2026-09-16 19:24:59 +02:00
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
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<plist version="1.0">
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<dict>
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<key>com.apple.security.app-sandbox</key>
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<true/>
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fix(app): a saved secret is 0600 on Apple's Arm too, and macOS saves at all
The short reading's H1: open(2) takes its mode among variable arguments,
which Apple's Arm passes on the stack, so bound with three fixed ones it
read the mode from whatever the stack held: a phrase or recovery codes
saved on an Apple silicon Mac could be readable by everyone. It is bound
as variadic now (VarArgs), and every file written is made 0600 through its
descriptor (fchmod), checked.
M1: macOS's sandbox lets an app reach the file the person chose and
nothing beside it, so the file made beside it was refused and nothing
could be saved; Learn's sandbox allowed reading chosen files alone, so its
exports never saved on macOS either. There, writePrivately now writes the
chosen file itself (decided by the developer on 21 Oct): opened without
following a link or waiting on a pipe and without truncating, refused with
nothing written unless fstat finds a file of the own user's, then made
0600 and emptied. Both apps' entitlements grant reading and writing the
files the person chooses. Linux keeps the new file renamed over it.
The reading's nits: the buffer is wiped whatever happens, an interrupted
call is made again (EINTR), the file made beside a chosen one is named
apart from it so a name as long as a folder takes still saves, the folder
is flushed after the rename, and Linux reads a file's type and owner with
statx, alike on every architecture, where __lxstat's version differed
(riscv64's was wrong). The test of another user's file is skipped as root.
The in-place path is tested on Linux; none of it has run on a Mac.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-21 17:57:44 +02:00
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<key>com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write</key>
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Import Anki decks with their files and history
Files in content: the person's images and sounds as asset rows synced like
all content, their files kept by hash on each device, uploaded after each
sync, downloaded on demand and checked against their hash
(core/asset/AssetRepository). Rich text names them as asset:<id> URLs, in
the editor's image block and an audio block of ours; any other URL is never
fetched. Sounds play through audioplayers, one at a time. Content holding
only an image or a sound isn't blank, and lists show it as such.
The Anki import ("Import from Anki" under Add material): .apkg and .colpkg
packages in all three formats Anki has written, read on an isolate of their
own. Modern packages compress everything with zstd in frames that don't
record their size, which pure_zstd v1.0.0 refuses; our fork decodes them.
Fields become rich text by a converter of our own (lines, lists, formatting,
images, sounds, cloze deletions hidden on the front). One card per note,
the files first, studysets as chosen (flatten, sub-studysets, or tags by
subdeck), the notes' tags, and, if wanted, the review history, which FSRS
replays: the first template's reviews to the card's schedule, a reversed
note type's second to the reverse one.
Imported cards say where they came from in their first revision (card
schema 3); the dashboard doesn't count them as written. The test fixtures
are exported by Anki itself (tool/anki/make_fixtures.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-10-02 04:52:02 +02:00
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<true/>
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2026-09-16 19:24:59 +02:00
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<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key>
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<true/>
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<key>com.apple.security.network.client</key>
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<true/>
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<key>com.apple.security.network.server</key>
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<true/>
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feat(learn): the assistant's field laid out as Claude's, with files attached and questions spoken, and no Check (ADR 0021, D67)
The question's text stands above its buttons: + attaching files, who
answers as a chip (Effort now a submenu of it), the conversations kept,
and the microphone while nothing is written, which gives way to the
button sending. What goes along is one row above the text, opening a
sheet with how far the assistant looks and the parts to send. A
conversation's follow-up has the same + and microphone.
Files are read on the device: an image goes as itself to an assistant
that reads images, a PDF as its pages' text, a text file as its text,
each cut at 20,000 characters and labelled by its name after the
question.
Voice is the device's own speech recognition (speech_to_text: Android,
Apple, Windows; none on Linux), in the app's language, the microphone
asked for once tapped. The privacy page says that Android's recogniser
may send the sound to Google or the phone's maker.
The field's Check goes, with its LanguageTool sheet (amending ADR 0024);
the editors' underlining and Why? stay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Tizian 「ティツィアーン」 <raisondetredev@pm.me>
2026-11-02 05:50:36 +01:00
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<key>com.apple.security.device.audio-input</key>
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<true/>
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2026-09-16 19:24:59 +02:00
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</dict>
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</plist>
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