signUpWithCode`'s.
Future<UuidValue> signUpWithCode(
Session session, {
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
required PasswordSetup setup,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// A new authenticator of [person]. Refusals as `enrolAuthenticator`'s.
Future<AuthenticatorEnrolment> enrolAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required String name,
required String label,
});
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
/// Confirms [person]'s [authenticator], with the owner's [proof] where
/// the account has one confirmed already; the first one's recovery codes.
/// Refusals as `confirmAuthenticator`'s.
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Future<List<String>> confirmAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required UuidValue authenticator,
required String code,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
OwnerProof? proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// [person]'s authenticators, the oldest first.
Future<List<Authenticator>> authenticatorsOf(
Session session,
UuidValue person,
);
/// Removes [person]'s [authenticator]. Refusals as
/// `removeAuthenticator`'s.
Future<void> removeAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required UuidValue authenticator,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
OwnerProof? proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
/// New recovery codes for [person], with the owner's [proof]. Refusals as
/// `newRecoveryCodes`'.
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Future<List<String>> newRecoveryCodes(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// Asks for the reset of a lost authenticator. Refusals as
/// `resetAuthenticator`'s.
Future<ResetPending> resetAuthenticator(
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData clientValue,
required ByteData clientProof,
required String address,
required String language,
UuidValue? request,
String? code,
UuidValue? keyChallenge,
ByteData? signature,
required String instanceUrl,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// The first step of proving the recovery phrase for [address], the
/// proofs begun from [network] counted. Refusals as `beginKeyProof`'s.
Future<KeyProofChallenge> beginKeyProof(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String network,
});
/// Sets a new password with the recovery phrase's proof; the account, for
/// the caller's session made after its sessions ended. Refusals as
/// `resetPasswordWithPhrase`'s.
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> resetPasswordWithPhrase(
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Session session, {
required UuidValue challenge,
required ByteData signature,
required NewPassword password,
String? totpCode,
String? recoveryCode,
required String instanceUrl,
required String address,
required String language,
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
});
/// Asks for the reset of a whole account. Refusals as
/// `startAccountReset`'s.
Future<ResetPending> startAccountReset(
Session session, {
required String address,
required String language,
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
});
/// Carries out the reset of a whole account; the account, for the
/// caller's session made after its sessions ended. Refusals as
/// `completeAccountReset`'s.
Future<AccountSessionsEnded> completeAccountReset(
feat(auth): a password with TOTP on the register, and resets The register's side of signing in with an address, a password that never leaves the device (SRP-6a) and a code from an authenticator (ADR 0017), with members forwarding every step through AccountRegister: - password.set: salt, Argon2id's costs, SRP's verifier, the public keys and the private keys wrapped twice, all made on the device; with the address a mailed code proves, an anonymous person becomes identified under their ID. It signs in once an authenticator is confirmed. - passwordSignIn.begin and complete: SRP's two steps with a TOTP or recovery code. An address nobody has is answered from a decoy key as an account would be; every wrong credential is refused alike. - authenticator: secrets sealed under totpKey (XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to their row), each code accepted once, ten recovery codes with the first, the last one kept. - accountRecovery: a lost authenticator reset 72 hours after the password and a mailed code or the recovery phrase ask, a lost password set anew with the phrase's signature, or the account reset with new keys 72 hours after a mailed code asks; a mail at each start, a sign-in calling it off. - An account with a password no longer signs in by a mailed code or GitHub; no new GitHub account is linked where passwords are offered, and from GITHUB_SIGN_IN_ENDS GitHub signs nobody in and its IDs go. Five tables, added by the module's migration; deletePerson deletes their rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-20 13:32:12 +02:00
Session session, {
required String address,
required UuidValue request,
required String code,
required PasswordSetup setup,
});
/// The first step of [person] proving their password to change it.
/// Refusals as `beginPasswordChange`'s.
Future<PasswordChallenge> beginPasswordChange(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
});
/// Changes [person]'s password, ending their sessions everywhere but
/// [keepSession]. Refusals as `changePassword`'s.
Future<void> changePassword(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
required NewPassword password,
UuidValue? keepSession,
});
/// Calls off every reset of [person]'s account waiting, with the owner's
/// [proof] (ADR 0017, the full reading's H1). Refusals as
/// `callOffResets`'.
Future<void> callOffResets(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
required OwnerProof proof,
});
/// Replaces the wrapping of [person]'s keys under their recovery phrase
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
/// and the phrase's proof key, with the owner's [proof]. Refusals as
/// `setRecoveryKeys`'.
Future<void> setRecoveryKeys(
Session session, {
required UuidValue person,
fix(auth)!: a session alone never gets a code checked The third reading found a stolen session guessing TOTP codes without end: nine wrong codes for new recovery codes, then removing an unconfirmed authenticator of its own, a success that cleared the session's count. As Proton has it, every signed-in change of how an account is secured now takes the owner's proof (OwnerProof): the password's SRP proof for a change's challenge and a TOTP or recovery code. Adding an authenticator once one is confirmed, removing a confirmed one, new recovery codes, a new phrase, a new password and deleting take it; only the first authenticator is confirmed with its own code alone, and removing an unconfirmed one takes nothing. A proof given where none is taken is refused, and a confirmed authenticator's code is never checked for a session alone, so no success passes a proof unchecked. A session's proofs count for it alone, before they are checked, cleared only by one accepted; the tenth wrong in a row ends the session. They never count toward the account's waits nor wait for them, so whoever knows the password no longer holds a signed-in owner out of changing it (the second finding), and a new password forgets those waits. Beginning a change counts nothing against the account (the third finding): 30 an hour per session, holding back that session alone. Deleting takes a TOTP code wherever an authenticator is confirmed, a code by mail where no second factor works (the fourth finding), which SignInWays now tells (secondFactorWorks). Signed-in calls no longer take the address: nothing there mails. wrongExistingCode goes, a wrong existing code being a wrong proof. The app follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 10:33:25 +02:00
required OwnerProof proof,
required WrappedKeys recoveryKeys,
required ByteData recoveryProofKey,
});
/// Deletes the account [person] with everything the register's server has
/// of them, and has every member of the instance delete theirs: one with a
feat(base): the changes of SimpleLogin accounts' keys, each with the password and a fresh sign-in (ADR 0020, D20) Every change takes the password's proof by its own proof key (the recovery phrase's for a lost password) and a SimpleLogin sign-in of the last ten minutes on the device (`KeysOwnerProof`, its attempt), as ADR 0017's take the password and a code. The sign-in is checked before the proof and taken with the change, so a wrong proof leaves it standing and each sign-in serves one change. - `keys.set(attempt, setup, handle?)`: the first keys of an account that SimpleLogin was added to (anonymous before, or signing in with GitHub or a code), with the handle where it has none; the sign-in alone, as there is no password to prove yet. - `keys.changePassword`, `keys.beginPhrase` and `keys.resetPassword` (a lost password, with the phrase): every other session ends, in every service, as ADR 0017's change has it. - `keys.setRecoveryKeys`: a new phrase. - `account.delete(keysProof)`: an account without SRP's verifier deletes itself with the proof and the sign-in; `requireOwnerToDelete` no longer asks such an account for SRP. - `newKeysPasswordDigest` on both sides, held to each other by a test; a challenge purpose of its own for the phrase's proof while signed in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the five new operations and the deletion's proof. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 22:11:49 +02:00
/// password only with [proof], one that signs in with SimpleLogin only
/// with [keysProof] (`requireOwnerToDelete`).
Future<void> deleteAccount(
Session session,
UuidValue person, {
DeletionProof? proof,
feat(base): the changes of SimpleLogin accounts' keys, each with the password and a fresh sign-in (ADR 0020, D20) Every change takes the password's proof by its own proof key (the recovery phrase's for a lost password) and a SimpleLogin sign-in of the last ten minutes on the device (`KeysOwnerProof`, its attempt), as ADR 0017's take the password and a code. The sign-in is checked before the proof and taken with the change, so a wrong proof leaves it standing and each sign-in serves one change. - `keys.set(attempt, setup, handle?)`: the first keys of an account that SimpleLogin was added to (anonymous before, or signing in with GitHub or a code), with the handle where it has none; the sign-in alone, as there is no password to prove yet. - `keys.changePassword`, `keys.beginPhrase` and `keys.resetPassword` (a lost password, with the phrase): every other session ends, in every service, as ADR 0017's change has it. - `keys.setRecoveryKeys`: a new phrase. - `account.delete(keysProof)`: an account without SRP's verifier deletes itself with the proof and the sign-in; `requireOwnerToDelete` no longer asks such an account for SRP. - `newKeysPasswordDigest` on both sides, held to each other by a test; a challenge purpose of its own for the phrase's proof while signed in. - Members ask the register for all of it; `RemoteRegister` and the instance API carry the five new operations and the deletion's proof. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-23 22:11:49 +02:00
KeysOwnerProof? keysProof,
});
/// Those of [people] that are accounts of the register.
Future<Set<UuidValue>> knownAccounts(
Session session,
Set<UuidValue> people,
);
}